

# THE UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS

A Publication of the Florida Bar  
Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section





# The Cover

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*The underlying photograph included on the cover page is provided courtesy of the State Archives of Florida.*

*The description below was initially published in the Florida Bar Journal, March 1959 Supplement, Pages 208, 213*

This 140-year-old water color sketch which accompanied a land survey made in Florida during the second Spanish occupation, 1783-1821, remains fresh and unspoiled. The original illustrated survey, prepared by a Spanish surveyor named Roberto McHardy, is on file in the office of Field Note Division, Department of Agriculture, in the Capitol at Tallahassee. A glance at the history of the period reveals that the origin of disagreement of title standards is not recent. The dossier containing McHardy's survey of Geronimo Alvarez' land was assembled in connection with Alvarez confirming this Spanish land grant before the Board of Commissioners — East Florida. This Board was created by act of Congress on May 8, 1822. The act was passed Pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty of February 22, 1819, wherein all Spanish grants of land made prior to January 24, 1818, were to be "ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the said grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the domain of his Catholic Majesty."

The first meeting of the Board was held on August 4, 1823 with the three duly appointed Commissioners, Davis Floyd, William F. Blair and Alexander Hamilton. The Board at this initial meeting passed certain regulations in an effort to standardize the procedures of confirming Spanish land grants and the titles to lands in East Florida. One of the regulations read as follows:

"All persons claiming title to lands under any patent grant, concession or order of survey, will make a brief statement by Memorial setting forth the situation, boundaries and if possible, the deraignment of title, to the Lands claimed, and by whom granted, and by what authority, and whether the same be the whole or part of the original grant."

It appears in the minutes of this first meeting of the Board that Alexander Hamilton dissented to the resolution that claimants be not required to produce plan title papers translated into the English language, but in all cases be -permitted to file the original Spanish documents.

Among the members of this first Board of Commissioners there arose in 1824 such a "divergence of opinion between Hamilton and the other Commissioners as to procedure that Hamilton refused to participate in the sessions and bombarded President Monroe, Secretary of Treasury Crawford, Secretary of State Adams, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands with serious charges against his colleagues and those in charge of Public Archives."<sup>1</sup> Hamilton resigned on March 31, 1824.

The land surveyed by McHardy consisted of a 500-acre tract "on the west side of Hillsborough River" and "located south of 210 acres situated on Gabardy's Canal, granted to Rafael Andrew and confirmed to Jose Sanchez." This property was granted to one Geronimo Alvarez by the Spanish territorial governor, Jose Coppinger, who was the last of the territorial governors of East Florida during the second Spanish occupation and prior to Spain's ceding of the Floridas to the United States by treaty ratified and proclaimed February 22, 1821. It is likely that the grant to Alvarez, an "ensign of the Irish

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<sup>1</sup> (G & S, V 750) (*Spanish Land Grants in Florida*, Vol. 2, page 43).

company of Militia of this city" (St. Augustine) was based on the Spanish royal order of 1815 for patriotic service. "The royal order of 1815 permitting grants for patriotic services was supposed to have been made in response to Governor Kindelan's recommendation two years earlier. The 'Patriot War' had just ended and the Governor suggested to one Juan Ruiz de Apadoca, Captain-General of Cuba, rewards for the three white militia companies and for the 3rd battalion of Cuba: (1) to each of the militia officers, a royal commission for each grade possible to him as a provincial; and (2) to all soldiers of the militia and to the married officers and soldiers of the 3rd battalion of Cuba, lands in proportion to the size of their families. He admitted that his plan would not, in reality, give them anything which was not already open to them, but he thought that 'public approbation would content the men and stimulate their patriotism'."<sup>2</sup>

Few residents of New Smyrna Beach today realize that the title to a Portion of the lands now occupied by them was initially confirmed through the petitions of Geronimo Alvarez and an artistically inclined Spanish surveyor by the name of Roberto McHardy.

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., page 25.

## PREFACE

The Florida Uniform Title Standards are designed to serve as a reference for some of the more common problems encountered in the examination of titles to real estate in Florida. The purpose of uniform title standards, generally, is to facilitate conveyancing by eliminating needless objections to marketability of title. A title standard may well be described as a voluntary agreement made in advance by members of the Bar on the manner of treating a particular title problem when and if it arises. These standards are interpretations of existing law and practice, and although they are approved by the Real Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar, they do not have the formal approval of any court or legislative body. Nevertheless, if they are generally adhered to, their purpose should be accomplished satisfactorily.

These title standards are intended to be used not only by experienced title attorneys, but also by those with little experience or those whose work may bring them into contact with title examinations less frequently. Accordingly, some of the standards set forth well settled principles of law, while others are statements of generally prevailing practices in areas where the applicable law provides no definitive answers.

Each title standard begins with a statement of the Standard, followed by one or more illustrative Problems, citations to Authorities & References, and in some cases, Comments designed to call attention to related issues and cautionary matters. The Standard itself rather than the Problems or comments, was intended to be the focal point, and primary consideration should be given to it.

The main purpose of the Problems is to give examples of the application of the Standard to representative factual situations, most of which are readily apparent. In some instances the Problems were used as a vehicle to address less obvious issues related to the Standard. The Problems are illustrative only, and were not intended to be all-inclusive.

The Authorities and References were included to indicate the source material in support of the Standard. It was not always possible to find primary authorities directly on point, and therefore in some instances the citations are to references that are merely of persuasive value. Also, citations to secondary authorities were frequently included as a convenience for locating a discussion of the subject matter.

The Comments were designed to call attention to related issues, to raise cautionary notes to be considered in applying the Standard, and in some instances to point out limitations or exceptions with respect to the application of the Standard. Occasionally, the Comments were used to set forth arguments contrary to the position adopted in the Standard. This was done for informational purposes only, and was not intended to detract from the Standard as stated.

Finally, whenever possible, cross-references to other Standards were included so that related issues might more readily be considered.

[see archived version of Preface to the original publication of the Uniform Title Standards, Florida Bar Journal, Supplement March 1959]



## UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS

### Foreword to the 2012 Revisions

At its June 1, 2012 Executive Council meeting, the Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section (“the Section”) approved the “final” revised standard to the Uniform Title Standards, completing the first major update and re-write of the Title Standards since 1981.

The Uniform Title Standards are standards for examining title to real property in Florida with the goal of resolving disagreements among real property attorneys on various types of title defects and their impact on the marketability of the title. Even though fewer attorneys today perform title examinations, the standards still serve as a resource for attorneys representing buyers and sellers in real estate transactions, where contracts typically call for the seller to convey marketable title. The popular FR/BAR Contract for Sale and Purchase has long incorporated the Uniform Title Standards as the “standard” for determining a buyer’s marketable title to the real property. Since its inception in the early 1970’s, the FAR/BAR Contract has provided that “(m)arketable title shall be determined according to applicable standards adopted by authority of The Florida Bar and in accordance with law.”

Of equal significance to all Floridians is the fact that the Florida courts have consulted and cited to the Uniform Title Standards when confronted with title issues covered by the standards. See, e.g., *Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.*, 236 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1970); *City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1970); and *Cunningham v. Haley*, 501 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5<sup>th</sup> DCA 1986). Understandably, the issues in these cases dealt with the proper application of Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act. Most recently, the Fifth District Court of Appeals cited to the Uniform Title Standards in a decision dealing with corporate authority to convey real property. *DGG Development Corp. v. Estate of Capponi*, 983 So. 2d (Fla. 5<sup>th</sup> DCA 2008).

The Uniform Title Standards occupied a central role in the function of the Section when it was created in 1954, becoming the *first* committee established by the Section. In fact, Florida’s first title standards committee existed as a committee of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar (“BOG”) before there was a RPPTL Section. After the Section was created, the BOG effectively ceded responsibility for developing uniform standards to the Section. In 2008-09 the BOG unanimously re-endorsed the Uniform Title Standards as standards of The Florida Bar.

The first known set of published Florida title standards is the set that appeared as a supplement to the March 1959 issue of The Florida Bar Journal. The Committee Chair at that time was David Catsman, who wrote in the Forward to the standards that Florida joined 25 other states in utilizing this method of solving some of the problems involved in real property title transactions.

The next known publication of title standards was in 1975, under the leadership of Sherwood Spencer, who noted that the 1975 update was the work of a task force led by Mandell Glicksberg, Professor of Law at University of Florida School of Law, with the help of a grant from the George B. Carter Foundation. (George B. Carter was a founder of Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, which became Attorneys' Title Insurance, Fund, Inc.) The Uniform Title Standards Committee was then set up as a continuing committee of the Section responsible for updating and revising the Standards. In the following years, revisions to the title standards would be developed under Professor Glicksberg's leadership and would utilize the resources of the University of Florida Law Review. Their work culminated in the third revision of the Uniform Title Standards in 1981 and is the version that is contained in that small blue three-ring binder that the Section used to distribute to new members and which still can be found on many law library shelves.

Since the late 1990's, the members of the Uniform Title Standards Committee, which was renamed the Title Issues and Standards Committee, undertook to research and draft revised standards on their own, with conferencing support provided by the Section. The members of the committee are a broad representation of the title insurance industry as well as attorneys in the private practice of law. The 2012 version of the standards represents the first time the standards exist solely in electronic form. They are published on the home page of the Section's website and are freely available to all visitors to the website at [www.RPPTL.org/](http://www.RPPTL.org/).

Patricia P. Jones  
Chair, Title Issues and Standards Committee  
June 2012

Space does not permit me to personally recognize everyone who contributed to this effort over the years, but I would like to specially recognize the following present and past members of the committee for their hard work and dedication:

Robert Graham  
Christopher Smart  
Gregory Hall  
Karla Staker  
Steve Reynolds  
Jim Russick

[see archived version of Forward to 1981 revision]

[see archived version of Forward to 1975 revision]

[see archived version of Forward to the original publication of the Uniform Title Standards, Florida Bar Journal, March 1959 Supplement]

## **INTRODUCTION TO THE ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THE UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS**

In 2012, the Title Issues and Standards Committee undertook the arduous task of updating the formatting of the Uniform Title Standards. While the Standards have always been an excellent resource for Florida lawyers, the distribution of those Standards had become more limited since the Standards were no longer published in print format. The goal of this endeavor was to format the Standards as a research tool for Florida real estate lawyers, as well as Florida lawyers that do not regularly practice in real estate. The updated format allows easy maneuvering throughout the Standards, as well as provides instant access to the extensive citations to Florida Statutes, case law, and secondary sources.

This Introduction will highlight many of the key features and updates included in the electronic PDF version of the Standards. In addition, this Introduction will address some basic functions of the PDF file to assist lawyers in utilizing all the newly added features.

### The Format

The Standards have been compiled into one PDF file that includes a table of contents as well as internal links. The internal links (which are identified by a blue underline) allow the user to immediately access both internal and external citations contained in the Standards with a simple click. Each external citation included as a link, is embedded in the PDF file as a separate PDF document. This allows the user immediate access to the cited external source.

### Key Features

*The Table of Contents:* The Standards contain two Tables of Content. The first Table of Contents is included as a bookmark feature of the PDF file, which can be accessed on the left hand side of the document. Within those bookmarks, each individual standard is included as a sub-bookmark that can be accessed by clicking on the + sign located to the left of each Chapter. The second Table of Contents is the print version, which is included on Page 10 of the Standards. Each Chapter and Standard included in the second table of contents includes an internal document link (represented by a blue underline). By clicking, the PDF document immediately links to the cited Chapter or Standard. *Note – if the user would like to immediately move back to the portion of the document prior to clicking the link, then a short cut for doing so is to simultaneously hold the ALT and LEFT ARROW keys.*

*Internal Links:* Throughout the Standards, there are cross references to other Standards. Links have been created on each of those references to move to that section. *ie. In the comment section of Standard 1.3 there is reference to Standard 18.4. If you click on that link it will move you to Standard 18.4. Note – if the user would like to immediately move back to the portion of the document prior to clicking the link, then a short cut for doing so is to simultaneously hold the ALT and LEFT ARROW keys.*

*External Links:* Throughout the Standards, there are citations to other sources including, Florida Statutes, the Florida Constitution, the U.S. Code, Florida and Federal case law, as well as secondary sources. Links have been created on many of those citations that allow immediate



access to the cited material; however, some references cannot be linked if the cited source is copyrighted. The external sources are saved as separate document files within the PDF. Those external source documents can be viewed and accessed by clicking on the “paperclip symbol tab” on the left hand side of the PDF document.

Once an external document link is clicked, the PDF will open that external document. The external document will either be opened with the same screen as the Standards, or a separate screen will active to open the external document. The instructions for setting up same screen viewing of external documents or separate screen viewing of external documents is provided below. If the user utilizes same screen access, then simultaneously hold the ALT and LEFT ARROW keys of the keyboard will return the PDF to the screen prior to clicking the external link. The separate screen access is particularly helpful if the user has access to two monitors since it will allow view of the Standards and the external document on a separate screen

*Instructions for Setting Single Screen or Separate Screen Access to External Documents*  
– *The setting for external documents can be access in the “Edit” Tab in the top left of the screen, and selecting the “Preferences” tab in the drop down menu below. Within the “Preferences” screen, there is a “Categories” menu on the left hand side. Below those “Categories” is an option for “Documents”. Once the “Document” tab is clicked, a screen with “Open Settings” appears on the right hand side of the screen that includes multiple box that can be “checked” or “unchecked”. One of those boxes is for “Open cross-document links in the same window”. For single screen access that box should be checked. For separate screen access that box should not be checked. Once the appropriate setting is made, the “OK” tab should be clicked in the bottom right hand corner of the screen.*

Specific information as to each category of external document included as links within the Standards is provided below:

Florida Statutes: The Standards include multiple citations to the Florida Statutes. Please note each Standard cites to the statute year applicable at the time the Standard was drafted or updated. Accordingly, the external document link is to that Florida Statute for the cited year. Please note that Florida Statutes citations prior to 1997 are not included as external links. *ie. Standard 2.1 includes multiple citations to § 222.20, Fla. Stat. (2001) both in the Authorities & References section and in the Comments section of that Standard. If you click on any of those external links then that statue will open in either the same screen or separate screen depending on the user setting.*

Florida Constitution: Chapter 18 of the Standards includes multiple citations to different revisions of the Florida Constitution. *ie. Standard 18.0 includes citations to Art. X, § 4(a), Fla. Const. (1968) (as amended) both in the Authorities & References section and in the Comments section of that Standard. If you click on any of those external links then that cited constitution provision will open in either the same screen or separate screen depending on the user setting.*

Case Law: The Standards include multiple citations to the Florida and Federal Case Law that can be accessed by clicking the external link. Please note that Florida cases prior to 1940 are not included as external links. *ie. Standard 1.3 includes an external link to Johnson*

*v. Fraccacreta*, 348 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) in the *Authorities & References* section of that Standard. If you click on any of that external links then that case will open in either the same screen or separate screen depending on the user setting.

Archived and Deleted Standards: The Standards include access to the original Standards published in 1959, as well as updated versions thereto, that are accessible as external links immediately after the table of contents. In addition, the Standards includes external links to Standards that have been subsequently deleted in revisions. *ie. Standard 18.2 has been deleted; however, an external link is provided to the archived version of that Standard. If you click on that external link then archived Standard will open in either the same screen or separate screen depending on the user setting.*

The Fund Title Notes: The Standards include multiple citations to The Fund Title Notes. The Fund Title Notes are underwriting guidelines prepared by Attorneys' Title Fund Services, LLC and Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. Citations to The Fund Title Notes can be accessed by clicking the external link. *ie. Standard 1.1 includes an external link to FUND TN 4.02.01 in the Authorities & References section and Comment section of that Standard. If you click on any of those external links then that Title Note will open in either the same screen or separate screen depending on the user setting.*

**The Fund Title Notes are the copyrighted materials owned by Attorneys' Title Fund Services, LLC and Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. Republication of the cited Fund Title Notes has been authorized for inclusion in these Standards; however, any reproduction or distribution of those copyrighted materials is strictly prohibited pursuant to applicable law.**

*Statutory Index*: An index of cited Florida Statutes is included at the end of the Standards. The Index includes external links to the cited Florida Statute, as well as an internal references to each Standard that cited to each statute. The cited Standards include internal document links to that Standard. *Note – if the user would like to return to the Index after clicking an internal document link to a cited Standard, then a short cut for doing so is to simultaneously hold the ALT and LEFT ARROW keys.*

*Case Index*: An index of cited Florida and Federal case law is included at the end of the Standards. The Index includes external links to the cited case law, as well as an internal references to each Standard that cited to each case. The cited Standards include internal document links to that Standard. *Note – if the user would like to return to the Index after clicking an internal document link to a cited Standard, then a short cut for doing so is to simultaneously hold the ALT and LEFT ARROW keys.*

Christopher W. Smart  
Chair, Title Issues and Standards Committee  
Robert M. Graham, Co-Vice Chair  
Karla J. Staker, Co-Vice Chair  
Brian W. Hoffman, Co-Vice Chair

# UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS

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## **ARCHIVED VERSIONS OF THE UNIFORM TITLE STANDARDS**

Original Publication of the Uniform Title Standards, Florida Bar Journal, March 1959  
Supplement

1995 Update to the Uniform Title Standards

STANDARD 00

CONSTRUCTION OF TITLE PROBLEMS

**STANDARD: THE ATTORNEY, UPON EXAMINING AN ABSTRACT OF TITLE TO LAND, SHOULD CONSTRUE QUESTIONS IN FAVOR OF MARKETABILITY WHENEVER POSSIBLE.**

Problem: What questions and objections should be raised by the examining attorney?

Answer: Objections and requirements should be made only when the irregularities or defects appearing in the abstract of title actually impair the title or may be expected to expose the purchaser or lender to the hazards of adverse claims or litigation. When such a situation arises the attorney should consult, when possible, with the prior examiner and endeavor to resolve the question in favor of marketability. He should communicate, when possible, with the prior examining attorney before delivering his opinion of title to his client.

## CHAPTER 1

### AGENCY AND POWERS OF ATTORNEY

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#### STANDARD 1.1

##### EXECUTION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY

**STANDARD: WHEN A DEED IS EXECUTED BY VIRTUE OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY, THE POWER OF ATTORNEY MUST BE EXECUTED AND RECORDED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE DEED.**

Problem 1: A gives B a power of attorney, duly acknowledged and witnessed, specifically authorizing B to convey Blackacre, but the power of attorney is not recorded. B conveys Blackacre to C under such power of attorney. Is the conveyance valid against subsequent bona fide purchasers and creditors?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: A gives B a power of attorney specifically authorizing B to convey Blackacre, but the power of attorney either is not witnessed or not acknowledged. B conveys Blackacre to C under such power of attorney. Is the conveyance valid against subsequent bona fide purchasers and creditors?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: § 695.01, Fla. Stat. (2001); § 709.015(2), Fla. Stat. (2001); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 31 (1998); 2 BOYER, *FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS* § 28.06, n.4 (Bender 3d ed. 1996); *FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS* § 6.65 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997); FUND TN 4.02.01.

Comment: Section 695.01, Fla. Stat. (2001) requires that the power of attorney be recorded to be valid against subsequent bona fide purchasers and creditors. To be recorded it must conform to the requirements of § 695.03, Fla. Stat. (2001) (acknowledgment for recording purposes). The general law is that a power of attorney must be executed with the same formality as the law requires for the instrument to be executed under it. 2A C.J.S. *Agency* § 45(b) (1972).

With respect to homestead property, see Title Standard 18.4 (Alienation Of Homestead -- Power Of Attorney). Note that § 689.111, Fla. Stat. (2001) requires that when a mortgage of homestead property is executed by power of attorney, the power of attorney must be executed in the same manner as a deed. All powers of attorney authorizing the execution of a mortgage must be acknowledged to be entitled to be recorded. FUND TN 4.02.01.



STANDARD 1.2

AFFIXING NAME OF PRINCIPAL IN EXECUTION  
OF INSTRUMENTS BY ATTORNEY IN FACT

**STANDARD: IN THE EXECUTION OF AN INSTRUMENT BY AN ATTORNEY IN FACT, THE NAME OF THE PRINCIPAL SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH AND MAY BE EITHER WRITTEN, PRINTED OR TYPED.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was purportedly conveyed by a deed in which the wording of the execution is "John Doe by Richard Roe, as his attorney in fact." The name of John Doe was typed but Richard Roe's name was signed, and Roe acknowledged that he executed the deed as attorney in fact for John Doe. Roe has a power of attorney in proper form. Did the grantee acquire title?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *State v. Hickman*, 189 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), *cert. den.* 194 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1966); 2 Fla. Jur. 2d *Agency and Employment* § 53 (1998); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.65 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997); FUND TN 4.02.02.

STANDARD 1.3

AUTHORITY TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY

**STANDARD: TO EMPOWER AN AGENT TO CONVEY REAL PROPERTY THE POWER OF ATTORNEY MUST GIVE CLEAR AUTHORITY TO DO SO, ALTHOUGH THE REAL PROPERTY NEED NOT BE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IF THE TERMS OF THE INSTRUMENT SHOW SUCH LAND TO BE WITHIN THE PRINCIPAL'S INTENTION IN THE GRANTING OF THE POWER.**

Problem 1: A gives to B a power of attorney authorizing B "to generally act for me and in my name, place and stead, in any state and in relation to all matters, to do any and all things and to execute any and all instruments which I might or could do if personally present." Does B have the authority to convey land owned by A?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: A gives to B a power of attorney authorizing B to "sell and convey any and all land owned by me," without specifically describing such land. Does B have the authority to convey any part or all of such land?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *Johnson v. Fraccacreta*, 348 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Bloom v. Weiser*, 348 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); 2 Fla. Jur. 2d *Agency & Employment* § 32 (1998); 2A C.J.S. *Agency* §§ 223-227 (1972); FUND TN 4.02.03;

Comment: With respect to homestead property, see Title Standard 18.4 (Alienation Of Homestead -- Power Of Attorney).

**CHAPTER 2**  
**BANKRUPTCY**

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STANDARD 2.1

EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS ON TITLE  
OF DEBTOR'S REAL ESTATE

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1979, THE FILING OF A PETITION IN BANKRUPTCY CREATES AN ESTATE WHICH INCLUDES ALL LEGAL OR EQUITABLE INTERESTS OF THE DEBTOR IN REAL PROPERTY AS OF THE TIME OF FILING OF THE PETITION, INCLUDING THAT WHICH MAY BE LATER EXEMPTED FROM THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS.**

Problem 1:            John Doe held three parcels of property by various tenancies: Blackacre by a tenancy by the entireties, Whiteacre by a joint tenancy, and Greenacre by a tenancy in common. Doe filed a petition in bankruptcy on or after October 1, 1979, and subsequently he and his various co-tenants attempted to convey Blackacre, Whiteacre, and Greenacre to Richard Roe. Doe was later granted a discharge and the proceeding was closed. Is Roe's title valid?

Answer:              No. Whether the bankruptcy proceedings are voluntary or involuntary, the filing of the bankruptcy petition creates an estate over which the trustee has dominion. Property held by the entireties by a debtor whose spouse does not also file a petition in bankruptcy will still become property of the estate until an exemption is established. Likewise, interests in tenancies in common or joint tenancies will become property of the estate until such property is exempted.

Problem 2:            Same facts as above, except that Doe also holds Blueacre as trustee for the benefit of Marvin Moe. What will happen to Blueacre upon the filing of the petition in bankruptcy?

Answer:              The estate will consist only of such right and title to the property as was possessed by the debtor. Generally, the estate will hold such property subject to the outstanding interest of the beneficiary.

Authorities &  
References:        Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541, 549 (2001); § 222.20, Fla. Stat. (2001); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1522 (15th ed. 2001); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1541, 1549 (15th ed. 2001); FUND TN 5.06.01.

Comment:

Section 541(a) provides that the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate and specifies what property shall comprise the estate. Essentially, the estate is composed of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property, wherever located, as of the time the case is filed. This estate includes all types of property, both tangible and intangible. In short, an important provision of § 541 is that all interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case become the property of the estate. *See* § 541(a) (1).

Once the property comes into the estate, the debtor is permitted to exempt it in accordance with § 522 of the Code. Pursuant to § 522(b) (1), the State of Florida has opted to veto the federal statutory scheme of exemptions; therefore, Florida's state law exemptions control in Florida bankruptcy cases. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1522.01 (15th ed. 2001); § 222.20, Fla. Stat. (2001). Nonetheless, under Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) the debtor must affirmatively claim any available exemption to release the property from the "estate." *See* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1541.02 (15th ed. 2001). Moreover, any challenge to a claimed exemption must be timely filed or it is lost.

After commencement of the bankruptcy case, protection is afforded to a transferee of real property who obtains the property in good faith, without knowledge, and for a fair equivalent value. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 549(c). A purchaser at a judicial sale also is protected against avoidance of the transfer by the trustee in bankruptcy. *See* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1541 (15th ed. 2001). However, this protection does not exist if the trustee has recorded a copy or notice of the petition in the land records of the jurisdiction where the property is located. If a fair equivalent value is not paid, but some value is given, then a lien arises in favor of the transferee to the extent that some value was present. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 549(c) (2001).

Some protection is afforded transferees of property from a debtor who is involved in involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 549(b). This provision only applies to transferees who take during the period between commencement of the case and entry of the order of relief. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303. Such a transfer is validated only to the extent that value was given after commencement of the case under this section; however, knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings is irrelevant. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1549 (15th ed. 2001).

**Note:** An interest which the debtor acquires by bequest, devise, inheritance, or as a result of a property settlement or a divorce decree also becomes property of the estate if the interest is acquired within 180 days after the filing of the petition. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (5).

STANDARD 2.2

SALE, LEASE, OR USE OF DEBTOR'S REAL PROPERTY  
BY DEBTOR OR TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1979, EITHER THE DEBTOR IN POSSESSION OR THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY CAN PROPERLY SELL, LEASE, OR USE THE REAL PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR'S ESTATE PROVIDED THAT NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING OF ANY SUCH SALE, LEASE, OR USE OF THE PROPERTY IN THE ESTATE (OTHER THAN IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS) IS PROVIDED AS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY CODE.**

Problem 1: A trustee in bankruptcy in the bankruptcy proceedings of John Doe entered into a contract for the sale of Doe's nonexempt real property to Richard Roe. The sale was not in the ordinary course of business. Notice of the proposed sale was given to Doe's creditors, but no hearing was ever requested by a party in interest and no hearing was ever held on the matter. The sale was subsequently completed. Did valid title pass to Roe?

Answer: Yes. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 102(1) and 363(b) simply require notice and an opportunity for a hearing of any sale, lease, or use of property of the estate other than in the ordinary course of business. A court order is not required.

Problem 2: Same facts as above, except that Doe, who is a debtor in possession, himself sells the property to Roe. Did valid title pass?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 102, 361, 363 (2001); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363 (15th ed. 2001); FUND TN 5.05.02.

Comment: Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363 defines the rights and powers of parties with interests in property of the estate. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.01 (15th ed. 2001). Section 363(b) states that the trustee may, "after notice and a hearing," use, sell, or lease the property, "other than in the ordinary course of business." A court order is not required. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1) (2001); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.02[1] (15th ed. 2001). Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) defines "after notice and a hearing" as "after such notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances but authorizes an act without an actual hearing if notice is properly given and if such a hearing is not requested in a timely manner by a party in interest." Thus, the burden is shifted to interested parties to provide the request for a hearing and, should no such request be made, action may be taken without a hearing. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.02 (15th ed. 2001).

**NOTE: ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS EXIST UNDER Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) FOR SALES "FREE AND CLEAR" OF LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES.**

The requirements of notice and a hearing should be considered to have been met if the public records of the appropriate county reflect the recordation of one of the following:

- a. A certified copy of the bankruptcy court docket showing that no request for a hearing was made pursuant to the notice; or,
- b. A certified copy of the notice filed in the bankruptcy court together with a certified copy of any court order entered after a request for a hearing.

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) provides that at any time, on request of an entity with an interest in property which has been or is proposed to be used, sold, or leased, the court shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as necessary to provide adequate protection. Section 361 states that adequate protection may be provided by periodic cash payments to provide for the decrease in value, or by additional replacement security to compensate for the decrease in value, or by other relief which will result in "the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property." The requirement of adequate protection is mandatory. If the proposed use, sale, or lease cannot be so conditioned then it must be prohibited. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.05[2] (15th ed. 2001).

Section 363(h) permits the sale of any interest of a co-owner in property in which the debtor had, at the time of filing of the case, "an undivided interest as a tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety," provided that certain conditions specified in this section are met.

Purchasers are protected under § 363(m) from the effect of a "reversal or modification on appeal" from the authorization to sell as long as the purchaser acted in good faith. *See* 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.06 (15th ed. 2001). Notwithstanding the provisions of § 363(m), Bankruptcy Rule 6004(g) operates to stay an order authorizing the use, sale, or lease of property until the expiration of ten days after entry of the order, unless the court orders otherwise.

If the trustee or debtor in possession is operating a business, it may sell property in the ordinary course of business without notice and a hearing unless the court orders otherwise. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (l).

STANDARD 2.3

EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ON RIGHT TO FORECLOSE

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1979, PRIOR RELIEF FROM THE BANKRUPTCY AUTOMATIC STAY IS NECESSARY FOR A VALID FORECLOSURE OF A MORTGAGE ENCUMBERING SUCH PROPERTY.**

**Problem:** John Doe, a mortgagor under a conventional mortgage, files a bankruptcy proceeding on or after October 1, 1979, at which time the subject mortgage is in default. The mortgagee desires to foreclose the mortgage without the approval of the bankruptcy court. May the mortgage foreclosure be commenced?

**Answer:** No. The bankruptcy automatic stay extends to all of the property of the estate and all property of the debtor, regardless of whether it is located within the district in which the court sits.

**Authorities & References:** Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2001); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1362 (15th ed. 2001).

**Comment:** The automatic stay, which arises upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, stops all foreclosure actions. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). This automatic stay is broader than the stay in the previous Bankruptcy Act and includes a stay against a pending mortgage foreclosure in a liquidation bankruptcy which was not stayed under the old Bankruptcy Act.

Section 362(b) provides a number of exceptions to this stay. A complete discussion may be found in 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1362.04 (15th ed. 2001). Section 362(e) provides that thirty days after a request for relief from the stay, the stay will be automatically vacated unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect pending a final hearing. In addition, § 362(d) provides that, under certain circumstances, the stay may be terminated, annulled, modified, or conditioned upon request of a party in interest after notice and a hearing. If the court does not grant relief from the stay, it will remain in effect. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2) (2001). However, if the stay is vacated pursuant to § 362(e), no further court order is necessary to permit foreclosure unless the court order granting stay relief so specifies.

## STANDARD 2.4

### EFFECT OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY ABANDONING PROPERTY OF DEBTOR

#### **STANDARD: AFTER NOTICE AND A HEARING, THE TRUSTEE MAY ABANDON PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE WHICH IS BURDENSOME OR OF INCONSEQUENTIAL VALUE.**

**Problem:** After authorization by the bankruptcy court, a trustee in bankruptcy abandoned Blackacre, which was property of the estate. The property was abandoned to John Doe, the debtor, because of his possessory interest in the property. May Doe convey valid title to Blackacre to Richard Roe?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 350, 521, 554 (2001); FUND TN 5.01.01.

**Comment:** Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that after notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate; similarly, upon request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order the trustee to abandon any such property of the estate. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) provides that in the absence of a court order to the contrary, any property scheduled under § 521(1) and not otherwise administered at the time of closing of a case is deemed abandoned to the debtor and deemed administered for the purpose of § 350. Section 554(d) provides that unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate. This subsection recognizes that abandonment requires notice and that there can be no abandonment by mere operation of law of property which is not listed in the debtor's schedules or otherwise disclosed to the creditors, and that such property will remain property of the estate. The unscheduled and unadministered asset remains property of the estate and the estate must be reopened and the property abandoned, sold, or exempted in order to remove it from the estate.

**But Note:** If a lender desires to proceed against property that has been abandoned to the debtor before the debtor receives a discharge, the lender should obtain relief from the automatic stay, because the stay relates to property of the debtor as well as to property of the estate.

The notice and hearing discussed above have the same construction as discussed in Title Standard 2.2 (Sale, lease, or use of debtor's real property by debtor or trustee in bankruptcy). If these requirements are met, the abandonment takes place and vests title to the abandoned property in the transferee, regardless of whether the transferee receives a deed.



## STANDARD 2.5

### EFFECT OF JUDGMENT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY ON TITLE TO AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY

**STANDARD: A JUDGMENT LIEN ACQUIRED BEFORE BANKRUPTCY THAT IS SUBSEQUENTLY DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY WILL NOT BECOME A LIEN ON PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER DISCHARGE.**

**Problem:** A judgment upon claims not subject to exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy was entered against John Doe on August 1, 1998, and a certified copy was recorded so as to constitute a lien on real property. Doe filed a petition in bankruptcy on January 4, 1999, properly scheduling the judgment, and subsequently received a discharge in the bankruptcy proceeding. Before one year following discharge had elapsed, Doe acquired a parcel of real property. Does the lien of the judgment attach to this after-acquired property?

**Answer:** No. The judgment, properly discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding, does not become a lien against property thereafter acquired by the debtor. The judgment is not a lien against the after-acquired property, and no petition pursuant to § 55.145, Fla. Stat. (2001) is necessary.

**Authorities & References:** *Albritton v. General Portland Cement Co.*, 344 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1977); Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 350, 523, 524, 541 (2001); § 55.145, Fla. Stat. (2001); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1524, 1522 (15th ed. 2001); FUND TN 5.03.02.

**Comment:** Section 524(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge as to claims not subject to exceptions to discharge in bankruptcy is completely effective and will operate as an injunction against the commencement of any action or any act to collect a debt as a personal liability of the debtor. Section 524(a) (3) specifically operates as an injunction against the commencement of an action to collect against any property of the debtor that is acquired after filing the bankruptcy petition. A creditor, including a judicial lien creditor, could not levy upon property acquired by the debtor after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. After the discharge in bankruptcy, no enforceable judgment exists against the person of the debtor. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2001).

As there is no actual cloud on title to the after-acquired property following discharge in bankruptcy, no action pursuant to § 55.145, Fla. Stat. (2001) is necessary. It is recommended that marketable title be reflected in the official records of the county in which the property is located. Therefore, certified copies of the petition in bankruptcy, the schedule of liabilities showing the judgment, and the order of discharge preferably should be recorded in that county.

**Note: Judgment liens against property owned by the debtor prior to bankruptcy proceedings are not covered by this Title Standard. Generally, the judgment lien continues to attach to property that was owned by the debtor before bankruptcy, even though the debtor has been personally discharged from the debt.**

**CHAPTER 3**  
**CONVEYANCES**

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STANDARD 3.1

CONVEYANCES TO AN UNINCORPORATED VOLUNTARY  
ASSOCIATION

**STANDARD: A CONVEYANCE TO AN UNINCORPORATED VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION DOES NOT OPERATE TO VEST LEGAL TITLE IN SUCH ASSOCIATION, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY STATUTE.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was conveyed to Wild Life Hunting and Fishing Association, an unincorporated voluntary association. Later, Blackacre was conveyed by this association by its president and secretary to John Doe. Did Doe acquire marketable title to Blackacre?

**Answer:** No.

**Authorities & References:** *Reid v. Barry*, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846 (1927) (unincorporated religious society); *Daniels v. Berry*, 513 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (unincorporated civic association); *Escambia Properties, Inc., v. Largue*, 260 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972) (corporation formed after acquisition of title); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10.02 (2002); FUND TN 6.01.02 B. (unincorporated church); FUND TN 10.04.05 (legal existence of parties to conveyance); FUND TN 10.04.09 (unincorporated labor unions); FUND TN 11.01.05 (conveyance to corporation prior to incorporation).

**Comment:** Though most unincorporated associations are not legal entities capable of acquiring or conveying real estate, there are some exceptions. If a business trust is a legal entity for purposes of holding title under the laws of the country or state where it was formed, then it would be considered a legal entity with the same powers and abilities in Florida. *See* FUND TN 31.01.01. Partnerships and joint ventures under Ch. 620, Fla. Stat., are other types of unincorporated associations capable of acquiring or conveying title. *See* Title Standards, Chapter 19 (Partnerships).

With respect to conveyances to partnerships, see Title Standards, Chapter 19 (Partnerships).

STANDARD 3.1-1

CONVEYANCES TO AND BY  
TRUSTEES OF UNINCORPORATED CHURCHES

**STANDARD: EVERY DEED OR OTHER INSTRUMENT TRANSFERRING REAL PROPERTY TO NAMED OR UNNAMED TRUSTEES OF A NAMED UNINCORPORATED CHURCH VESTS TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN THE TRUSTEES OF THE UNINCORPORATED CHURCH AND THEIR SUCCESSORS WITH FULL POWER AND AUTHORITY TO CONVEY AND MORTGAGE THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED.**

Problem: The deed to Blackacre transfers the property to "the trustees of United Kingdom Church." United Kingdom Church is an unincorporated church. May the trustees of United Kingdom Church convey the property to John Doe?

Answer: Yes. If the deed transfers the property to named or unnamed trustees of a named unincorporated church, the trustees have full authority to convey or mortgage the property.

Authorities & References: § 692.101, Fla. Stat. (2001); 45 Fla. Jur. 2d *Religious Societies* § 9 (2002); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10.10 (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.70 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996); FUND TN 6.03.01.

Comment: The pastor, secretary, or other authorized administrative personnel of an unincorporated church may execute an affidavit stating the names of the trustees of the unincorporated church as of the date stated in the affidavit. Such an affidavit is conclusive as to the facts stated therein as to purchasers and mortgagees without notice.

All deeds and mortgages executed by the trustees of an unincorporated church and recorded in the public records of the county where the real property is located prior to the effective date of the statute, May 21, 1986, are good and valid if they were not contested by suit commenced within two years after the effective date of the act.

STANDARD 3.2

DEED PURPORTING TO CORRECT PREVIOUS EFFECTIVE DEED

**STANDARD: A GRANTOR WHO HAS CONVEYED LAND BY AN EFFECTIVE AND UNAMBIGUOUS DEED CANNOT AVOID THE EFFECT OF SUCH CONVEYANCE BY EXECUTING A NEW DEED MAKING A CHANGE IN THE CONVEYANCE, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER DEED PURPORTS TO CORRECT OR MODIFY THE FORMER.**

**Problem:** John Doe, the record owner of Blackacre, conveyed the west half of Blackacre to Richard Roe. Doe later conveyed the east half of Blackacre to Roe by a deed containing a recital that it was executed to correct an erroneous description in the previous deed. Doe then executed a deed of the west half of Blackacre to Simon Grant. Did Grant acquire *marketable* title to the west half of Blackacre?

**Answer:** No. The later conveyance from Doe to Roe of the east half of Blackacre did not nullify the former conveyance of the west half of Blackacre. It is necessary for Simon Grant to obtain a conveyance from Roe.

**Authorities & References:** *Kirkpatrick v. Ault*, 177 Kan. 552, 280 P.2d 637 (1955); *Hilterbrand v. Carter*, 27 P.3d 1086 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); 26A C.J.S. *Deeds* §§ 31, 174 (2001); FUND TN 10.03.03.

**Comment:** The Standard is designed to point out that marketability of title cannot be achieved by the apparent unilateral action of the grantor.

Where the rights of third parties are not involved, the grantee's acceptance of the corrective deed may nullify the effect of the prior deed, as between the parties.

STANDARD 3.3

AFFIDAVIT

**STANDARD: WHENEVER POSSIBLE AND IN CONFORMITY WITH STANDARDS PROMULGATED HERE, THE EXAMINER SHOULD ACCEPT AND RELY ON AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH STATES SUFFICIENT FACTS TO NEGATE A POSSIBLE DEFECT IN AN OTHERWISE MARKETABLE TITLE.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was conveyed to John Doe. Later a conveyance appears from J. Doe. May an affidavit that grantee and grantor are one and the same person be accepted as true?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Blackacre was conveyed to John Doe. A judgment appears against J. Doe. May an affidavit to the effect that J. Doe and John Doe are not the same person be accepted?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Jane Doe, his wife, as an estate by the entirety. There is a conveyance by Jane Doe, a widow, and a death certificate of J. Doe appears of record. May an affidavit be accepted that J. Doe and John Doe are one and the same person?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 4: Blackacre was conveyed to Simon Grant. Simon Grant then conveyed to John Doe. There was no recitation of the marital status of Simon Grant on the deed of conveyance. Should an affidavit from a person with knowledge of the facts, stating that Simon Grant was a single man at the time of the conveyance, be accepted?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *Felt v. Morse*, 80 Fla. 154, 85 So. 656 (1920); Annot., 7 A.L.R. 1166, 1171 (1920); BAYSE, CLEARING LAND TITLES §§ 31-45 (West 2d ed. 1970); 1 FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE § 9.31 (Fla. Bar CLE 2d ed. 1971); FUND TN 10.04.07, 18.02.01, 20.02.05.

Comment: With respect to continuous marriage affidavits, see Title Standard 6.6.

STANDARD 3.4

ACKNOWLEDGMENT – NECESSITY FOR SEAL  
(FLORIDA AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES)

**STANDARD: A CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT, MADE IN FLORIDA OR IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, TO BE VALID AND ENTITLE THE INSTRUMENT TO WHICH IT IS APPENDED TO BE RECORDED MUST HAVE THE OFFICER'S SEAL AFFIXED.**

Problem 1: A certificate of acknowledgment attached to a deed was duly signed by a Florida notary (or other authorized official), but his seal was not affixed. The clerk accepted the deed for recordation. Was the recordation effective?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Same facts as in Problem 1 except that the Florida notary had obtained and attached a certificate of notarial authority from the Secretary of State, as provided in § 117.03 Fla. Stat. The clerk overlooked the omission of the notary's seal and recorded the deed. Was the recordation valid and effective?

Answer: No.

Problem 3: A certificate of acknowledgment attached to a deed was duly signed by a notary of a foreign country having a seal, or by an authorized officer of the United States, but no seal was affixed. The clerk accepted the deed for recordation. Was the recordation valid and effective?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: § 695.03(1), (3), Fla. Stat. (2002); *Norris v. Billingsley*, 48 Fla. 102, 37 So. 564 (1904); *Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hickey*, 263 So. 2d 269 (3d DCA Fla. 1972); FUND TN 1.02.07, 1.04.02.

Comment: A certificate evidencing the authority of an officer to act is not a substitute for the positive statutory requirement of a seal in executing an acknowledgment certificate.

*But see James v. Gollnick*, 100 Fla. 829, 130 So. 450 (1930) (the lack of a notary's seal may be cured seven years after recordation by § 694.08, Fla. Stat.). *See also* § 95.231, Fla. Stat. (2002); FUND TN 1.02.07.

Exceptions to this Standard are those acknowledgments of members of the Armed Forces and their spouses taken in accordance with § 695.031, Fla. Stat. (2002). Spouses were not included prior to May 2, 1957. Also, under the Uniform Electronic Signature Act, neither a rubber stamp nor an impression seal is required for an electronic notarization. § 668.50, Fla. Stat. (11) (a) (2002); FUND TN 1.02.07.

Effective January 1, 1992, a Florida notary's seal must be a rubber stamp § 117.05(3) (a), Fla. Stat. (2002); FUND TN 1.02.07. From 1973 to 1992, the seal may be of the rubber stamp or impression type. *See* FUND TN 1.02.07.

STANDARD 3.5

ACKNOWLEDGMENT -- NECESSITY FOR SEAL (OUT OF STATE)

**STANDARD: A CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT MADE OUT OF FLORIDA BUT IN THE UNITED STATES, TO BE VALID AND ENTITLE THE INSTRUMENT TO WHICH IT IS APPENDED TO BE RECORDED, MUST BE UNDER THE SEAL OF THE OFFICER OR COURT OF THE OFFICIAL AUTHORIZED BY FLORIDA LAW, UNLESS THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC WHO DOES NOT AFFIX A SEAL, IN WHICH CASE IT IS SUFFICIENT IF THE NOTARY PUBLIC TYPES, PRINTS, OR WRITES BY HAND ON THE INSTRUMENT, "I AM A NOTARY PUBLIC OF THE STATE OF (STATE), AND MY COMMISSION EXPIRES ON (DATE)".**

Problem: A certificate of acknowledgment attached to a deed dated in 1991 was duly signed by a South Dakota notary who did not affix a seal. However, the instrument included the statement, "I am a notary public of the state of South Dakota, and my commission expires on July 1, 1992." The clerk accepted the deed for recordation. Was the recordation valid and effective?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 695.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); FUND TN 1.04.01.

Comment: See Comment, Title Standards 3.4 (Acknowledgment -- Necessity For Seal (Florida and Foreign Countries)).

The following are the officers before whom an acknowledgment or proof may be made in another state: a civil law notary of this state; a judge or clerk of any court of the United States or of any state, territory, or district; a United States commissioner or magistrate; a notary public, justice of the peace, master in chancery, or registrar or recorder of deeds of any state, territory, or district having a seal. For all officers except notaries public, the acknowledgment or proof must be under the seal of the officer or court, as the case may be. Effective October 1, 1980, § 695.03(2), Fla. Stat. was amended to provide that if the acknowledgment or proof is made before a notary public who does not affix a seal, it is sufficient for the notary public to type, print, or write by hand on the instrument, "I am a Notary Public of the State of (state), and my commission expires on (date)." § 695.03(2), Fla. Stat.

STANDARD 3.6

ERRONEOUS, INCONSISTENT OR OMITTED DATE

**STANDARD: THE FACT THAT AN INSTRUMENT SUCH AS A DEED OR MORTGAGE IS UNDATED, BEARS A DATE DIFFERENT FROM THE DATE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT, OR BEARS AN IMPOSSIBLE DATE, DOES NOT AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENT AS A MUNIMENT OF TITLE.**

Problem 1: Doe's deed to Blackacre conveying it to Roe is dated June 1, 1998. The acknowledgment is dated May 31, 1998. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: A deed to Blackacre from Doe to Roe bears no date but is otherwise regular. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: A deed to Blackacre from Doe to Roe is dated April 31, 1998, an impossible date. The acknowledgment is dated April 20, 1998. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *Douglas v. Tax Equities, Inc.*, 144 Fla. 791, 797, 198 So. 5, 8, *reh'g denied*, 144 Fla. 801, 198 So. 578 (1940); *Moody v. Hamilton*, 22 Fla. 298 (1886); *Henry v. First Indiana Bank*, 200 B.R. 59 (Bkrtcy. M.D. 1996); 26A C.J.S. *Deeds* § 38 (2002); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 19 (2003); Game, *Examination of Abstracts*, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 77, 80 (1953); FUND TN 1.02.02.



**CHAPTER 4**  
**CORPORATIONS**

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STANDARD 4.1

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CORPORATE INSTRUMENTS

**STANDARD: WHERE AN INSTRUMENT OF A CORPORATION IS EXECUTED BY THE PROPER OFFICER OR OFFICERS WHO ARE DESIGNATED IN THE INSTRUMENT AS SUCH, BUT WHOSE CAPACITIES ARE NOT RECITED IN THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT, SUCH ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS VALID.**

Problem:                   A corporate instrument is executed by John Doe as President. His office is set out under his signature. The acknowledgment merely recites:

“The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this \_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, (year), by John Doe.”

(Signature of Notary Public—State of Florida)

(Print, Type or Stamp Commissioned Name of Notary Public)

Personally Known \_\_\_OR Produced Identification \_\_\_.

Type of Identification Produced \_\_\_\_\_.

Is the acknowledgment sufficient to entitle the instrument to be recorded?

Answer:                   Yes.

Authorities                   *House of Lyons v. Marcus*, 72 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1954). *See also Edenfield v. Wingard*, 89  
& References:               So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1956); *Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hickey*, 263 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); *Mills v. Barker*, 664 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); § 117.05, Fla. Stat. (2002); FUND TN 1.02.06.

STANDARD 4.2

PRIOR CONVEYANCE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL  
PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF A CORPORATION

**STANDARD: UNLESS THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS THAT A CORPORATE DEED IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE CONSTITUTED A CONVEYANCE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF THE CORPORATION, AN EXAMINER MAY ASSUME THAT THE TRANSACTION DID NOT REQUIRE AUTHORIZATION BY A MAJORITY OF THE STOCKHOLDERS FOR A SALE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE CORPORATE PROPERTY AND ASSETS.**

Problem 1:           Appearing in the chain of title is a properly executed deed of a corporation conveying one or more parcels of land. Nothing on the record shows that the property conveyed constituted all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation. Must an examiner make independent inquiry as to whether the conveyance was a conveyance of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation and whether the corporation had the authorization of a majority of the stockholders to make the sale?

Answer:             No.

Problem 2:           The deed of the corporation recites, or the record shows, that the deed was a conveyance of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation. Must the examiner make an independent inquiry as to whether the corporation had shareholder authorization?

Answer:             Yes. However, if the conveyance was made after July 1, 1990, the effective date of § 607.1201, Fla. Stat., shareholder approval is not necessary for conveyances of all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation, when such conveyances are made in the usual and regular course of business, unless the corporation's articles of incorporation require otherwise.

Authorities  
& References:       §§ 607.1201, .1202, Fla. Stat. (2002); FUND TN 11.01.01.

Comment:           In 1990, the Florida Legislature repealed § 607.241, Fla. Stat. (1989), which required shareholder authorization for a conveyance of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation. The Florida Business Corporation Act now provides that a corporation may dispose of all, or substantially all, of its property in the usual and regular course of business without shareholder authorization unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. § 607.1201, Fla. Stat. (2002). However, if the disposition of property is not in the usual and regular course of business, the corporation's board of directors must obtain shareholder authorization of the disposition. . § 607.1202, Fla. Stat. (2002).

A disposition of corporate assets may be considered a sale of “substantially all” of those assets if the sale substantially limits the corporation's business or serves to destroy the fundamental purpose for which the corporation was organized. *Schwadel v. Uchitel*, 455 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); *see also South End Improvement Group, Inc. v. Mulliken*, 602 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (the test is whether the

disposition's quantitative or qualitative impact, or both, would fundamentally change the nature of the corporation); *BSF Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank*, 204 A.2d 746 (Del. 1964); *National Bank of Commerce v. United States*, 158 F.Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1958); *Union-May Stern Co. v. Industrial Commission*, 273 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); FLORIDA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 10.46 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2002).

Effective July 1, 1991, as to corporations not for profit, the applicable statutes are §§ 617.1201 and .1202, Fla. Stat. *See also Lensa Corp .v. Poinciana Gardens Ass'n*, 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

When taking a deed or other instrument transferring title to realty, consideration must be given to Title Standard 4.2-1.

STANDARD 4.2-1

CURRENT CONVEYANCE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL  
PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF A CORPORATION

**STANDARD: THE CONVEYANCE OF ALL OR SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF A CORPORATION CONVEYS MARKETABLE TITLE IF IT IS IN THE USUAL AND REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS AND THE CORPORATION'S ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION DO NOT REQUIRE SHAREHOLDER AUTHORIZATION.**

Problem 1: ABC Corporation conveyed Blackacre to John Doe by deed signed in the corporate name, executed by its president, and sealed with the corporate seal (or by deed executed in the corporate name by its president in the presence of two subscribing witnesses). Blackacre constituted all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation, but this fact does not appear on the face of the deed. The deed does not recite that a majority of shareholders authorized the corporation to convey Blackacre. Should Doe require evidence of this fact before accepting the deed?

Answer: Yes, unless the conveyance is in the usual and regular course of business and the articles of incorporation do not require shareholder authorization.

Problem 2: Same facts as above, except that Blackacre does not constitute all or substantially all of the property and assets of the corporation. Should Doe require evidence of this fact before accepting the deed?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: §§ 607.1201, .1202 Fla. Stat. (2002); § 692.01, Fla. Stat. (2002); FLORIDA CORPORATE PRACTICE § 10.46 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2002); FUND TN 11.01.01.

Comment: The standard applies only to what a title examiner should do in connection with a corporate conveyance being made in a current transaction. Reference should be made to Title Standard 4.2 to determine what a title examiner may justifiably infer when the corporate conveyance has already become a part of the chain of title.

Section 607.1201, Fla. Stat. (2002) does not require majority shareholder authorization of a disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation which is in the usual and regular course of business unless authorization is required by the corporation's articles of incorporation. The requirement of majority shareholder authorization does not apply in the case of a mortgage on any or all of the corporate property and assets, whether or not in the usual and regular course of business, unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise. § 607.1201, Fla. Stat. (2002).

However, majority shareholder authorization is required for any disposition of all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation not in the usual and regular course of business. § 607.1202, Fla. Stat. (2002). The articles of incorporation or the board of directors may require a greater vote than a majority of shareholders, or authorization by a particular voting group. There is not a statutory exception for innocent purchasers who purchase property from a corporation when the shareholders did not authorize the sale. Evidence of shareholder authorization may, among other possibilities, take the form of minutes of the stockholders' meeting at which authorization was given.

Finally, the examiner of title should bear in mind that additional limitations on corporate conveyances may exist in the corporate charter or bylaws.

Effective July 1, 1991, as to corporations not for profit, the applicable statutes are §§ 617.1201 and .1202, Fla. Stat. *See also Lensa Corp.v. Poinciana Gardens Ass'n*, 765 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

STANDARD 4.3

CONVEYANCE BY CORPORATIONS

**STANDARD: A CORPORATION MAY CONVEY ITS LAND EITHER BY AN INSTRUMENT IN WRITING SIGNED IN ITS NAME BY AN AUTHORIZED AGENT IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES OR BY AN INSTRUMENT SEALED WITH THE COMMON OR CORPORATE SEAL AND SIGNED IN ITS NAME BY ITS PRESIDENT OR ANY VICE-PRESIDENT OR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER.**

Problem 1: ABC Corporation conveyed Blackacre by deed executed by its President in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. The deed contained no corporate seal. Is the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes. This assumes the person executing the deed was properly authorized. The authority of the president to bind the corporation may generally be assumed. See *Ocean Bank v. Inv-Uni Inv. Corp.*, 599 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Evidence of authorization should be obtained when someone other than the president executes the instrument, in cases where the execution is under § 689.01, Fla. Stat. See *Pan-American Const. Co. v. Searcy*, 84 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1956); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.43 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997); FUND TN 11.05.03.

Problem 2: ABC Corporation conveyed Blackacre by deed sealed with the corporate seal and executed by its president. There were no subscribing witnesses. Is the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes. Affixing the corporate seal gives the president, vice-president, and chief executive officer prima facie record authority to convey the real property of the corporation. FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.44 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997).

Authorities & References: § 689.01, Fla. Stat. (2002); §§ 692.01, .02 Fla. Stat. (2002); *Adams v. Whittle*, 101 Fla. 705, 135 So. 152 (1931); *Douglass v. State Bank*, 77 Fla. 830, 82 So. 593 (1919); *Campbell v. McLaurin Inv. Co.*, 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917); *Norman v. Beckman*, 58 Fla. 325, 50 So. 876 (1909); *Snead v. U.S. Trucking Corp.*, 380 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA) *rev. denied* 389 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1980); *Prezioso v. Cameron*, 559 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10.06 (1997); FUND TN 11.05.02, 11.05.03.

Comment: If the corporate conveyance is made by an instrument in writing signed by an authorized agent in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, the conveyance is valid. § 689.01, Fla. Stat. (2002).

If the corporate conveyance is executed by an instrument sealed with the corporate seal and signed by the president, vice-president, or chief executive officer, no corporate resolution need be recorded to evidence the authority of the party executing the conveyance, and the instrument shall be valid. § 692.01, Fla. Stat. (2002).

There is uncertainty as to whether a corporation can make a valid conveyance in trust without having two subscribing witnesses to the deed. .§ 689.06, Fla. Stat. requires two witnesses and does not make an exception for corporations. Therefore, caution dictates having two subscribing witnesses on corporate conveyances under seal. See, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.45 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997).

The attesting signature of a secretary or assistant secretary is not necessary to the validity of a corporate conveyance, but it serves to identify the seal used and the officers making the conveyance. *See* FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.48 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997).

STANDARD 4.3-1

CONVEYANCE BY CORPORATIONS:  
AUTHORITY TO CONVEY; FRAUD

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1972, AN INSTRUMENT CONVEYING LAND OF A CORPORATION, SEALED WITH THE COMMON OR CORPORATE SEAL AND SIGNED IN THE CORPORATE NAME BY ITS PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, OR CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER IS, ABSENT FRAUD IN THE TRANSACTION BY THE PERSON RECEIVING THE INSTRUMENT, VALID WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFICER SIGNING FOR THE CORPORATION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS TO DO SO.**

**Problem:** On January 1, 2002, John Doe gives valuable consideration in exchange for an instrument conveying Blackacre, owned by ABC Corporation. The instrument is sealed with the common or corporate seal and signed in the corporate name by Richard Roe, the chief executive officer of ABC Corporation. Roe does not have authority from the board of directors to execute such an instrument. Is the deed valid?

**Answer:** Yes, the deed is valid if Doe does not know that Roe is without authority to execute the instrument, or is not aware of any facts that would put Doe on inquiry as to the extent of Roe's authority.

**Authorities & References:** § 692.01, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.0304, Fla. Stat. (2002); *Jackson v. Citizen's Bank & Trust Co.*, 53 Fla. 265, 44 So. 516 (1907); *Snead v. U.S. Trucking Corp.*, 380 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st DCA) *rev. denied* 389 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1980); *Prezioso v. Cameron*, 559 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); *Ocean Bank of Miami v. Inv-Uni Investment Corp.*, 599 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); *Radison Properties Inc. v. Flamingo Groves Inc.*, 767 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); FUND TN 11.05.03.

**Comment:** Whether the person receiving the instrument should inquire as to the authority of the corporate officer to sign for the corporation is necessarily a question of fact in each case. Attorneys for such persons should resolve questions of doubt by requiring evidence of the authority of the corporate officer to convey. *Rothfleisch v. Cantor*, 534 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In the case of fraud, subsequent good faith purchasers for value and without notice of the fraud take free of any defect arising from the fraud. § 692.01, Fla. Stat. (2002); *see* FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS §§ 9.7 – 9.10 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 2000).



STANDARD 4.4

FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

**STANDARD: THE FAILURE OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO OBTAIN A PERMIT PRIOR TO TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN FLORIDA DOES NOT PRECLUDE IT FROM ACQUIRING, HOLDING, ENCUMBERING, OR DISPOSING OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY IN THIS STATE.**

Problem 1: ABC Company, a New York corporation, is the record owner of a tract of land in Florida. It has never obtained a permit to transact business in Florida. The corporation conveyed the property. Is the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same facts as above, except that ABC Company did obtain a permit to transact business in Florida which has since been withdrawn or revoked. Is the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: §§ 607.1501(2) (g), .1501(2) (m) Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); *see Hogue v. D.N. Morrison Const. Co.*, 115 Fla. 293, 156 So. 377 (1934); *Herbert H. Pape, Inc. v. Finch*, 102 Fla. 425, 136 So. 496 (1931); *Rubin v. Kapell*, 105 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); *Batavia, Ltd. v. U.S. By and Through Dept. of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service*, 393 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); FUND TN 11.06.01, 11.06.03.

Comment: Upon the issuance of a certificate of revocation, or upon the filing of an application for withdrawal, the authority of a foreign corporation which had previously obtained a permit to transact business in Florida shall cease. § 607.1531(3), Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1520(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Under the facts of Problem 2, because the foreign corporation conveyed the property without having a valid permit to transact business in Florida, the corporation is in the same position as under the facts of Problem 1. See § 607.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002). The examiner of title should note that a foreign corporation may also own or create a security interest in real property without obtaining a permit to transact business. § 607.1501(2) (g), .1501(2) (m) Fla. Stat. (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.58 (Fla. Bar CLE 2d ed. 1994).

If a foreign corporation conveys property in connection with activities which require a permit to transact business and it does not have the permit, the corporation will be subject to statutory penalties. § 607.1502, Fla. Stat. (2002). However, the conveyance of title will be valid. § 607.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS § 9.6 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 2000).

As to foreign corporations not for profit, the applicable statutes are §§ 617.1501(2) and 617.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002). *See* FUND TN 11.08.02.

STANDARD 4.4-1

DISSOLVED FOREIGN CORPORATION

**STANDARD: TITLE TO FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY HELD BY A DISSOLVED FOREIGN CORPORATION MUST BE CONVEYED BY A PERSON OR PERSONS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE FOREIGN STATE OR COUNTRY TO CONVEY PROPERTY OF THE DISSOLVED FOREIGN CORPORATION.**

Problem 1: XYZ Corporation, incorporated under the laws of Foreign State, secured a permit to transact business in Florida and was subsequently dissolved. After dissolution, XYZ Corporation's board of directors conveyed to John Doe land located in Florida which was owned by the Corporation. The directors had the power to convey property of the dissolved corporation under Foreign State's laws. Does Doe have marketable title?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same as Problem 1, except that under Foreign State's laws the directors did not have the power to convey the property of the corporation after dissolution. Does Doe have marketable title?

Answer: No.

Problem 3: Same as in Problem 1, except that XYZ Corporation's permit to transact business in Florida was withdrawn or revoked, or was never obtained, prior to the conveyance. Does Doe have marketable title?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 607.01401(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1405, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1501, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1505(3), Fla. Stat. (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 299 (2002); 36 Am. Jur. 2d *Foreign Corporations* § 396 (2002); *see Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe*, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); *Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma*, 273 U.S. 257, 260 (1927).

Comment: Foreign corporations are excluded from the requirements of Florida law pertaining to transfer of property after dissolution because foreign corporations are excluded from the definition of a corporation under the statute. § 607.01401, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1405, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.1505(3), Fla. Stat. (2002). Dissolved foreign corporations are thus governed by the laws of the state or country of incorporation. Failure to obtain a valid permit to transact business before making the conveyance is of no consequence to the marketability of title. § 607.1502(5), Fla. Stat. (2002); *see*. § 607.1501, Fla. Stat. (2002); Title Standard 4.4 (Foreign Corporations).

Section 692.03 purports to validate a conveyance executed by the surviving directors or trustees of a dissolved foreign corporation if the conveyance has been of record for at least seven years. FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS § 9.6 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 2000); *but see* FUND TN 11.04.05 (declaring that § 692.03, Fla. Stat. should not be considered as applicable to foreign corporations.)

STANDARD 4.5

CORPORATION DELINQUENT IN FILING ANNUAL  
REPORT OR PAYMENT OF TAXES OR FEES

**STANDARD: THE VALIDITY OF A CONVEYANCE BY A CORPORATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE CORPORATION AT THE TIME OF THE CONVEYANCE WAS DELINQUENT IN THE FILING OF ITS ANNUAL REPORT AND THE PAYMENT OF FEES AND TAXES DUE UNDER CHAPTER 607, Fla. Stat.**

**Problem:** ABC Corporation conveyed a portion of its land. At that time it had not filed its annual report or paid certain corporate fees and taxes that were required at the time. The corporation had not been dissolved and was an existing corporate entity. Was the conveyance valid?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** § 607.1622, Fla. Stat. (2002); *see Webb v. Scott*, 129 Fla. 111, 176 So. 442 (1937); *330 Michigan Avenue, Inc. v. Cambridge Hotel*, 183 So. 2d 725 (1966); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.55 (Fla. Bar CLE 2d ed. 1994); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS § 9.4 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 2000); FUND TN 11.01.06.

**Comment:** Section 607.1622(8), Fla. Stat. (2002) prescribes the penalties for failure to file an annual report conforming to the requirements of § 607.1622(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).

Caution should be exercised, for among the prescribed penalties for failure to file the required annual report is dissolution or cancellation of the corporation's certificate of authority to do business § 607.1622(8), Fla. Stat. (2002).

Part of the requirement of filing an annual report is payment of all fees and taxes due. § 607.1622(8), Fla. Stat. (2002).

STANDARD 4.6

CORPORATION NAME OMITTED FROM SIGNATURE

**STANDARD: THE VALIDITY OF A CONVEYANCE BY A CORPORATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE OMISSION OF THE CORPORATE NAME OVER THE SIGNATURE OF THE OFFICER EXECUTING THE CONVEYANCE WHERE THE CORPORATION NAME APPEARS IN THE BODY OF THE INSTRUMENT AS THE GRANTOR AND THE INSTRUMENT IS OTHERWISE PROPERLY EXECUTED AND ACKNOWLEDGED.**

**Problem:** ABC Corporation is named in the body of a deed as the grantor. The deed is signed by “John Doe, President,” or “John Doe, President of A.B.C. Corporation,” but the name of the corporation does not appear immediately above the signature of the president. Is the deed valid?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *See Ballas v. Lake Weir Light and Water Co.*, 100 Fla. 913, 130 So. 421 (1930); *Steele v. Hallandale, Inc.*, 125 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.50 (Fla. Bar CLE 3d ed. 1997); 18B Am. Jur.2d *Corporations* § 1665 (2002); FUND TN 11.07.02.

**Comment:** In *Ballas*, an executory contract and not a conveyance was involved, but the principles stated appear to apply with equal weight to a conveyance.

STANDARD 4.7

USE OF SCROLL SEAL BY CORPORATION

**STANDARD: A CORPORATION MAY USE A SCROLL SEAL IN LIEU OF AN IMPRESSION SEAL WHEREVER A CORPORATE SEAL IS REQUIRED.**

**Problem:** A deed of ABC Corporation was executed by its president, vice president, or chief executive officer. A scroll seal was used instead of an impression seal. There were no witnesses. Is the deed valid?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** § 692.01, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 695.07, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 695.08, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 607.0302(2), Fla. Stat. (2002); *Jacksonville, M.P. Ry & Nav. Co. v. Hooper*, 160 U.S. 514, 16 S. Ct. 379 (1896); *Sarasota Kennel Club v. Shea*, 56 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1952); *Campbell v. McLaurin Inv. Co.*, 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917); *Cross v. Robinson Point Lumber Co.*, 55 Fla. 374, 46 So. 6 (1908); *Langley v. Owens*, 53 Fla. 302, 42 So. 457 (1906); *Commerford v. Cobb*, 2 Fla. 418 (1859); *Epstein v. Deerfield Beach Bank & Trust Co.*, 280 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). See FUND TN 11.03.02.

**Comment:** As to Florida corporations not for profit, the seal must contain the words “corporation not for profit.” § 617.0302(3), Fla. Stat.

**CHAPTER 5**  
**ESTATES OF DECEDENTS**

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STANDARD 5.1

TITLE DERIVED THROUGH INTESTATE DECEDENT

**STANDARD: TITLE TO REAL ESTATE OF AN INTESTATE DECEDENT (EXCLUDING SURVIVORSHIP ESTATES) PASSES AS OF THE DATE OF DEATH TO THE HEIRS, SUBJECT TO: (1) THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S POSSESSION AND CONTROL OVER REAL ESTATE, OTHER THAN PROTECTED HOMESTEAD, FOR THE PAYMENT OF EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION, DEBTS AND TAXES, OR FOR DISTRIBUTION ; AND (2) THE LIEN OF ESTATE TAXES, IF ANY.**

Problem 1: John Doe died intestate and, although his estate was fully administered in Florida probate proceedings and the personal representative discharged, Blackacre was omitted from the personal representative's certificate of distribution. All heirs conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes, provided federal and Florida estate taxes have been paid or the appropriate statutes of limitation have run on the state and federal estate tax liens.

Problem 2: John Doe died and, although an Order of Summary Administration was entered, both the petition for summary administration and the order omitted Blackacre. Later, all heirs conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe, a bona fide purchaser for value. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes, provided federal and Florida estate taxes, if any, have been paid or the appropriate statutes of limitation have run on the state and federal estate tax liens. The Order of Summary Administration can be relied upon to establish the identity of the heirs.

Authorities & References: § 732.101(2), Fla. Stat.; § 733.607(1); § 733.608(1), (2), Fla. Stat.; *Jones v. Federal Farm Mortg. Corp.*, 132 Fla. 807, 182 So. 226 (1938); *Spitzer v. Branning*, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (Fla. 1938); *Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez*, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.18 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FUND TN 2.09.03.

Comment: Section 732.101(2), Fla. Stat. provides that the decedent's death is the event that vests the heirs' right to the decedent's intestate property. However, for title to be marketable, Florida probate or similar judicial proceedings are necessary to establish the identity of the heirs. In addition, in order to preserve a permanent record of the probate proceedings for *future* marketability purposes, it is strongly recommended that certified copies of the pertinent excerpts be recorded in the official records of the county where the real property is located. Rule 2.075 of the Rules of Judicial Administration permit the destruction of probate proceedings after the lapse of ten years from a final

judgment. At a minimum, the documents to be recorded in an intestate estate are the petition for administration, letters of administration, and order closing the estate and discharging the personal representative if the estate has been closed, as well as the order authorizing the sale by the personal representative if there has been a sale of estate lands.

Under §§ 733.607(1) and 733.608, Fla. Stat., the decedent's real property, except protected homestead, is subject to the possession and control of the personal representative for such purposes as the payment of devises, estate and inheritance taxes, claims, charges, and expenses of the administration and obligations of the decedent's estate.

Protected homestead does not become an asset within the possession and control of the personal representative. *Spitzer v. Branning*, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (Fla. 1938); *Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez*, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988). Therefore, during the administration of the estate, a conveyance from the heirs would not create a marketable title unless: (1) a final order determining the property to be protected homestead had been entered, or (2) the personal representative relinquishes control, or potential control over the asset by quitclaim deed, certificate of distribution or other similar instrument, and estate taxes cleared.

STANDARD 5.2

TITLE DERIVED THROUGH TESTATE DECEDENT

**STANDARD: A WILL IS INEFFECTIVE TO CONVEY TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY UNTIL THE WILL IS ADMITTED TO PROBATE IN FLORIDA, BUT UPON ADMISSION TO PROBATE THE WILL RELATES BACK TO THE DEATH OF THE TESTATOR AND TAKES EFFECT AS OF THAT DATE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TITLE.**

**Problem:** John Doe owned Blackacre at the time he died testate. His will was duly admitted to probate in Florida, the estate was properly and fully administered and the personal representative was duly discharged. The will contained a devise of Blackacre (non-homestead) to the testator's widow, but the legal description in the petition for discharge and distribution was incorrect. Subsequent to the close of the estate Doe's widow conveyed Blackacre by proper description to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

**Answer:** Yes. Title passed to the widow under the will as of the date of Doe's death.

**Authorities & References:** §§ 732.6005, .514, Fla. Stat.; § 733.103, Fla. Stat.; *Sorrells v. McNally*, 105 So 106 (Fla. 1925); *Murphy v. Murphy*, 170 So. 856 (Fla. 1936); *Palmquist v. Johnson*, 155 Fla. 628, 21 So. 2d 353 (1945); *U.S. v. 936.71 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Brevard County, Fla.*, 418 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1969). See § 732.4015, Fla. Stat. concerning homestead property; FUND TN 2.08.02.

**Comment:** Concerning the devise of homestead property, see Title Standard 18.8.

As to nonresident decedents, see Title Standard 5.15.

The Standard is to be construed subject to the intention of the testator as expressed in his will. § 732.6005, Fla. Stat.

This Title Standard does not address the factors to be reviewed in determining whether a property has homestead status or whether a judicial determination of homestead status is required.



STANDARD 5.3

SALE OF NONHOMESTEAD REAL PROPERTY BY PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT COURT  
AUTHORIZATION OR CONFIRMATION

**STANDARD: A CONVEYANCE OF NONHOMESTEAD REAL PROPERTY BY A FLORIDA PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF AN ESTATE WITH POWER OF SALE IN THE WILL, BUT WITHOUT A COURT ORDER AUTHORIZING OR CONFIRMING THE CONVEYANCE, CONFERS MARKETABLE TITLE.**

**Problem:** John Doe was the record owner of Blackacre, (nonhomestead) when he died in 2001. Richard Roe was appointed the personal representative of John Doe's estate by a Florida court. The will contained the following provision: "I confer upon my personal representative full authority to sell and convey any part or all of my estate, real or personal." In 2001 Richard Roe, as personal representative, conveyed Blackacre to Simon Grant, who recorded the deed. No authorization or confirmation of the court appears of record. Does Simon Grant have marketable title?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** § 733.613(2), Fla. Stat.; *In re Granger*, 318 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); FUND TN 2.07.05.

**Comment:** With respect to a limited power of sale, see Title Standard 5.7 (Limitation on Power of Sale).

This Title Standard assumes the power of sale was not personal to the personal representative named in the will. For further discussion, see Title Standard 5.9 (Powers of Successor Personal Representatives).

As to the sale of homestead property by the personal representative, see Title Standard 18.10. For discussion on clearance of estate tax liens, see Chapter 12.

This Title Standard does not address the factors to be reviewed in determining whether a property has homestead status or whether a judicial determination of homestead status is required.

STANDARD 5.4

SALE OF NONHOMESTEAD REAL PROPERTY BY PERSONAL  
REPRESENTATIVES WITH COURT  
AUTHORIZATION OR CONFIRMATION

**STANDARD: WHERE THERE IS NO WILL, OR THE WILL DOES NOT GIVE THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE POWER TO SELL NONHOMESTEAD REAL PROPERTY, PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OR SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION BY THE COURT IS REQUIRED FOR VALID TITLE.**

Problem 1: John Doe appointed Richard Roe as the personal representative in his will. The will did not confer a power of sale on the personal representative. During the course of the administration of the estate, Richard Roe, as personal representative, sold Blackacre to Simon Grant with authorization of the court. Blackacre was not the decedent's homestead. Is the title marketable?

Answer: Yes. (The result would be the same if the court confirmed the sale after it had occurred.)

Authorities & References: § 733.613(1), Fla. Stat.; *In re Estate of Smith*, 200 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); *In re Estate of Gamble*, 183 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); *In re Granger*, 318 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); *Anderson v. Johnson*, 732 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).

Comment: For conveyances made without court authorization but under a power of sale in the will, see Title Standard 5.3 (Sale of Nonhomestead Real Property By Personal Representatives Without Court Authorization or Confirmation).

If the personal representative is the purchaser, see Title Standard 5.5 (Acquisition of Estate Lands by Fiduciaries).

As to the sale of homestead property by the personal representative, see Title Standard 18.10. For discussion on clearance of estate tax liens, see Chapter 12.

This Title Standard does not address the factors to be reviewed in determining whether a property has homestead status or whether a judicial determination of homestead status is required.

STANDARD 5.5

ACQUISITION OF ESTATE LANDS BY FIDUCIARIES PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1979

{Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.}

STANDARD 5.5-1

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES – CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1976 THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT CONVEY MARKETABLE TITLE IN ANY TRANSACTION IN WHICH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, SUCH AS A TRANSACTION IN WHICH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, THE SPOUSE, AGENT OR ATTORNEY OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OR ANY ENTITY OR TRUST IN WHICH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS A SUBSTANTIAL BENEFICIAL INTEREST PURCHASES REAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE, UNLESS (1) THE WILL OR A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEDENT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSACTION; OR (2) THE TRANSACTION WAS APPROVED BY THE COURT AFTER NOTICE TO INTERESTED PERSONS.**

Problem 1: In the estate of John Doe, deceased, a Florida court issued letters testamentary to Richard Roe. The will, which was duly admitted to probate, authorized Richard Roe to sell real property of the estate. In 2002, Richard Roe, as personal representative, conveyed Blackacre to his wife, Mary Roe. Does Mary have marketable title?

Answer: No, unless (1) the will empowered Richard Roe to so dispose of the property, or (2) John Doe executed a contract of sale to Mary before his death, or (3) there was a court authorization or confirmation of the sale.

Problem 2: Richard Roe was duly appointed personal representative by a Florida court. Prior to his death, John Doe contracted to sell Blackacre to Richard Roe. In 2002, John Doe died and Richard Roe as personal representative, completed the conveyance of Blackacre to himself according to the terms of the contract. There was no court authorization or confirmation of the sale. Does Richard Roe have marketable title?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 733.610, Fla. Stat.; *Taylor v. Hopkins*, 472 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); *Iandoli v. Iandoli*, 547 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); FUND TN 2.08.05.

Comment: The cited statute provides that any sale involving a conflict of interest on the part of the personal representative is voidable by any interested party, unless one of the specific conditions described by the Standard is met.

Where the record does not reveal that the transaction was affected by a possible conflict of interest, either through similarity of names or otherwise, a bona fide purchaser subsequently dealing with the real property would appear to be protected. §§ 733.611, .613, Fla. Stat.

See UTS 18.10 for discussion of sales of devised homestead by a personal representative.

STANDARD 5.6

DEED UNDER POWER OF SALE GRANTED TO  
TWO OR MORE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

**STANDARD: IF TWO OR MORE PERSONS ARE APPOINTED JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND UNLESS THE WILL PROVIDES OTHERWISE, (1) THE CONCURRENCE OF ALL JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED PURSUANT TO A WILL OR CODICIL EXECUTED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1987, OR APPOINTED TO ADMINISTER AN INTESTATE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT WHO DIED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1987 IS REQUIRED TO CONVEY PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE; (2) A MAJORITY OF JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED PURSUANT TO A WILL OR CODICIL EXECUTED ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1987, OR APPOINTED TO ADMINISTER AN INTESTATE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT DYING ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1987, IS REQUIRED TO CONVEY PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE. THIS RESTRICTION DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE CONCURRENCE REQUIRED CANNOT BE OBTAINED IN TIME FOR EMERGENCY ACTION TO PRESERVE THE ESTATE, OR WHEN A JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS DELEGATED TO ACT FOR THE OTHERS.**

Problem 1: John Doe's will, admitted to probate in 1973, contained a power of sale and named Richard Roe, John James and Henry Smith as executors. It did not provide for any action to be taken by less than all of them. All three qualified. Richard Roe and Henry Smith executed a deed conveying estate property to Simon Grant later that year. ~~Is~~ Was Grant's title marketable?

Answer: No, unless the court authorized the conveyance by Roe and Smith alone.

Problem 2: Same as above, but John Doe's will was executed in 1980 and offered for probate in 1986.

Answer: No, unless this was an emergency action taken to preserve the estate while John James' concurrence could not be obtained or James had delegated his fellow representatives to act in his absence.

Authorities & References: § 733.615, Fla. Stat.; § 732.50, Fla. Stat. (1973); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE §§ 4.39, 4.42, 13.25 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007).

Comment: Title Standards 5.3 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives Without Court Authorization or Confirmation) and 5.4 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives With Court Authorization or Confirmation) should be considered in applying this Standard.

The surviving qualified personal representatives may exercise a power of sale even though more personal representatives are named in the will. *See* Title Standard 5.11 (Powers of Surviving Personal Representatives).

The Standard takes no position as to what constitutes emergency or delegation nor the means by which that is documented, short of a court order.

STANDARD 5.7

LIMITATION ON POWER OF SALE

**STANDARD: A LIMITED POWER OF SALE CONTAINED IN A WILL MAY BE EXERCISED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSES STATED IN THE WILL UNLESS PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OR SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION IS OBTAINED FROM THE COURT.**

**Problem:** The will of John Doe gave his personal representative power of sale for purpose of paying debts of John Doe to L. Shark. At the time of probate, there was no indebtedness to L. Shark. The personal representative, for full consideration, but without an order of the court, sold real property of the estate to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

**Answer:** No.

**Authorities & References:** § 733.613(1), Fla. Stat.; *Standard Oil Co. v. Mehrtens*, 96 Fla. 455, 118 So. 216 (1928); *In re Estate of Smith*, 200 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); *In re Estate of Gamble*, 183 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 10.5 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.8 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004).

**Comment:** With respect to a sale without court authorization or confirmation, see Title Standard 5.3 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives Without Court Authorization or Confirmation).

STANDARD 5.8

POWER OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE  
TO MORTGAGE REAL ESTATE

**STANDARD: THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT DYING AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1975 MAY MORTGAGE REAL ESTATE, EXCEPT PROTECTED HOMESTEAD, WITHOUT COURT AUTHORIZATION OR CONFIRMATION PROVIDED THE WILL CONTAINS A SPECIFIC POWER TO SELL REAL PROPERTY OR A GENERAL POWER TO SELL ANY ASSET OF THE ESTATE.**

Problem 1: The will of John Doe, who died prior to January 1, 1976, named Richard Roe as executor and contained a general power of sale. Roe, as executor, borrowed \$1,000, which he used for proper estate purposes. To secure this loan, Roe, without an order of the court, executed and delivered a mortgage on real property of the estate. Is the mortgage valid?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Same as problem 1 except that John Doe died after December 31, 1975.

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 733.613(2), Fla. Stat; *Standard Oil Co. v. Mehrrens*, 96 Fla. 455, 118 So. 216 (1928); *Wilson v. Fridenburg*, 21 Fla. 386 (1885); *In re Estate of Gamble*, 183 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1st DCA Fla. 1966); *In re Estate of Smith*, 200 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.20 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.8 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004).

Comment: It should be noted that § 733.613(2), Fla. Stat. expressly states that a specific power to mortgage real property will authorize such action by a personal representative. Under the former Probate Code there was no mention of a specific power to mortgage. See §§ 733.22-.25, Fla. Stat. (1973).

Standard 5.9

RELEASE OF DOWER BY SURVIVING SPOUSE

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for original text.]



STANDARD 5.10

POWERS OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

**STANDARD: FOR DECEDENTS DYING AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1975, A POWER OF SALE CONTAINED IN A WILL AND CONFERRED ON A NAMED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE MAY BE EXERCISED BY A SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL UNLESS THE POWER OF SALE WAS EXPRESSLY MADE PERSONAL TO THE NAMED INDIVIDUAL.**

Problem 1: John Doe died leaving a will that named Richard Roe as personal representative. The will empowered “Richard Roe, and no other, to convey all or part of my real estate.” Richard Roe did not qualify as personal representative; instead, Simon Grant was appointed personal representative and as such conveyed part of the estate to Frank Thomas without a court order. Is Frank Thomas’ title marketable?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: John Doe’s will named Richard Roe and conferred on Richard Roe a power of sale. It did not mention successor personal representatives and contained no further language concerning the power of sale or why it was conferred upon Roe. Richard Roe refused to act as personal representative and Simon Grant was personal representative. In 2006, Simon Grant, without court approval, conveyed part of the estate to Frank Thomas. Is Frank Thomas’ title marketable?

Answer: Yes. It does not appear that John Doe intended to limit the power of sale to Richard Roe.

Authorities § 733.614, Fla. Stat.; PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 10.12 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.8 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); FUND TN 2.08.01.

Comment: Under former § 733.22, Fla. Stat. (1975), a successor personal representative could only exercise a power to sell real estate if the will specifically provided that the power extended to successors, while § 733.614, Fla. Stat. (2009) provides for a successor’s exercise of the power to sell real estate unless the power is made personal to the named personal representative.

Caution is advised whenever a will contains language expressing faith in the judgment or knowledge of a personal representative in connection with a power of sale.

A power of sale may be exercised by a successor personal representative with court authorization or confirmation. *See* Title Standard 5.4 (Sale of Real Property by Personal Representatives with Court Authorization or Confirmation).

STANDARD 5.11

POWERS OF SURVIVING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES

**STANDARD: IF THE APPOINTMENT OF ONE OR MORE JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES IS TERMINATED, OR IF ONE OR MORE NOMINATED JOINT PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES IS NOT APPOINTED, THE REMAINING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE(S) MAY EXERCISE A POWER OF SALE CONTAINED IN THE WILL, UNLESS THE WILL PROVIDES OTHERWISE.**

**Problem:** The will of John Doe contained a power of sale and named John Smith, Richard Roe and Henry James as personal representatives. Smith did not qualify. May Roe and James exercise the power?

**Answer:** Yes, unless the will prohibited such action.

**Authorities & References:** § 733.616, Fla. Stat.; *Stewart v. Mathews*, 19 Fla. 752 (1883); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.8 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 4.42 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007).

**Comment:** Title Standards 5.3 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives Without Court Authorization or Confirmation) and 5.4 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives With Court Authorization or Confirmation) should be considered when applying this Standard.

With respect to who must join in a deed executed pursuant to a power of sale, see Title Standard 5.6 (Deed Under Power of Sale Granted To Two or More Personal Representatives).

STANDARD 5.12

TITLE DERIVED FROM PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE  
NOT HAVING STATUTORY PREFERENCE IN APPOINTMENT

**STANDARD: WITH RESPECT TO ALL INTESTATE OR TESTATE PROCEEDINGS ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1976, TITLE CONVEYED TO A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FROM A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE APPOINTED BY THE COURT IS MARKETABLE EVEN THOUGH THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ONE OF THE PARTIES ENTITLED TO PREFERENCE UNDER § 733.301, Fla. Stat.**

Problem 1: Mary Roe died intestate leaving a son, Richard Roe, as her only heir at law. The son was stationed overseas with the Navy. Formal notice was not served on Richard Roe that Bessie Doe, Mary Roe's neighbor and closest friend, had applied for letters of administration. Bessie Doe was appointed personal representative by the court. May Bessie Doe convey marketable title to a bona fide purchaser?

Answer: Yes, provided that Bessie Doe also had authority to sell the real property.

Problem 2: John Doe died in 2005, leaving a will which named Richard Roe personal representative and which gave the personal representative the power to sell. The will devised all John Doe's property to his friend, Frank Thomas, who was stationed overseas with the Navy. Richard Roe refused the appointment and the court named Simon Grant personal representative. No notice was sent to Frank Thomas, who had not waived his preference. With or without a court order, may Simon Grant convey marketable title to John Doe's real property to a bona fide purchaser?

Answer: Yes. Even though a devisee has statutory preference, a bona fide purchaser may rely on the propriety of the appointment. *See*. § 733.301, Fla. Stat.

Authorities §§ 733.301, .611, .613, Fla. Stat.; *In re Estate of Bush*, 80 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1955); *In re Estate of Williamson*, 95 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1957); *Anderson v. Johnson*, 732 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); *In re Estate of Cunningham*, 104 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE §§ 4.54, 5.5 and 5.6 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007).

Comment: As to whether the personal representative had authority to convey the property, see Title Standards 5.3 (Sale of Real Property By Personal Representatives Without Court Authorization or Confirmation), 5.4 (Sale of Nonhomestead Real Property By Personal Representatives With Court Authorization or Confirmation), 5.6 (Deed Under Power of Sale Granted to Two or More Personal Representatives) and 5.10 (Powers of Successor Personal Representatives).

STANDARD 5.13

PROBATE NON-CLAIM ACT —  
UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA

**STANDARD: THE PROBATE NON-CLAIM ACT, § 733.702, Fla. Stat. IS NOT BINDING AS TO CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT IS BINDING AS TO THE CLAIMS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND ITS AGENCIES.**

Problem 1: United States asserted a claim against the estate of John Doe, deceased, after the expiration of the notice to creditors' period. Is the claim of the United States barred?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: The State of Florida, or one of its agencies, filed a claim against the estate of John Doe, deceased, after the expiration of the notice to creditors period. Is the claim barred?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: 31 U.S.C., § 3713 (2004); § 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2004); *United States v. Summerlin*, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); *State v. Moore's Estate*, 153 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1963); *In re Smith's Estate*, 132 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961); PRACTICE UNDER PROBATE CODE § 8.1 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FUND TN 2.02.04.

STANDARD 5.14

EFFECT OF ORDER OF FINAL DISCHARGE

**STANDARD: AN ORDER OF FINAL DISCHARGE DIVESTS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF CONTROL OVER ESTATE PROPERTY.**

Problem: John Doe died devising Blackacre by his will to his son, Richard Doe. The estate was administered and a final discharge of the personal representative entered. Richard Doe sold Blackacre to Simon Grant. Was Simon Grant's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 733.901, Fla. Stat.; PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 14.9 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007).

STANDARD 5.15

RECITAL OF HEIRSHIP IN DEED

**STANDARD: WHERE A DEED, WHICH CONTAINS A RECITAL THAT THE GRANTORS ARE THE SOLE AND ONLY HEIRS OF A NAMED DECEDENT, HAS BEEN OF RECORD FOR MORE THAN SEVEN YEARS, SUCH RECITAL MAY BE ACCEPTED AS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE TRUTH OF THE RECITAL IN THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION TO THE CONTRARY.**

Problem: John Doe acquired title to Blackacre in 1999. By deed recorded more than seven years ago, Mary Doe, unmarried, Albert Doe, unmarried, and Sarah Doe, unmarried, conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. In the deed there is a recital that the grantors are the sole heirs of John Doe. In the absence of evidence or information to the contrary, may such recital be accepted as sufficient to establish its truth?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 95.22, Fla. Stat.; FUND TN 10.01.01.

STANDARD 5.16

FOREIGN WILL AS MUNIMENT OF TITLE

**STANDARD: A FOREIGN WILL DULY ADMITTED TO RECORD IN FLORIDA WILL PERMIT A VALID CONVEYANCE OF FLORIDA REAL ESTATE BY THE DEVISEES NAMED IN SUCH WILL.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was devised to John Doe under the last will of Richard Roe, who died a resident of New York in 1995. Roe's will was admitted to probate in New York in 1995 and a duly authenticated copy thereof was admitted to record in Florida in 1999 pursuant to *F.S.* 734.104. Thereafter John Doe conveyed the property to Simon Grant. Is Simon Grant's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1 except that an authenticated copy of Roe's will was recorded in 1999 in the Official Records of the county where the land is located. Is Simon Grant's title marketable?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: § 734.104, Fla. Stat.; PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 17.5 (Fla. Bar. CLE 5th ed. 2007); FUND TN 2.05.04.

Comment: The examiner must also be satisfied that: (1) the estate is cleared as to estate taxes and (2) all specific bequests under the will have been paid if Doe acquired title under the residuary clause of Roe's will rather than by means of a specific devise. If the will is not entitled to be admitted to record in Florida, or if the domiciliary proceedings have not been closed and it is impossible to determine whether or not the specific bequests have been paid, in a situation where the Florida real estate passes under the residuary clause of the will, ancillary administration pursuant to § 734.102, Fla. Stat. should be resorted to in order to convey marketable title. It is also possible to proceed under Chapter 735, Part I, Fla. Stat., provided the value of the estate does not exceed the jurisdictional limits applicable under the statute in force at the date of decedent's death. Claims of creditors should be cleared or otherwise addressed for conveyances made within two years of a decedent's death.

STANDARD 5.17

SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE HELD  
BY ESTATE OF NON-RESIDENT DECEDENT

**STANDARD: THE SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE MADE BY A FOREIGN PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OR GUARDIAN TO WHICH IS ATTACHED AN AUTHENTICATED COPY OF LETTERS OR OTHER EVIDENCE SHOWING APPOINTMENT FOR MORE THAN THE STATUTORY PERIOD AND WHERE NO ANCILLARY PROCEDURE HAD BEEN FILED IN THIS STATE MAY BE ACCEPTED AS A SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE ENCUMBERING LANDS IN THIS STATE.**

Problem 1: John Doe, the owner of Blackacre, had mortgaged his property to Richard Roe, a resident of Georgia. Richard Roe died and no ancillary proceedings were taken out in Florida for a period of ninety days. John Doe obtained a satisfaction of mortgage from the foreign personal representative to which was attached a duly authenticated copy of the letters of authority showing appointment more than ninety days prior to the date of the satisfaction of mortgage. Is such satisfaction of mortgage valid in this state without ancillary administration?

Answer: Yes, the statutory period is ninety (90) days for a foreign personal representative.

Problem 2: John Doe, the owner of Blackacre, had mortgaged his property to Richard Roe, a resident Georgia. Richard Roe was declared incompetent and no ancillary proceedings were taken out in Florida for a period of sixty days. John Doe obtained a satisfaction of mortgage from the foreign guardian to which was attached a duly authenticated copy of the letters of authority showing appointment more than sixty days prior to the date of the satisfaction of mortgage. Is such satisfaction of mortgage valid in this state without ancillary proceedings?

Answer: Yes, the statutory period is sixty (60) days for a foreign guardian, curator, or conservator.

Authorities

& References: § 734.101(3), .30(3), Fla. Stat.; § 744.306(3), Fla. Stat.; *See also* former § 744.15(3), Fla. Stat. (1973); PRACTICE UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE § 17.3 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2007); FUND TN 2.08.04.

Comment: The authenticated copies of letters or other evidence showing appointment should show that the authority was in full force and effect on the date of the execution of the satisfaction. *See* § 731.201(1), Fla. Stat. for discussion of “authenticated” copies.



CHAPTER 6

CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP

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STANDARD 6.1

CREATION OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES

**STANDARD: A DEED TO TWO PERSONS WHO ARE, IN FACT, HUSBAND AND WIFE, EVEN THOUGH NOT SO DESIGNATED, CREATES A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES, ALTHOUGH PROOF OF THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE REQUIRED.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was deeded to John Doe and Mary Doe. Later Mary Doe, as the survivor of John Doe, conveyed to Richard Roe by a deed to which a death certificate of John Doe was attached. Is Richard Roe's title to Blackacre marketable?

**Answer:** Yes, provided an affidavit or other suitable evidence appears of record showing that John Doe and Mary Doe were, in fact, husband and wife when they acquired title.

**Authorities & References:** *American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Whitlock*, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936); *Beal Bank SSB v. Almand & Assoc.*, 710 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.03(2) (2004).

**Comment:** With respect to the necessity of proof of continuous marriage, see Title Standard 6.6 (Deed From Survivor Of a Tenancy By the Entireties).

Section 741.211, Fla. Stat., effective January 1, 1968, invalidates common law marriages entered into in Florida on and after the effective date.

Section 741.212, Fla. Stat., effective June 5, 1997, states that marriages between persons of the same sex, wherever created, are not recognized for any purpose in this state.

STANDARD 6.2

INTERSPOUSAL CREATION OF TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES

**STANDARD: A SPOUSE HOLDING TITLE MAY CREATE A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES BY A DEED TO THE OTHER SPOUSE IN WHICH THE PURPOSE TO CREATE THE ESTATE IS STATED, OR BY A DEED TO BOTH SPOUSES.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was owned by John Doe. He executed a deed direct to Mary Doe, his wife, as grantee, expressly stating the purpose to create a tenancy by the entireties between John and Mary Doe. Was a tenancy by the entireties created?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same as above, except the deed to Mary Doe did not contain the statement of purpose, although it did describe her as the grantor's wife. Was a tenancy by the entireties created?

Answer: No. Mary obtained sole ownership.

Problem 3: Blackacre was owned by John Doe. He executed a deed to himself and his wife, Mary Doe. Was a tenancy by the entireties created?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 689.11, Fla. Stat. (2004); *Baumgardner v. Kennedy*, 343 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); *Schuler v. Claughton*, 248 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1957); *Johnson v. Landefeld*, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); 25 Fla. Jur. 2d *Family Law* § 406 (2004); FUND TN 20.01.06.

Comment: Caution should be exercised in applying this Standard to conveyances of homestead property executed prior to January 7, 1969, the effective date of the 1968 Florida Constitution. Where the property conveyed is homestead, see Title Standards 18.1 (Alienation of Homestead Property — Joinder of Spouse), 18.2 (Gratuitous Alienation of Homestead Property Before January 7, 1969), and 18.3 (Gratuitous Alienation of Homestead Property On or After January 7, 1969).

STANDARD 6.3

CONVEYANCE OF ENTIRETIES PROPERTY  
BY ONE SPOUSE TO A THIRD PERSON

**STANDARD: NO INTEREST IN LAND HELD AS A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES CAN BE ENCUMBERED OR CONVEYED TO A THIRD PERSON BY EITHER SPOUSE ACTING ALONE, EXCEPT WHERE ESTOPPEL BY DEED APPLIES.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, as a tenancy by the entireties. Mary Doe, acting alone, executed a deed of Blackacre to Stephen Grant. Subsequently, Mary Doe died, having been continuously married to John. John Doe, as an unmarried man, then conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. Did Roe acquire marketable title to Blackacre free from any interest in Grant?

Answer: Yes. The same result would follow if the instrument executed by Mary Doe alone had been a mortgage.

Problem 2: Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, as a tenancy by the entireties. John Doe, acting alone, executed a mortgage on Blackacre to Stephen Grant. Subsequently, Mary Doe died and John Doe, as an unmarried man, conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. Did Roe acquire marketable title to Blackacre free from any interest in Grant?

Answer: No. Estoppel by deed has been held applicable to a mortgage executed solely by one spouse on property held as a tenancy by the entireties. Although there is no direct authority, it is reasonable to assume that estoppel by deed would be applicable to create a cloud upon title had John Doe executed a deed, rather than a mortgage, to Stephen Grant purporting to convey to fee in Blackacre. *Hillman v. McCutchen*, 166 So. 2d 611 (Fla 3d DCA.1964), *cert. den.* 171 So. 2d 391. *But see Leitner v. Willaford*, 306 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

Problem 3: Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, as a tenancy by the entireties. John and Mary Doe conveyed to Stephen Grant by separate deeds. Did Grant acquire marketable title to Blackacre?

Answer: No. Neither deed should be considered effective to convey an interest in Blackacre. Possibly, the separate deeds could be construed as one, or John or Mary or both could be estopped to assert their interest, but this would not render Grant's title marketable until such determination was made. *But see MacGregor v. MacGregor*, 323 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

Authorities & References: *Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.*, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935); *Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave*, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.03[3] (a) (2004); FUND TN 20.01.02.

STANDARD 6.4

CONVEYANCE OF ENTIRETIES PROPERTY BY  
ONE SPOUSE TO THE OTHER

**STANDARD: A CONVEYANCE OF LAND, HELD AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES, BY ONE SPOUSE TO THE OTHER VESTS TITLE IN THE GRANTEE.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Mary Doe, husband and wife, as tenants by the entireties. Later John Doe, signing alone, deeded the property to Mary Doe, his wife. Did Mary Doe acquire the fee simple title to Blackacre?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *Hunt v. Covington*, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.03[3] (c) (2004).

**Comment:** Where the property conveyed is homestead, see Title Standards 18.1 (Alienation of Homestead — Joinder of Spouse), 18.2 (Gratuitous Alienation of Homestead Before January 7, 1969) and 18.3 (Gratuitous Alienation of Homestead On or After January 7, 1969). *See also* FUND TN 16.02.03.

STANDARD 6.5

EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ON PROPERTY  
HELD AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES

**STANDARD: UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY THE JUDGMENT DISSOLVING THE MARRIAGE, TITLE TO LAND HELD BY A HUSBAND AND WIFE AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES VESTS IN THE PARTIES AS TENANTS IN COMMON WHEN THE JUDGMENT BECOMES FINAL.**

**Problem:** Title to Blackacre was vested in John Doe and Mary Doe, husband and wife. Their marriage was later dissolved by a judgment which made no disposition of Blackacre. Thereafter, John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

**Answer:** No. Mary Doe would still have an undivided one-half interest.

**Authorities & References:** § 689.15, Fla. Stat. (2004); *Owen v. Owen*, 284 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1973); *Reid v. Reid*, 68 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1954); *Markland v. Markland*, 155 Fla. 629, 21 So. 2d 145 (1945); *Locke v. Locke*, 383 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); 25A Fla. Jur. 2d *Family Law* § 719 (2004); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 10.18 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); FUND TN 14.02.01.

**Comment:** The court has broad discretion in equity to adjust the property rights of the parties. *Canakaris v. Canakaris*, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.05[2] (2004).

STANDARD 6.6

PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUATION OF MARRIAGE

**STANDARD: WHERE AN INTEREST IN LAND IS OR WAS PREVIOUSLY VESTED IN TWO PERSONS AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETY, THE CONTINUATION OF THE ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY THROUGH THE DATE OF DIVESTITURE OF THE INTEREST MAY BE PRESUMED IN THE ABSENCE OF RECORD EVIDENCE OF DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was owned by John Doe and Mary Doe as a tenancy by the entireties. Subsequently, John Doe died and Mary Doe recorded a certified copy of the death certificate (or other satisfactory evidence). Mary then conveyed Blackacre to Stephen Grant. Is Grant's title marketable?

Answer: Yes, provided there is no evidence that John and Mary Doe were not continuously married from the inception of their title until his death.

Problem 2: Title vested as above. John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, conveyed to Richard Roe. A certified copy of a judgment against John Doe was recorded in the county in which the land is situated during the ownership by the Does. No evidence of dissolution of the marriage appears of record. Is Roe's title clouded by the final judgment?

Answer: No. The judgment against one spouse does not attach to entireties property, and the continuation of the marriage throughout ownership may be presumed.

Problem 3: Title vested as above. In a foreclosure action is it necessary to join a judgment creditor of one of the spouses?

Answer: No, absent evidence of termination of the marriage by dissolution or death, the marriage is presumed to have continued throughout ownership.

Authorities & References: § 689.15, Fla. Stat. (2004); *General Properties Corp. v. Gore*, 153 Fla. 236, 14 So. 2d 411 (1943); 25 Fla. Jur. 2d *Family Law* § 49 (2004).

Comment: Although the standard indicates that an affidavit of continuous marriage is not necessary, it is always desirable, and should be obtained, particularly in current transactions where one or both of the parties is available. In the case of divestiture by foreclosure, the entire court file, particularly any part relating to service of process, should be examined for indications that the parties are no longer married.

STANDARD 6.7

TITLE IN SURVIVING TENANT BY  
THE ENTIRETIES — HOMESTEAD

**STANDARD: UPON THE DEATH OF EITHER SPOUSE, FEE SIMPLE TITLE TO PROPERTY HELD AS A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES VESTS IN THE SURVIVING SPOUSE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE STATUS OF THE PROPERTY AS HOMESTEAD.**

**Problem:** John Doe and Mary Doe, husband and wife, acquired title to Blackacre as tenants by the entireties. Thereafter, they resided on the property with their minor children. Upon the death of either John Doe or Mary Doe, does fee simple title to Blackacre vest in the surviving spouse?

**Answer:** Yes. The stated result depends on the valid establishment of a tenancy by the entireties in the first instance.

**Authorities & References:** § 732.401(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); *Regero v. Daugherty*, 69 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1953); *Menendez v. Rodriguez*, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932); *Kinney v. Mosher*, 100 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.24 (2004).

**Comment:** For questions arising with respect to homestead property, see Title Standards, Ch. 18 (Homestead).

STANDARD 6.8

CREATION OF JOINT TENANCY

**STANDARD: A DEED TO TWO OR MORE GRANTEEES OTHER THAN HUSBAND AND WIFE, AS "JOINT TENANTS" CREATES A TENANCY IN COMMON UNLESS THE DEED EXPRESSLY PROVIDES FOR THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was deeded to John Doe and Richard Roe as joint tenants. John Doe died and Richard Roe conveyed the entire fee to Simon Grant. Is Simon Grant's title marketable?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Blackacre was deeded to John Doe and Richard Roe as joint tenants, with right of survivorship. John Doe died and Richard Roe conveyed the entire fee to Simon Grant. Is Simon Grant's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 689.15, Fla. Stat. (2004); *Kozacik v. Kozacik*, 157 Fla. 597, 26 So. 2d 659 (1946); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 10.16 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 20.02(2) (2004).



STANDARD 6.9

MORTGAGES MADE TO HUSBAND AND WIFE CREATE  
A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES

**STANDARD: ANY MORTGAGE ENCUMBERING REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY ASSIGNMENT OF A MORTGAGE ENCUMBERING REAL PROPERTY, MADE TO TWO PERSONS WHO ARE HUSBAND AND WIFE, CREATES A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES IN SUCH MORTGAGE AND THE OBLIGATION SECURED THEREBY UNLESS A CONTRARY INTENTION APPEARS IN SUCH MORTGAGE OR ASSIGNMENT OR THE OBLIGATION SECURED THEREBY.**

**Problem:** John Doe holds a mortgage on Blackacre. He assigns the mortgage to X and X's wife. Does the assignment of the mortgage create a tenancy by the entireties?

**Answer:** Yes. Unless the assignment or mortgage indicates otherwise, a tenancy by the entireties will be created.

**Authorities & References:** § 689.115, Fla. Stat. (2004); *Vandenberg v. Wells*, 721 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); 25 Fla. Jur. 2d *Family Law* § 392 (2004).

**Comment:** The Legislature enacted § 689.115, Fla. Stat. in response to *Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. DeWitt*, 458 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In *DeWitt*, the court held that a mortgage was intangible personal property. As personalty, the mortgage would be held as tenants in common unless the intention of the parties to create a tenancy by the entireties could be proven.

The last five words of this Title Standard (“or the obligation secured thereby”) do not appear in § 689.115, Fla. Stat. but were added to indicate the Standard should not be relied on if a contrary intention is stated in the obligation secured.

This Title Standard may not be applicable to notes and mortgages held outside the State of Florida. See *In re Estate of Siegel*, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), *cert. den.* 366 So. 2d 425; FUND TN 22.05.03.

CHAPTER 7

LEASES

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STANDARD 7.1

TRANSFER OF LESSEE'S INTEREST

**STANDARD: A LEASEHOLD ESTATE IS FREELY ALIENABLE UNLESS THE LEASE PROVIDES OTHERWISE.**

**Problem:** John Doe leases a building to Richard Roe. The lease is silent on the subject of transfer of the lessee's interest. May Roe sublease or assign his lease?

**Answer:** Yes. Where the lease is silent there is no restraint upon its alienation.

**Authorities & References:** *Frissell v. Nichols*, 94 Fla. 403, 114 So. 431 (1927); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY COMPLEX TRANSACTIONS § 10.12 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2005); 4 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 50.21[5] [a] (2004).

STANDARD 7.2

PRIORITY OF LEASE AS AGAINST  
SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE

**STANDARD: A RECORDED LEASE IS AN ENCUMBRANCE ON THE TITLE SENIOR TO ALL SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGES BY THE LESSOR, SO THAT A FORECLOSURE OF SUCH SUBSEQUENT MORTGAGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE LESSEE.**

Problem: John Doe leased his building to Richard Roe. The lease was recorded. John Doe later mortgaged the property to Simon Grant, who foreclosed for nonpayment of the mortgage. Will the foreclosure proceedings terminate Richard Roe's tenancy?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: *Jones v. Florida Lakeland Homes Co.*, 95 Fla. 964, 117 So. 228 (1928).

Comment: An unrecorded lease may also be superior to a subsequent mortgage by the lessor if the lessee was in possession of the property at the time the mortgage was executed. *See Marion Mortgage Co. v. Grennan*, 143 So. 761 (Fla. 1932).

STANDARD 7.3

CANCELLATION OF LEASES

**STANDARD: A LEASE FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR MUST BE ASSIGNED OR CANCELLED BY AN INSTRUMENT IN WRITING SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF TWO SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was leased to John Doe for 99 years by a recorded lease. Two years later an unwitnessed instrument purporting to assign or cancel the lease was placed on record. Is the instrument sufficient to assign or cancel the lease?

**Answer:** No.

**Authorities & References:** § 689.01, Fla. Stat. (1979); *Grable v. Maroon*, 40 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1949); FUND TN 19.02.01.

**Comment:** It is unclear whether defects in the execution of a cancellation or assignment of a lease may be cured by § 95.231, Fla. Stat. (2004).

**CHAPTER 8**  
**CONSTRUCTION LIENS**

---

STANDARD 8.1

EFFECTIVE DATES OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS

**STANDARD: IN ORDER TO PERFECT A CONSTRUCTION LIEN, A CLAIM OF LIEN MUST BE RECORDED. CONSTRUCTION LIENS FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OR SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS ATTACH AND TAKE PRIORITY AT THE TIME THE CLAIM OF LIEN IS RECORDED. ALL OTHER CONSTRUCTION LIENS, WHEN PERFECTED, ATTACH AND TAKE PRIORITY AS OF THE TIME OF RECORDATION OF AN UNEXPIRED NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT, EXCEPT THAT IN THE EVENT NO NOTICE OF COMMENCEMENT IS RECORDED, SUCH LIENS ATTACH AND TAKE PRIORITY AS OF THE TIME THE CLAIM OF LIEN IS RECORDED.**

Problem 1:           A notice of commencement for the construction of apartment buildings on Blackacre was recorded Jan. 2, 2004. Construction was clearly visible on Jan. 15, 2004. On March 1, 2004 an architect recorded a claim of lien for services rendered in connection with the landscaping for the apartments. When did the architect's lien attach?

Answer:             March 1, 2004.

Problem 2:           Same facts as Problem 1 except that on Dec. 10, 2004 a subcontractor timely filed for record a claim of lien for roofing work done on the apartments. When did the subcontractor's lien attach?

Answer:             Jan. 2, 2004.

Problem 3:           Apartment buildings were being constructed on Blackacre. Construction visibly commenced on Jan. 15, 2004, but no notice of commencement was filed. On Dec. 10, 2004, a subcontractor timely filed for record a claim of lien for roofing work done on the apartments. When did the subcontractor's lien attach?

Answer:             Dec. 10, 2004.

Problem 4:           A recorded notice of commencement does not contain an effective date. When does it expire?

**Answer:** If no expiration date is stated in the notice, it expires one year from the date of recording. A claim of lien recorded after the expiration of a notice of commencement will take effect as of the date such lien was recorded.

**Authorities & References:** §§ 713.07(1), .07(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); § 713.08, Fla. Stat. (2005); *Page Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Goldmar Homes, Inc.*, 338 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 33.05, 33.09 (2004).

**Comment:** The mere visible commencement of improvements, in the absence of a recorded notice of commencement, is no longer important with respect to the time at which a construction lien attaches.

The notice of commencement, in itself, does not constitute a lien or notice of a lien. § 713.13(3), Fla. Stat. (2005).

As regards the time at which a construction lien attaches, no distinction is made between lienors in privity with the owner and those not in privity with the owner. *See* § 713.05, .06, Fla. Stat. (2004); § 713.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2005).

If none of the improvements mentioned in the notice of commencement are begun within ninety days after the recording thereof, the notice is void and of no effect. § 713.13(2), Fla. Stat. (2005).

## STANDARD 8.2

### DURATION OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS

**STANDARD: CONSTRUCTION LIENS ON REAL PROPERTY ARE EXTINGUISHED ONE YEAR AFTER THE RECORDING OF THE INITIAL CLAIM OF LIEN UNLESS WITHIN THAT TIME AN ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LIEN HAS BEEN COMMENCED. THEREAFTER, THE LIEN WILL NOT BE GOOD AGAINST CREDITORS OR SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION WITHOUT NOTICE UNLESS A NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS HAS ALSO BEEN RECORDED. THE PERIOD DURING WHICH AN ACTION MUST BE COMMENCED IS SHORTENED IF A NOTICE OF CONTEST IS RECORDED AND SERVED ON THE LIENOR, IN WHICH EVENT AN ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LIEN MUST BE COMMENCED WITHIN SIXTY DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF A NOTICE OF CONTEST; OTHERWISE, THE LIEN IS EXTINGUISHED. BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING THE OWNER OR LIENOR MAY CAUSE THESE PERIODS TO BE STAYED OR EXTENDED.**

Problem 1: A claim of lien is recorded on January 2, 2004. Nothing else appears of record and no action to enforce the lien has been commenced. Can marketable title be conveyed after January 2, 2005?

Answer: Yes. The lien is extinguished and no action may be brought to enforce it.

Problem 2: A claim of lien is recorded on January 2, 2004. An action to enforce the lien is commenced on December 5, 2004. No notice of lis pendens is recorded. Can marketable title be conveyed to a purchaser for value without notice on January 8, 2005?

Answer: Yes. Unless a notice of lis pendens is recorded, the lien is extinguished upon such real property held by a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value without notice.

Problem 3: A claim of lien is recorded on January 2, 2004. A notice of contest is recorded and served upon the lienor on March 1, 2004. No action to foreclose the lien was commenced. Can marketable title be conveyed on May 15, 2004?

Answer: Yes. An owner may elect to shorten the duration of a construction lien by causing a notice of contest to be recorded and served upon the lienor. If the lienor fails to institute an action to enforce the lien within sixty days after service of such notice the lien is automatically extinguished.

Problem 4: Same facts as Problem 3 except that the lienor amended his claim of lien on March 20, 2004. Can marketable title be conveyed on May 15, 2004?

Answer: Yes. The filing of an amended claim of lien does not toll the running of the sixty day time limitation.

Authorities &  
References:

§§ 713.21(3), .22(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2004); *Jack Stilson & Co. v. Caloosa Bayview Corp.*, 278 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1973); *Kimbrell v. Fink*, 78 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1955); *Bowery v. Babbit*, 99 Fla. 1151, 128 So. 801 (1930); 11 U.S.C., § 108(c); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.11 (2004); FUND TN 21.02.02.

Comment:

Any interested party may further shorten the period within which a construction lien may be enforced by filing a complaint in the circuit court of the county in which the land is located. Upon the filing of such complaint the clerk will issue a summons to the lienor, and unless the lienor institutes an action to enforce the lien or shows cause why the lien should not be enforced within 20 days, the court will cancel the lien. § 713.21(4), Fla. Stat. (2004).



STANDARD 8.3

CLAIM OF LIEN -- NOTICE

**STANDARD: A CLAIM OF LIEN PROPERLY RECORDED CONSTITUTES CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO ALL PERSONS OF THE CONTENTS AND EFFECT OF SUCH CLAIM.**

Problem: A claim of lien has been recorded on Blackacre. Is a title examiner on constructive notice of the existence of a lien?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 713.08(5), Fla. Stat. (2005); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.05[3] [c] [i] (2004).

Comment: Errors or omissions in the claim of lien will not affect its validity as against one not adversely affected by the error or admission. § 713.08(4) (a) (c), Fla. Stat. (2005);

STANDARD 8.4

CONSTRUCTION LIENS - PRIORITY AS AGAINST  
PURCHASERS AND OTHERS

**STANDARD: CONSTRUCTION LIENS HAVE PRIORITY OVER ANY CONVEYANCE OR ENCUMBRANCE NOT RECORDED AS OF THE TIME THE LIEN ATTACHES, BUT CONVEYANCES OR ENCUMBRANCES RECORDED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE LIEN ATTACHES HAVE PRIORITY OVER SUCH LIENS.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was being improved and a notice of commencement had been recorded. Subsequently, John Doe, the owner of Blackacre, mortgaged it to Richard Roe. The mortgage was recorded. Thereafter a subcontractor properly recorded a claim of lien for work performed during the construction. Is the mortgagee's interest in Blackacre subordinate to that of the lienor?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe obtains a construction mortgage in order to improve Blackacre. The mortgage contains a valid clause securing future advances. The mortgagee records the mortgage before the notice of commencement or any claims of lien are recorded. Thereafter the mortgagee makes disbursements pursuant to the mortgage subsequent to the recording of the notice of commencement. Are both the mortgagee's interest in Blackacre and the later disbursements protected against the claims of lienors?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 697.04, Fla. Stat (2005); § 713.07(3), Fla. Stat. (2005); *Industrial Supply Corp. v. Bricker*, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.09[3] (2004).

Comment: Mortgages securing future advances take priority from the date of the recording thereof provided the mortgage instrument complies with § 697.04, Fla. Stat. Advances made within twenty years of the execution of such a mortgage shall be protected as against liens attaching subsequent to the recording of the mortgage instrument. § 697.04, Fla. Stat. (2005) § 713.07(3), Fla. Stat. (2005); *Industrial Supply Corp. v. Bricker*, 306 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).

STANDARD 8.5

VALIDITY OF CONSTRUCTION LIENS INCURRED  
BY LESSEE AS AGAINST LESSOR'S INTEREST

**STANDARD: CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS FOR WORK DONE AND MATERIAL FURNISHED AT THE REQUEST OF A LESSEE MAY ENCUMBER THE TITLE OF THE LESSOR IF THE IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LESSEE AND LESSOR EXCEPT WHEN THE LEASE PROHIBITS SUCH LIENS AND THE LEASE OR A SHORT FORM THEREOF HAS BEEN RECORDED.**

**Problem:** John Doe leased Blackacre to Richard Roe. In accordance with the terms of the lease, Roe caused improvements to be constructed upon Blackacre. A materialman filed a lien against the land for nonpayment by Roe. The lease was recorded but did not expressly provide that Doe's interest would not be subject to liens for improvements made on behalf of the lessee. Is the lien enforceable against Doe's interest?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** § 713.10, Fla. Stat. (2005); *Anderson v. Sokolik*, 88 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1956); *Edward L. Nezelek, Inc. v. Food Fair Properties Agency, Inc.*, 309 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); *Robb v. Lott Paving Co.*, 289 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); *Jenkins v. Graham*, 237 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.03[2] [b] (2004).

**Comment:** § 713.10, Fla. Stat. (2005) provides that, in the absence of fraud, the title of the lessor shall not be subject to liens for improvements made by the lessee when the lease is recorded and expressly prohibits such liability. It is not clear whether such an express prohibition will prevent exposure of the lessor's interest where the recorded lease also contains a provision requiring the lessee to make the improvements. *14th Heinberg v. Henricksen & Co.*, 877 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

No position is taken with respect to what may be required to constitute a sufficient agreement between the lessee and lessor. Furthermore, although not entirely clear, it would appear that there is no requirement that such agreement be contained in the lease itself. *See* § 713.10, Fla. Stat. (2005).

STANDARD 8.6

CONSTRUCTION LIENS -- WAIVER

**STANDARD: A LIENOR MAY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM A CONSTRUCTION LIEN ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF LABOR, SERVICES, OR MATERIAL FURNISHED PRIOR TO THE DATE OF SUCH WAIVER.**

Problem 1: A written contract between the owner and contractor prior to the commencement of construction provided that the contractor waived his right to claim a lien pursuant to Chapter 713, Part 1, Florida Statutes. Does a claim of lien thereafter recorded by the contractor constitute a valid construction lien?

Answer: Yes, because lien rights cannot be waived prior to the furnishing of services or materials for which a lien is claimed. *See* UTS 8.3.

Authorities & References: § 713.20(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.10[1] (2004).

Comment: Acceptance of an unsecured note by the lienor for all or any part of his claim does not constitute a waiver thereof unless expressly so agreed in writing. § 713.20(1), Fla. Stat. (2005); *Ideal Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Katzentine*, 127 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).

## CHAPTER 9

### JUDGMENTS AND MORTGAGES

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#### STANDARD 9.1

#### LIEN OF JUDGMENT

**STANDARD: A FLORIDA COURT JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF MONEY RECORDED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 1972, DOES NOT BECOME A LIEN ON THE DEBTOR'S REAL ESTATE UNTIL A CERTIFIED COPY THEREOF IS RECORDED IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OR THE JUDGMENT LIEN RECORDS OF THE COUNTY WHERE THE LAND IS LOCATED, WHICHEVER IS MAINTAINED AT THE TIME OF RECORDATION. EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1993, THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT BECOME A LIEN UNLESS IT CONTAINS THE ADDRESS OF THE PERSON WHO HAS THE LIEN OR IS RECORDED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH AN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING SUCH INFORMATION.**

**Problem 1** John Doe recovered a judgment in Alachua County against Richard Roe on July 1, 1984. The *original* judgment was recorded in the Official Records of Alachua County, where Roe's land was located. However, a certified copy of the judgment was not recorded in that county. Roe conveyed his Alachua County land to Mary Loe in 1987. Is Loe's title free from the lien of the judgment?

**Answer:** Yes. Recording a certified copy of a judgment, order or decree is essential to obtain a valid lien on real estate. Once a certified copy of the judgment is recorded, the lien becomes a general lien on all of the debtor's real estate located in the county of recordation.

**Problem 2** A certified copy of a money judgment was recorded on January 4, 1995, in the county where Richard Roe owned non-homestead real property. The judgment did not contain the address of the judgment creditor, nor did the creditor simultaneously record a separate affidavit stating the creditor's address. Richard Roe sold the property to Mary Loe. Is Loe's title free from the lien of the judgment?

**Answer:** Yes. A certified copy of a judgment recorded on or after October 1, 1993, becomes a lien provided that (1) it contains the lienor's address, or (2) a separate affidavit stating the lienor's address is recorded simultaneously therewith.

**Authorities and References:** § 55.07(1), Fla. Stat.; *Steinbrecher v. Cannon*, 501 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), *rev. denied*, 509 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1987); *Robinson v. Sterling Door & Window Co., Inc.*, 698 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); *Hott Interiors, Inc. v. Fostock*, 721 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); *In re Lee*, 223 B.R. 594 (Bkrcty. M.D. Fla. 1998); *Decubellis v. Ritchotte*, 730 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); *In re Jackie Johns, DMD, P.A.* 267 B.R. 901 (Bkrcty. S.D. Fla. 2001); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.05[1] (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.20 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996).

Comment: § 55.10, Fla. Stat. applies whether the judgment is rendered in a state or federal court located within Florida. *See* 28 U.S.C. 1962; 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.05[2] (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.20 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996).

An *execution* lien on real property cannot attach before a judgment lien attaches. Therefore, the mere act of delivering a writ of execution to and levy by a sheriff cannot alone create a lien on real property. A certified copy of a final judgment must be recorded before a lien on real property is created. *Diaz v. Plumhoff*, 742 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).

For a discussion of the statute of limitations on judgment liens, see Title Standard 9.2, for a discussion of the limitations period on judgment liens recorded on or after July 1, 1987, see Title Standard 9.2-1 (Limitations on Lien of Judgments on or after July 1, 1987, and prior to July 1, 1994) and Title Standard 9.2-2 (Limitations on Lien of Judgments on or after July 1, 1994).

## STANDARD 9.2

### LIMITATION ON LIEN OF JUDGMENT

**STANDARD: SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF § 55.10, Fla. Stat., NO CERTIFIED COPY OF A FLORIDA COURT JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR DECREE SHALL BE A LIEN UPON REAL PROPERTY WITHIN THE STATE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF TWENTY (20) YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THE ENTRY OF SUCH JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR DECREE.**

**Problem:** John Doe recovered a judgment against Richard Roe on July 8, 1985. John Doe did not record a certified copy of his judgment in the Official Records until August 3, 1986. When will the lien of the judgment expire?

**Answer:** At midnight on July 8, 2005, twenty years after the *entry* of the judgment. The twenty-year period is measured from the date of entry of the judgment, not from the date of recording the judgment or certified copy thereof.

**Authorities & References:** § 55.081, Fla. Stat.; § 55.10(1)-(4), Fla. Stat.; 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.05[3] (2002); Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.090.

**Comment:** The twenty-year limitation period is applicable to judgments entered in federal as well as state courts, except as otherwise provided below. *See* 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.05[2] (2002); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.20c (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996); FUND TN 18.03.03.

The twenty-year statute of limitations applies to judgments, orders or decrees in favor of the State of Florida in accordance with specific statutory authority. *See*, for example, § 938.29, Fla. Stat. (public defender liens) and § 775.089, Fla. Stat. (restitution liens).

**Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act.** A judgment obtained under the Federal Debt Collection Procedure Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C., § 3001, et seq., becomes a lien on real property of the judgment debtor upon filing a certified copy of the abstract of judgment. Said lien has a duration of twenty years from date of recording and may be renewed for an additional twenty year period upon filing of a notice of renewal prior to the expiration of the first twenty-year term and upon court approval of said renewal. 28 U.S.C. § 3201(c); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE, § 5.20c (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996). Section 55.081, Fla. Stat. does not apply to judgments obtained under the Act. It is unclear whether § 55.081, Fla. Stat. applies to all other judgments entered in favor of the United States. *See Custer v. McCutcheon*, 283 U.S. 514 (1931); *United States v. Kellum*, 523 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1975); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.126 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996).

**Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.** Effective October 1, 1984, under the Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, §§ 55.501-.509, Fla. Stat., a lien is created by recording a certified copy of a final judgment from another state in the Official Records of the county where the property sought to be liened is located together with an affidavit and mailing of notice as set forth under § 55.505, Fla. Stat. The statute of limitations for such a lien is the same as §§ 55.10 and 55.081, Fla. Stat. or the statute of limitations of the state where the judgment was rendered, whichever is less.

*See In Re Tranter*, Bkrptcy 245 B.R. 419 (Bkrcty. S.D. Fla. 2000) and *Muka v. Horizon Financial Corp.*, 766 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Effective June 2, 1994, this act was amended to include any judgment, decree or order of a court of the United States.

**Uniform Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act.** Effective October 1, 1994, under the Uniform Out-of-country Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, §§ 55.601-.607, Fla Stat., lien on real property is created after recording, in the public records of the county where enforcement is sought, a certified copy of the foreign country judgment together with an affidavit and mailing of notice as required by § 55.604, Fla. Stat. and recording of a clerk's certificate or order recognizing the foreign judgment. The twenty-year statute of limitations in § 95.11(1), Fla. Stat. that applies to actions on state court judgments has been held to apply to actions on foreign country judgments recorded under the Act. *Nadd v. Le Credit Lyonnais, S.A.*, 741 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) *app'd* 804 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2002).

The twenty-year statute of limitations might be terminated early by the death of the judgment debtor. *See* FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.28 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996). Further, a judgment lien is not enforceable when the judgment debtor has been dead for two years and administration was not commenced on the estate within two years after debtor's death pursuant to § 733.710, Fla. Stat. This latter statute would not be applicable to eliminate a lien on property that decedent conveyed during his/her lifetime.

For a discussion of the limitations period on certified copies of judgments recorded on or after July 1, 1987, see Title Standard 9.2-1 (Limitations on Lien of Judgments on or after July 1, 1987, and prior to July 1, 1994) and Title Standard 9.2-2 (Limitations on Lien of Judgments on or after July 1, 1994).



STANDARD 9.2-1

LIMITATIONS ON LIEN OF JUDGMENTS RECORDED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1987, AND PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1994

**STANDARD: A FLORIDA COURT JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR DECREE RECORDED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1987, AND PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1994, BECOMES A LIEN ON REAL ESTATE IN ANY COUNTY WHEN A CERTIFIED COPY THEREOF IS RECORDED IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THAT COUNTY, AND IT SHALL BE A LIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED SEVEN (7) YEARS FROM THE DATE OF RECORDING THE CERTIFIED COPY IN THAT COUNTY. THE JUDGMENT LIEN MAY BE EXTENDED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED TEN YEARS BY RE-RECORDING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD. THE JUDGMENT LIEN MAY BE EXTENDED FURTHER BY RE-RECORDING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE ADDITIONAL TEN-YEAR PERIOD. IN NO EVENT, HOWEVER, SHALL THE LIEN UPON REAL ESTATE EXTEND BEYOND THE TWENTY-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN § 55.081, Fla. Stat.**

**Problem:** John Doe recovered a judgment against Richard Roe on July 1, 1986. John Doe did not record a certified copy of his judgment in the Official Records until August 3, 1990. When did the lien of the judgment expire?

**Answer:** On midnight August 3, 1997, seven years after the certified copy of the judgment was *recorded*. However, if John Doe properly re-recorded a certified copy of the judgment, then the lien would not expire until midnight July 1, 2006, twenty years after the entry of the judgment.

**Authorities & References:** §§ 55.10(1)-(4), Fla. Stat.; § 55.081, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.090.

**Comment:** Section 55.10(1)-(4), Fla. Stat. applies prospectively, not retroactively.

For a discussion of the twenty-year period provided by § 55.081, Fla. Stat. *See* Title Standard 9.2 (Limitation on Lien of Judgment).

The requirement for an address affidavit set forth under Title Standard 9.1 also applies to extensions of judgments.

In the absence of case law interpreting the various amendments to § 55.10, Fla. Stat., it is unclear whether a judgment lien re-recorded after expiration of its initial lien period is valid as a new and separate lien.

STANDARD 9.2-2

LIMITATIONS ON LIEN OF JUDGMENTS RECORDED ON OR AFTER  
JULY 1, 1994

**STANDARD: A FLORIDA COURT JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE RECORDED ON OR AFTER JULY 1, 1994, BECOMES A LIEN ON REAL ESTATE IN ANY COUNTY WHEN A CERTIFIED COPY THEREOF IS RECORDED IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THAT COUNTY, AND IT SHALL BE A LIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED TEN (10) YEARS FROM THE DATE OF RECORDING THE CERTIFIED COPY IN THAT COUNTY. THE JUDGMENT LIEN MAY BE EXTENDED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED TEN YEARS BY RE-RECORDING A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT, ORDER OR DECREE PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF THE INITIAL TEN-YEAR PERIOD. IN NO EVENT, HOWEVER, SHALL THE LIEN UPON THE REAL ESTATE EXTEND BEYOND THE TWENTY-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN § 55.081, Fla. Stat.**

**Problem:** John Doe recovered a judgment against Richard Roe on July 1, 1993. John Doe did not record a certified copy of his judgment in the Official Records until August 1, 1994. When will the lien of the judgment expire?

**Answer:** On midnight August 1, 2004, ten years after the certified copy of the judgment was recorded. However, if John Doe properly re-records a certified copy of the judgment, then the lien would not expire until midnight July 1, 2013.

**Authorities & References** §§ 55.10(1)-(4), Fla. Stat.; § 55.081, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.090.

**Comments:** Section 55.10(1)-(4), Fla. Stat. applies prospectively, not retroactively.

For a discussion of the twenty-year period provided by § 55.081, Fla. Stat. see Title Standard 9.2 (Limitation on Lien of Judgment).

The requirement for an address affidavit set forth under Title Standard 9.1 also applies to extensions of judgments.

In the absence of case law interpreting the various amendments to § 55.10, Fla. Stat. it is unclear whether a judgment lien re-recorded after expiration of its initial lien period is valid as a new and separate lien.

STANDARD 9.3

SERVICE OF PROCESS

**STANDARD: SINCE IT IS SERVICE OF PROCESS, RATHER THAN RETURN OF PROCESS, WHICH GIVES A COURT JURISDICTION OVER A DEFENDANT, RETURN OF VALIDLY EFFECTIVE SERVICE OF PROCESS CAN BE AMENDED TO SPEAK THE TRUTH. HOWEVER, UNTIL PROPER PROOF OF SERVICE IS MADE, A COURT IS WITHOUT EFFECTIVE JURISDICTION TO ENTER ANY JUDGMENT AGAINST A DEFENDANT WHO HAS NOT APPEARED IN THE CAUSE OR OTHERWISE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT'S JURISDICTION.**

Problem 1: Valid service of process was made on John and Jane Doe, defendants in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. However, the sheriff's return recited only that service was made on Jane Doe. John Doe's name did not appear on the return of service. The sheriff amended the return *after* the judgment was entered to add his name. Is the judgment valid against John Doe?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Valid service of process is made on John and Jane Doe, defendants in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. However, the sheriff's return recited only that service was made on Jane Doe. John Doe's name did not appear on the return of service. The sheriff amended the return to add his name *before* the entry of the judgment. Is the judgment valid against John Doe?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *Klosenski v. Flaherty*, 116 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1960); *Largay Enterprises, Inc. v. Berman*, 61 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1952); *International Typographical Union v. Ormerod*, 59 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1952); *Wilmott v. Wilmott*, 119 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), *aff'd* 122 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960); § 48.21, Fla. Stat.; Fla. R. Civ. Pro. 1.070; FUND TN 12.07.06.

STANDARD 9.4

TITLE ACQUIRED BY MORTGAGOR AFTER EXECUTION OF MORTGAGE

**STANDARD: A MORTGAGE GIVEN BY A MORTGAGOR THEN HAVING NO TITLE, BUT WHO SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRES TITLE, IS VALID EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES MAY HAVE INTERVENED.**

**Problem:** John Doe mortgaged Blackacre to Richard Roe. Doe was not then the owner of Blackacre, but subsequently acquired title thereto. Does the lien of Roe's mortgage attach to the after-acquired title?

**Answer:** Yes. The mortgagor's after-acquired title inures to the benefit of the mortgagee.

**Authorities & References** *Taylor v. Federal Farm Mortg. Corp.*, 193 So. 758 (Fla. 1940); *Florida Land Inv. Co. v. Williams*, 92 So. 876 (Fla. 1922); *Hillman v. McCutchen*, 166 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), *cert. den.*, 171 So.2d 391; 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 15.05 (2002).

**Comment:** This Standard involves only the validity of the mortgage. Caution should be exercised with respect to the rights of third parties.

The above Standard may not apply to purchase money mortgages in some situations. *See Nelson v. Diggins*, 149 So. 613 (Fla. 1933); *Florida Land Inv. Co. v. Williams*, 92 So. 876 (Fla. 1922) and further proceedings at 116 So. 642 (Fla. 1928); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 15.05 (2002); FUND TN 22.03.10.

STANDARD 9.5

MERGER OF TITLE AND MORTGAGE

**STANDARD: A DEED FROM THE FEE OWNER TO THE MORTGAGE HOLDER, WHICH SHOWS AN INTENTION TO DISCHARGE THE MORTGAGE, CREATES A MERGER AND THE MORTGAGE IS DISCHARGED.**

**Problem:** John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe, the holder of a mortgage encumbering Blackacre, reciting therein that said conveyance was given for the purpose of extinguishing the debt. Was the mortgage discharged of record by the merger?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References** *Alderman v. Whidden*, 195 So. 605 (Fla. 1940); *Stovall v. Stokes*, 115 So. 828 (Fla. 1927); *Floorcraft Distributors, Inc. v. Horne-Wilson, Inc.*, 251 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.15 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996); FUND TN 22.05.10.

**Comment:** The intention that the two estates merge must be clearly indicated on the record, and there should be no indication, from the record or otherwise, that the mortgagor has or claims grounds for setting aside the conveyance.

STANDARD 9.6

IRREGULARITIES AND DISCREPANCIES IN SATISFACTIONS OF MORTGAGES

**STANDARD: A SATISFACTION OF MORTGAGE IS SUFFICIENT NOTWITHSTANDING MINOR IRREGULARITIES OR DISCREPANCIES IF THE DESCRIPTIVE DATA REASONABLY DISTINGUISHES THE MORTGAGE BEING SATISFIED FROM ALL OTHER MORTGAGES.**

Problem 1: The mortgage satisfaction makes no reference to the book and page where the mortgage on Blackacre is recorded. The satisfaction contains a recital of the date, parties, and a description of Blackacre. The record does not disclose any other mortgage on Blackacre to which the descriptive data could apply. Is the satisfaction sufficient?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: The mortgage satisfaction correctly refers to the book and page where the mortgage on Blackacre is recorded. The satisfaction contains a recital of the parties and description of Blackacre but there is a discrepancy in the date recited. Is the satisfaction sufficient?

Answer: Yes. If the satisfaction contains a discrepancy in more than one descriptive item it generally should not be accepted.

Problem 3: Same facts as Problem 2 except that reference to the date is omitted in the satisfaction. Is the satisfaction sufficient?

Answer: Yes. If the mortgage recording information is correct, then omission of other descriptive items can usually be ignored.

Authorities & References: FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.13 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1996).

STANDARD 9.7

SATISFACTION OF CORRECTIVE OR RE-RECORDED MORTGAGE

**STANDARD: WHERE A MORTGAGE IS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER WHICH CAN BE DETERMINED FROM THE RECORDS TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO CORRECT OR MODIFY THE FORMER, OR TO BE A RE-RECORDING OF THE FORMER, AND TO SECURE THE SAME OBLIGATION, MARKETABILITY IS NOT IMPAIRED BY A FAILURE TO SATISFY THE EARLIER OF THE MORTGAGES IF THE LATTER IS SATISFIED OF RECORD. IN CASE OF RE-RECORDING OF THE SAME MORTGAGE, A SATISFACTION REFERRING TO EITHER RECORDED MORTGAGE IS SUFFICIENT.**

Problem: John Doe mortgages Blackacre to Richard Roe, the mortgage being properly recorded. Thereafter, John Doe places of record a mortgage in favor of Richard Roe which encumbered only the west one-half of Blackacre. The latter instrument recited that it was given to correct an erroneous description in the earlier mortgage. Subsequently, the latter mortgage was satisfied of record. May the earlier mortgage be disregarded?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: §§ 701.03, .04, Fla. Stat.; *Matheson v. Thompson*, 20 Fla. 790 (1884).

Comment: By satisfying the corrective mortgage, the mortgagee acknowledges the modification.

## CHAPTER 10

### NAMES

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#### STANDARD 10.1

##### ABBREVIATIONS, DERIVATIVES, AND NICKNAMES

**STANDARD: ALL CUSTOMARY AND GENERALLY ACCEPTED ABBREVIATIONS, DERIVATIVES, AND NICKNAMES OF FIRST NAMES AND MIDDLE NAMES SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE EQUIVALENT THEREOF.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was conveyed to L. Joseph Emery and Frederick Stephens as grantees. A conveyance was then executed by L. Jos. Emery and Fred Stephens as grantors. May identity of these grantors be presumed?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *Johnson v. State*, 51 Fla. 44, 40 So. 678 (1906); *Clinton v. Miller*, 124 Mont. 463, 226 P.2d 487 (1951); 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES §§ 73-77 (3d ed. 2003); FUND TN 10.04.07.

**Comment:** As regards the use of initials, variances may be cured ten years subsequent to recording by § 689.19, Fla. Stat. (2007).



STANDARD 10.2

RULE OF IDEM SONANS

**STANDARD: DIFFERENTLY SPELLED NAMES ARE PRESUMED TO BE THE SAME WHEN THEY SOUND ALIKE, OR WHEN THEIR SOUNDS CANNOT EASILY BE DISTINGUISHED, OR WHEN COMMON USAGE HAS, BY CORRUPTION OR ABBREVIATION, MADE THEIR PRONUNCIATION IDENTICAL.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was conveyed to Lawrence Emery and Frederick Stephens as grantees. A conveyance is then executed by Laurence Emory and Frederick Stevens as grantors. May the discrepancy in spelling be disregarded?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *Burrows v. Hagerman*, 159 Fla. 826, 33 So. 2d 34 (1947); *Altman v. Simon*, 109 Fla. 196, 147 So. 222 (1933); *Myers v. State*, 84 Fla. 508, 94 So. 507 (1922); *Rhodes v. State*, 74 Fla. 230, 76 So. 776 (1917); 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 78 (3d ed. 2003); FUND TN 10.04.07.

STANDARD 10.3

RECITALS OF IDENTITY IN CONVEYANCES

**STANDARD: A RECITAL OF IDENTITY, CONTAINED IN A CONVEYANCE EXECUTED BY THE PERSON WHOSE IDENTITY IS RECITED, MAY BE RELIED UPON UNLESS THERE IS SOME GENUINE REASON TO DOUBT THE TRUTH OF THE RECITAL.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was conveyed to Joe Emery. A conveyance is then executed by J. Lawrence Emery, "said J. Lawrence Emery being also known as Joe Emery" as grantor. May identity of the grantee and grantor be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Blackacre was conveyed to Laura Emery, as grantee. A conveyance is then executed by Laura Graham, formerly Laura Emery, or (nee Laura Emery) as grantor. May identity of the grantee and grantor be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *McKay v. Easton*, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 619 (1873). 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LANDTITLES § 78 (3d ed. 2003); FUND TN 10.04.07.

STANDARD 10.4

USE OR NON-USE OF MIDDLE  
NAMES AND INITIALS

**STANDARD: THE USE IN ONE INSTRUMENT AND NON-USE IN ANOTHER OF A MIDDLE NAME OR INITIAL ORDINARILY DOES NOT CREATE A QUESTION OF IDENTITY AFFECTING TITLES.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was conveyed to Lawrence Emery. A conveyance was then executed by Lawrence J. Emery. May identity of these persons be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Blackacre was conveyed to Lawrence Emery. A conveyance is then executed by Lawrence Joseph Emery. May identity of these persons be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: Blackacre was conveyed to Lawrence J. Emery. A conveyance is then executed by Lawrence Joseph Emery. May identity of these persons be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *Burroughs v. State*, 17 Fla. 643 (1880); 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 77 (3d ed. 2003); FUND TN 10.04.07.

Comment: Variances between instruments affecting title with respect to the use or non-use of middle names or initials may be cured 10 years subsequent to the recording thereof. § 689.19, Fla. Stat. (2007).

STANDARD 10.5

EFFECT OF SUFFIX

**STANDARD: ALTHOUGH IDENTITY OF NAME RAISES THE PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY OF PERSON, THE ADDITION OF A SUFFIX SUCH AS "JR." OR "II" TO THE NAME OF A SUBSEQUENT GRANTOR MAY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF IDENTITY WITH THE PRIOR GRANTEE.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was conveyed to John Doe. Later a conveyance thereof was executed by John Doe, Jr., as grantor. May identity of these persons be presumed?

**Answer:** No. The use of the word "Jr." in the latter conveyance would indicate that there is more than one person bearing the name John Doe. A conveyance will be presumed to have run to the father in the absence of something in the deed evidencing intention to make the son the grantee. It will be necessary to explain the manner in which John Doe, Jr., acquired title as against John Doe.

**Authorities & References:** *State ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams*, 97 Fla. 159, 120 So. 310 (1929); FUND TN 10.04.07.

STANDARD 10.6

NAME VARIANCES IN CORPORATE CONVEYANCES

**STANDARD: CORPORATIONS ARE SATISFACTORILY IDENTIFIED ALTHOUGH THEIR NAMES ARE INCORRECTLY SET OUT OR VARIANCES EXIST FROM INSTRUMENT TO INSTRUMENT DUE TO THE OMISSION, ADDITION, OR MISSPELLING OF ANY PART OF THE CORPORATE NAME IF THE IDENTITY OF THE CORPORATION PLAINLY APPEARS FROM THE CONTENTS OF THE INSTRUMENT; AFFIDAVITS AND RECITALS OF IDENTITY MAY BE USED AND RELIED UPON TO OBVIATE VARIANCES TOO SUBSTANTIAL OR TOO SIGNIFICANT TO BE IGNORED.**

Problem: Blackacre was conveyed to A and B Land Development Company, a Florida Corporation, its proper name. Later a conveyance appears by A & B Development Co., a Florida corporation. May the identity of the grantee and grantor be presumed?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 694.12, Fla. Stat. (2007); FUND TN 11.07.03.

## CHAPTER 11

### PLATS

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#### STANDARD 11.1

#### CORRECTING ERROR IN NAME OR DESIGNATION OF PLAT

**STANDARD: AN ERROR IN A CONVEYANCE AS TO THE NAME OF A PLAT MAY BE DISREGARDED IF THE PLAT BOOK AND PAGE REFERENCE ARE CORRECT AND, AT THE TIME OF THE CONVEYANCE, THERE WAS NO RECORDED PLAT WITH THE ERRONEOUS NAME, OR PHASES THEREOF, CONTAINING THE LOT DESIGNATED IN THE CONVEYANCE. AN ERROR IN THE PLAT BOOK OR PAGE REFERENCE IN A CONVEYANCE MAY BE DISREGARDED IF THE NAME OF THE PLAT IS EXACT AND THE NAME OF THE PLAT RECORDED AT THE ERRONEOUS PLAT BOOK AND PAGE IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE NAME OF THE PLAT ON THE CONVEYANCE OR THE PLAT AT THE ERRONEOUS PLAT BOOK DOES NOT CONTAIN THE LOT DESIGNATED IN THE CONVEYANCE.**

Problem 1: John Doe conveyed land describing it as Lot 1, Block A, of Greenacre, Plat Book 4, Page 3, of the Public Records of Orange County, Florida, instead of the correct plat name of Blueacre. There is no plat named Greenacre recorded in Orange County. Is a corrective deed necessary?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1, except there is a plat named Greenacre recorded in Orange County, which does not contain a lot with the designation "Lot 1, Block A." Is a corrective deed necessary?

Answer: No.

Problem 3: Same facts as Problem 2, except there is a plat named Greenacre, *Phase I* recorded in Orange County which does contain a lot with the designation "Lot 1, Block A." Is a corrective deed necessary?

Answer: Yes, a corrective deed should be obtained where the erroneous plat name refers to a recorded plat, or phase thereof, which contains a lot with the same lot and block designation referenced on the conveyance.

Problem 4: John Doe conveyed land describing it as Lot 1, Block A of Blackacre, Plat Book 5, Page 3, of the Public Records of Miami-Dade County, Florida, instead of the correct description of Plat Book 5, Page 31. The name of the plat actually recorded at Plat Book 5, Page 3 is Whiteacre and the only plat of record in Miami-Dade County named Blackacre is the one recorded at Plat Book 5, Page 31. Is a corrective deed necessary?

Answer: No.

Problem 5: Same facts as Problem 4, except the plat recorded at Plat Book 5, Page 3 is named *Blackacre Phase II*?

Answer: Yes, a corrective deed should be obtained where the name of the plat recorded at the erroneous page is similar to the name of the plat on the conveyance, unless the plat recorded at the erroneous page does not contain the lot and block designated in the conveyance.

Authorities  
& References: FUND TN 13.02.02.

Comment: This Standard should be relied upon only when the facts and circumstances, such as the location of the land, references in other recorded documents, etc., make it reasonably clear what plat reference was intended. If an index containing the names of all recorded plats for the county is available, the attorney or title examiner may be able to make the necessary determinations without assistance from the official custodian of the public records. While recordation of an affidavit from an attorney, a title examiner, or the official custodian of records is the best practice where there has been an error in the name or designation of the plat, such an affidavit is not required for marketable title.

STANDARD 11.2

PRIVATE DEDICATIONS

**STANDARD: ABSENT EXPRESS WORDS OF CONVEYANCE, A DEDICATION OF PROPERTY IN A PLAT TO A PRIVATE ENTITY DOES NOT CONVEY THE FEE SIMPLE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY.**

Problem 1            A recorded plat shows a dedication that states as follows: “The Maintenance Tract, as shown hereon, is hereby dedicated and conveyed in fee simple to the Blackacre Landing Property Owners Association, Inc., its successors and/or assigns, for maintenance, utilities, and vehicle storage purposes and shall be the perpetual maintenance obligation of said Association.” Is this a good conveyance of the Maintenance Tract to the Association?

Answer:            Yes. The language clearly states that it is a conveyance in fee simple of the property.

Problem 2            A recorded plat shows a dedication that states as follows: “The Maintenance Tract, as shown hereon, is hereby dedicated and reserved to the Blackacre Landing Property Owners Association, Inc., its successors and/or assigns, for maintenance, utilities, and vehicle storage purposes and shall be the perpetual maintenance obligation of said Association.” Is this a good conveyance of the Maintenance Tract to the Association?

Answer:            No. The language does not clearly state that it is a conveyance in fee simple of the property.

Authorities            *City of Miami v. Florida East Coast Railway Company*, 84 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1920); *Reiger v. Anchor Post Products, Inc.*, 210 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); *Burnham v. Davis Islands, Inc.*, 87 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1956); 4-120 FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 120.03.

Comment:            A common law dedication requires four elements, one of which is a public use or public purpose. There can be no dedication for private use or to uses public in their nature but the enjoyment of which is restricted to a limited part of the public.



STANDARD 11.3

TITLE TO PUBLIC STREETS ABUTTING PLATTED LOTS

**STANDARD: PRIOR TO ANY CONVEYANCE OF LOTS ON A PLAT, THE OWNER AND DEDICATOR OF A PLATTED SUBDIVISION OWNS THE FEE INTEREST IN ALL THE STREETS DEPICTED ON THE PLAT, SUBJECT TO THE EASEMENT CREATED BY THE DEDICATION. A CONVEYANCE OF A LOT BY REFERENCE TO THE PLAT, CARRIES TITLE TO THE CENTERLINE OF AN INTERIOR PUBLIC STREET ABUTTING THE LOT, SUBJECT TO THE EASEMENT, SUCH THAT TITLE TO THE STREET IS ENCUMBERED BY THE PURCHASER'S MORTGAGE OF THE LOT, UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE IN THE CONVEYANCE OR MORTGAGE.**

Problem 1: John Doe conveys his subdivision lot, which abuts an abandoned public street, to Richard Roe. Does the conveyance by lot and block number alone carry the interest in the street?

Answer: Yes, subject to any private easement rights in the street.

Problem 2: John Doe mortgages a lot in a platted subdivision by reference to lot and block number alone, without mention of an interest in the street. Subsequently, he executes a quitclaim deed to Richard Roe for the portion of an abandoned public street abutting his mortgaged lot. The mortgagee neither joins in the deed nor executes a release of the mortgage with reference to the abandoned street. Is Richard Roe's title marketable?

Answer: No.

Problem 3: John Doe mortgaged a lot in a platted subdivision by reference to lot and block number alone, without mention of an interest in the interior public street. Subsequently, the interior street abutting his lot was abandoned by the city. Thereafter, the mortgagee foreclosed and obtained a certificate of title which referenced the lot and block number alone, without mention of the vacated interior street. Would the mortgagee's conveyance of the lot include marketable title to the centerline of the vacated street?

Answer: Yes, subject to any private easement rights in the street.

Authorities & References: *Servando Building Co. v. Zimmerman*, 91 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1956); *Buckels v. Tomer*, 78 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1955); *Smith v. Horn*, 70 So. 435 (1915); *Joseph v. Duran*, 436 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 133 (2008); FUND TN 13.01.04, 24.01.03.

Comment: As the conveyance of lots by reference to a plat may create private easement rights in adjoining lot owners, these rights should be considered in addition to public easement rights when analyzing abandonment of a street. See Comment to Standard 11.4. This standard is applicable to lots abutting interior streets, and the Comment to Standard 11.5 should be referred to when dealing with periphery streets. Standards 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5 treat closely related issues and should be read together for a full understanding of title to streets dedicated by plat.

## STANDARD 11.4

### RESERVATION OF PUBLIC STREET DEDICATED BY PLAT

**STANDARD: A PROVISION IN THE DEDICATORY LANGUAGE OF A PLAT RESERVING THE STREETS OR THE “REVERSIONARY INTEREST” THEREIN TO THE DEDICATOR DOES NOT PREVENT TITLE TO THE CENTERLINE OF AN INTERIOR ABUTTING PUBLIC STREET FROM PASSING WITH TITLE TO THE LOT, SUBJECT TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EASEMENTS, UNLESS OTHERWISE CLEARLY PROVIDED IN THE CONVEYANCE. WHEN THE PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE STREET ARE VACATED, THE LOT OWNER HOLDS TITLE TO THE CENTERLINE OF THE INTERIOR STREET SUBJECT TO ANY PRIVATE EASEMENT RIGHTS.**

**Problem 1:** John Doe recorded a plat dedicating the streets. The dedication contained the following language: “and does hereby dedicate to the perpetual use of the public, as public highways, the streets as shown hereon, reserving unto himself, his heirs, successors, assigns, or legal representatives, the reversion or reversions of the same, whenever abandoned by the public or discontinued by law.” John Doe thereafter conveyed lots abutting interior streets in the subdivision. These deeds referred to the plat but were silent with respect to title to the streets. The streets were subsequently abandoned. Do the abutting owners now own the fee to the centerline of the streets?

**Answer:** Yes, subject to any private easement rights in the street.

**Problem 2:** Same facts as Problem 1, except the deeds from John Doe expressly reserve title to or the “reversionary interest” in the streets. Do the abutting owners own the fee to the centerline of the vacated street?

**Answer:** No, fee title to the street remains with John Doe, subject to any private easement rights.

**Authorities & References:** § 177.085, Fla. Stat. (2008); *U.S. v. 16.33 Acres of Land in Dade County*, 342 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1977); FUND TN 24.01.01.

**Comment:** The above Standard is based on § 177.085, Fla. Stat., which became effective on July 1, 1972. The statute purports to be retroactive, but there is some question with respect to the constitutionality of its retroactive application. Therefore, as to Problem 1, caution should be exercised as to plats filed prior to July 1, 1972 which contain reversionary language. See *Peninsular Point, Inc. v. South Georgia Dairy Co-Op*, 251 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); FUND TN 24.01.03. Dedication of a street by plat and subsequent conveyance of lots by reference to that plat create two independent sets of rights in the street easement: the one in the public, which may be vacated by act of the appropriate local government, the other in the owners who take by reference to the plat and for whom the use of the street is reasonably and materially beneficial. Private rights should therefore also be considered in addition to public rights when analyzing a reservation or reversion. See *Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Worley*, 38 So. 618 (Fla. 1905); *Powers v. Scobie*, 60 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1952); *Highland Const., Inc. v. Paquette*, 697 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); *Easton v. Appler*, 548 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); *Reiger v. Anchor Post Products, Inc.*, 210 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). This standard is applicable to lots abutting interior streets, and the Comment to Standard 11.5 should be referred to when dealing with periphery streets. Standards 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5 treat closely related issues and should be read together for a full understanding of title to streets dedicated by plat.

STANDARD 11.5

ABANDONMENT OF PUBLIC STREET ON PLATTED LAND

**STANDARD: WHEN AN INTERIOR PUBLIC STREET DEDICATED BY PLAT IS DISCONTINUED THROUGH LEGAL PROCESS AND TITLE TO, OR THE “REVERSIONARY INTEREST” IN, THE STREET HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY RESERVED TO THE DEDICATOR, FEE TITLE TO THE CENTERLINE OF THE STREET ABUTTING A LOT IS IN THE LOT OWNER, SUBJECT TO ANY PRIVATE EASEMENT RIGHTS, SUCH THAT TITLE TO THE STREET IS ENCUMBERED BY THE LOT OWNER’S MORTGAGE OF THE LOT, UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE IN THE CONVEYANCE OR MORTGAGE.**

**Problem:** Veronese Street, a dedicated interior public street in the Blackacre subdivision, was vacated by the City. John Doe owned a lot in Blackacre which abutted Veronese Street. There was no effective reservation of title to, or the reversionary interest in, Veronese Street. John Doe claimed fee title to the centerline of the street. Was his claim of title valid?

**Answer:** Yes, subject to any private easement rights.

**Authorities & References:** *New Fort Pierce Hotel Co. v. Phoenix Title Corp.*, 171 So. 525 (1936); *Smith v. Horn*, 70 So. 435 (1915); *Florida S. Ry. v. Brown*, 1 So. 512 (1887); *Burkart v. City of Ft. Lauderdale*, 168 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1964); *Dean v. MOD Properties, Ltd.*, 528 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); *Calvert v. Morgan*, 436 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); *Hurt v. Lenchuk*, 233 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); FUND TN 24.01.01.

**Comment:** As the conveyance of lots by reference to a plat may create private easement rights in adjoining lot owners, these rights should be considered in addition to public easement rights when analyzing the abandonment of a street. See Comment to Standard 11.4. When the street is on the periphery of the plat and the dedicator does not, at the time of the plat, own the land on the other side of the street outside of the plat and does not reserve title to, or the “reversionary interest” in, the street, the abutting lot owner will take the entire width of the street upon vacation of the street, subject to any private easement rights. Title to the underlying fee of a street on the periphery of the plat is otherwise subject to the all of standards applicable to title to interior streets, but caution should be observed when analyzing periphery streets as they frequently run along bodies of water and this may raise separate issues of submerged lands and may implicate riparian rights. See, e.g., *Caples v. Taliaferro*, 197 So. 861 (Fla. 1940). Standards 11.3, 11.4 and 11.5 treat closely related issues and should be read together for a full understanding of title to streets dedicated by plat.

STANDARD 11.6

DESCRIPTION MADE BY REFERENCE TO A PLAT

**STANDARD: IF A DEED DESCRIBES PROPERTY CONVEYED BY REFERENCE TO A RECORDED PLAT, THE CONVEYANCE IS TAKEN SUBJECT TO EVERY PARTICULAR SHOWN ON THE PLAT.**

**Problem:** John Doe acquired title by a deed which described the property as Lot 1, Block A, of Blackacre, Plat Book 7, Page 12, of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida. The recorded plat shows a 10 ft. wide easement within the northern boundary of Lot 1. Doe was never made aware of the easement. Is John Doe's title to the property subject to the easement shown on the plat?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Ass'n v. Caruana*, 623 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1993); *Wahrendorff v. Moore*, 93 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1957); *Lawyers Title Guaranty Fund v. Milgo Electronics*, 318 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 135 (2008); FUND TN 24.03.01.

CHAPTER 12

TAX LIENS

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STANDARD 12.1

DIVESTMENT OF STATE ESTATE TAX LIEN

**STANDARD: REAL PROPERTY THAT IS A PART OF THE ESTATE OF A RESIDENT DECEDENT IS DIVESTED OF A STATE ESTATE TAX LIEN IF “TRANSFERRED TO A BONA FIDE PURCHASER, MORTGAGEE OR PLEDGEE FOR AN ADEQUATE AND FULL CONSIDERATION IN MONEY OR MONEY’S WORTH.”**

Problem 1: John Doe, a Florida resident, was the record owner of Blackacre. The personal representative of John Doe's estate sold Blackacre to Simon Grant pursuant to a court order authorizing the sale. It appears that the sale was bona fide and adequate consideration was given. Is Simon Grant's title free of any state estate tax lien?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe, a Florida resident, was the record owner of Blackacre. The personal representative of John Doe's estate distributed Blackacre to Ralph Doe, a devisee, pursuant to the terms of John's will. Is Ralph Doe's title free of any state estate tax lien?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: § 198.22, Fla. Stat. (2007); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.03[2] [a] (2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.86 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); FUND TN 2.10.02.

Comment: Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the estates of resident and nonresident decedents dying on and after Jan. 1, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2011, are not subject to the Florida estate tax.

STANDARD 12.2

FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LIENS

**STANDARD: TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY DERIVED FROM A DECEDENT'S ESTATE IS NOT MARKETABLE UNLESS CLEARED OF THE LIEN OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES.**

**Problem:** John Doe was the record owner of Blackacre and died leaving an estate sufficiently large to be subject to federal estate taxes. The personal representative of John Doe's estate, being duly authorized, conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe before the administration of the estate was completed. The deed contained a recital that all debts and obligations of the estate, including taxes, had been paid in full. Was Richard Roe's title to Blackacre marketable?

**Answer:** No. The lien of federal estate taxes may be cleared by recording (1) a certificate of release issued by the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service upon a finding that the liability assessed has been fully satisfied or is legally unenforceable; or (2) a certificate of discharge of specific property.

**Authorities & References:** 26 U.S.C. § 6325; *Treas. Reg.* §§ 20.6325-1, 301.6325-1.

**Comment:** A showing that the decedent's estate was not subject to federal taxes, or the taxes were otherwise eliminated, as, for example, by the running of any applicable limitations period, will obviate the need to clear title of a federal estate tax lien.

The federal estate tax lien is divested as to any part of the gross estate used for the payment of charges against the estate and expenses of its administration, allowed by any court having jurisdiction. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a) (1). Care should be taken to ensure that the factual basis for such divestment exists.

With respect to property that is subject to a federal estate tax lien but is not derived from a decedent's estate, see Title Standard 12.3 (Federal Estate Tax Lien On Survivorship Property).

STANDARD 12.3

FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LIEN ON  
SURVIVORSHIP PROPERTY

**STANDARD: REAL PROPERTY IS DIVESTED OF A FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LIEN IF TRANSFERRED BY THE SURVIVING TENANT OF A JOINT TENANCY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP OR A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES TO “A BONA FIDE PURCHASER MORTGAGEE, OR PLEDGEE FOR AN ADEQUATE AND FULL CONSIDERATION IN MONEY OR MONEY'S WORTH.”**

**Problem:** John Doe and Mary Doe, husband and wife, owned Blackacre as a tenancy by the entireties. John Doe died and Mary Doe seeks to sell Blackacre. Is a release from federal estate taxes, and any liens thereunder, necessary?

**Answer:** No. However, upon a conveyance of Blackacre, any estate tax lien would then attach to the sale proceeds and all of the other property of Mary Doe.

**Authorities & References:** 26 U.S.C. § 6324; *Rev. Rul.* 56-144, 1956-1 CUM.BULL. 563; FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.86 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.03[1] [b] (2007); FUND TN 2.10.02.

**Comment:** Title examiners should satisfy themselves that the transfer of the property was bona fide, the consideration was substantially equivalent to the value of the property, and the dealings were at arm's length, “as between strangers.”

STANDARD 12.4

ESTATE TAX LIEN — LIMITATIONS

**STANDARD: TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY DERIVED FROM A DECEDENT'S ESTATE IS DEEMED TO BE FREE OF: (1) ANY FEDERAL ESTATE TAX LIEN IF THE DECEDENT HAS BEEN DEAD FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS, AND (2) THE FLORIDA ESTATE TAX LIEN IF THE DECEDENT HAS BEEN DEAD FOR MORE THAN TWELVE YEARS, UNLESS NOTICE OF THE FLORIDA ESTATE TAX LIEN HAS BEEN FILED OR THERE ARE OTHER FACTS OF RECORD TO PUT THE EXAMINER ON NOTICE OF SUCH STATE LIEN.**

**Problem:** In 1995 John Doe, the record owner of Blackacre, died. Blackacre was distributed to Ralph Doe, the devisee under John Doe's will. Nothing appears of record to indicate that title to Blackacre was cleared of any possible estate tax lien. In 1999 Ralph Doe gratuitously conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. No notice of an estate tax lien has been filed and nothing appears of record to indicate that such a lien exists. In 2008 is title to Blackacre marketable even though the clearing of state and federal estate tax liens, if any, does not appear of record?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** 26 U.S.C. § 6324; §§ 198.22, .33, Fla. Stat. (2007); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 34.03[1] [c], 34.03[2] [b] (2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 5.57 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); FUND TN 2.10.07.

**Comment:** Unpaid Florida estate taxes are a lien on the gross estate for twelve years. § 198.22, Fla. Stat. (2007). However, liability for Florida estate taxes is discharged after ten years from the date the decedent's Florida estate tax return is filed with the Department of Revenue. § 98.33, Fla. Stat. (2007). The Department may extend the lien for an additional five years by recording a notice of lien in the public records where the property is situated. No Florida estate tax lien may continue longer than twenty years from the decedent's date of death. § 198.33(2), Fla. Stat. (2007).

Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, the estates of resident and nonresident decedents dying on and after Jan. 1, 2005 and before Jan. 1, 2011, are not subject to the Florida estate tax.

A federal estate tax lien may be unenforceable ten years after the date of decedent's death. 26 U.S.C. § 6324(a) (1).



STANDARD 12.5

LIEN OF INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES

**STANDARD: DELINQUENT INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES ARE A LIEN UPON REAL PROPERTY ONLY WHEN A WARRANT ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE FOR THE FULL AMOUNT DUE IS RECORDED IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE PROPERTY IS LOCATED.**

**Problem:** An intangible personal property tax was assessed against John Doe, the owner of Blackacre, for the year 2005. John Doe did not pay the tax. Nothing appears of record with respect to the delinquent tax. In 2007 John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. Did Richard Roe take subject to a lien for the intangible personal property tax?

**Answer:** No. A lien would not attach until a warrant issued by the Department of Revenue is recorded in the county in which Blackacre is located.

**Authorities & References:** § 199.262, Fla. Stat. (2007); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 34.02[2] (2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND Insurance § 5.65 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); FUND TN 30.08.03.

**Comment:** The lien for intangible personal property taxes expires twenty years after the last date the tax may be assessed, after the tax becomes delinquent, or after the filing of a tax warrant, whichever is later. § 95.091(1) (b), Fla. Stat. (2007).

## CHAPTER 13

### TRUSTS

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#### STANDARD 13.1

##### CONVEYANCES OR MORTGAGES BY OR TO TRUSTEES — EFFECT OF DESIGNATION “TRUSTEE”

**STANDARD: THE WORDS “TRUSTEE” OR “AS TRUSTEE” FOLLOWING THE NAME OF A GRANTEE, TRANSFEREE, ASSIGNEE, OR MORTGAGEE DO NOT, OF THEMSELVES, CONSTITUTE NOTICE OF A TRUST WHERE THE INSTRUMENT CONTAINS NO OTHER REFERENCE TO A TRUST AND NO SUCH TRUST APPEARS OF RECORD.**

Problem 1: Blackacre was conveyed to “Richard Roe, trustee” by deed which contained no other reference to a trust. The records fail to disclose a declaration or other evidence of a trust. Does the word “trustee” following the name of the grantee constitute notice of a trust?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: A mortgage was signed to “Richard Roe, as trustee.” The instrument contained no other reference to a trust and the records fail to disclose a declaration or other evidence of a trust. May a subsequent assignee treat Richard Roe as holding the mortgage free from a trust?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities &  
References:

§ 689.07, Fla. Stat. (2005); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 10.05[3] (2005); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.26 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); see *Buttner v. Talbot*, 784 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); *Grammer v. Roman*, 174 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); *Resnick v. Goldman*, 133 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).

Comment: Under § 689.07, Fla. Stat., the title will vest into the grantee individually if “no beneficiaries are named, the nature and purposes of the trust, if any, are not set forth, and the trust is not identified by title or date. . . .” In reaction to the case of *In re: Douglas K. Raborn*, 16 Fla. Law Weekly Fed. D 257 (S. D. Fla. 2003), the Florida legislature added the last clause in 2004, to clarify existing law and to provide for it to apply retroactively.

Section 689.07, Fla. Stat. expressly provides that nothing therein shall prevent any person from recording a declaration of trust subsequent to the recording of an instrument conveying, transferring, assigning, or mortgaging any interest in real property. In such event any grantee, transferee, assignee, or mortgagee of the “trustee” taking prior to the recording of the declaration takes free from the claims of the beneficiaries. Although not expressly stated in the statute, it seems to be implied that any grantee, transferee, assignee, or mortgagee of the “trustee” taking subsequent to the recording of the declaration would take subject to the claims of the beneficiaries, and caution should be exercised in this situation. § 689.07(4), Fla. Stat. (2005); FUND TN 31.04.02.

Although the point is undecided, there is some question as to whether actual knowledge of the existence of a trust agreement will withdraw from a grantee, transferee, assignee, or mortgagee of the trustee the protection of § 689.07, Fla. Stat., even where the conveyance to the trustee is strictly within the scope of § 689.07, Fla. Stat. FUND TN 31.04.03. In addition, it has been held that § 689.07 does not preclude a court of equity from declaring a resulting trust. In declaring a resulting trust, the court relied, *inter alia*, upon knowledge of the existence of a trust agreement. *Arundel Debenture Corp. v. LeBlond*, 139 Fla. 668, 190 So. 765 (1939).

Under § 689.07, Fla. Stat. a conveyance to a person whose name is followed by the words “trustee” or “as trustee” in which no other reference is made to a trust creates a fee simple title individually in the grantee. The title thereby acquired is subject to whatever homestead rights exist at the time. *See* Uniform Title Standards, Chapter 20 (Marital Property).

STANDARD 13.2

IMPLIED POWER OF SALE

**STANDARD: TITLE DERIVED FROM A TRUSTEE UNDER A VALID RECORDED TRUST WHICH CONTAINS NO EXPRESS POWER OF SALE MAY BE MARKETABLE BY REASON OF AN IMPLIED POWER OF SALE IF THE TRUST IMPOSED ON THE TRUSTEE DUTIES WHICH COULD NOT BE PERFORMED IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH POWER.**

**Problem:** Blackacre was devised to Richard Roe in trust to pay specific amounts in cash to specified beneficiaries within specified times and to distribute the remaining assets of the trust in cash to named beneficiaries in specified proportion. The trust was recorded and valid but contained no express power of sale. Roe, as trustee, conveyed by trustee's deed to Simon Grant. Did Grant acquire marketable title to Blackacre?

**Answer:** Yes. Under the circumstances presented in the problem, the trustee could not perform the duties of payment and distribution in cash imposed on him by the trust instrument in the absence of a power sale, which necessarily was implied.

**Authorities**

**& References:** *Jordan v. Landis*, 128 Fla. 604, 175 So. 241 (1937); *Walker v. Close*, 98 Fla. 1103, 125 So. 521 (1929); *First Baptist Church of Jacksonville v. American Bd. of Comm'rs for Foreign Mission*, 66 Fla. 441, 63 So. 826 (1913); *In re Walker's Will*, 258 Wis. 65, 45 N.W.2d 94 (1950); *Annot.*, 23 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1952).

**Comment:** Section 737.402, Fla. Stat. (2005) provides that, unless otherwise provided in the trust instrument, the trustee of a trust is authorized to sell property. *See In Re Will of Jones*, 289 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (finding the trustee had an independent power of sale under § 691.03(2), Fla. Stat. (1973), the predecessor to § 737.402, Fla. Stat.). However, a court order authorizing the sale should be obtained if there is an express limitation of the power of sale in the trust instrument, § 737.402(2), Fla. Stat.; if the sale would create a conflict of interest for the trustee, § 737.403(2), Fla. Stat.; or if a court has prohibited the sale subsequent to execution of the trust instrument but before the sale, § 737.4031(1) (d), Fla. Stat. *See also*, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.23 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004); FUND TN 31.05.04.

STANDARD 13.3

EXECUTION OF DEED BY TRUSTEES

**STANDARD: WHERE THERE ARE THREE OR MORE TRUSTEES OF A TRUST, A VALID DEED MAY BE EXECUTED BY A MAJORITY UNLESS THE TRUST INSTRUMENT PROVIDES OTHERWISE.**

**Problem:** The trust appointed John Doe, Frank Doe, and Richard Roe as trustees. The trust instrument was silent with respect to the number of trustees needed to act on behalf of the trust. John Doe and Frank Doe executed a deed to Simon Grant. Is Grant's title marketable?

**Answer:** Yes. The answer assumes that the trustees had the power of sale.

**Authorities & References:** § 737.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2005); *see* FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.32 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 2004).

**Comment:** Where the trust instrument appoints two trustees, the deed must be executed by both of them unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.

STANDARD 13.4

DEED EXECUTED BY THE SURVIVOR  
OF TWO OR MORE TRUSTEES

**STANDARD: A DEED EXECUTED BY THE SURVIVOR OR SURVIVORS OF TRUSTEES WHO HAD THE POWER OF SALE IN THE TRUST IS VALID, UNLESS THE TRUST PROVIDES OTHERWISE.**

**Problem:** John Doe and Richard Roe were named as trustees. The trust agreement does not require appointment of a successor trustee to Richard Roe. John Doe, as trustee, executed a deed as survivor to Simon Grant. Attached to the deed is the death certificate of Richard Roe. Is Simon Grant's title marketable?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** § 737.404(2), Fla. Stat. (2005); *see* FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY SALES TRANSACTIONS § 6.32 (Fla. Bar. CLE 4th ed. 2004).

**Comment:** With respect to the number of trustees, or survivors, who must act, see Title Standard 13.3 (Execution of Deed by Trustees).

CHAPTER 14

SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT

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STANDARD 14.1

SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT  
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS

**STANDARD: A DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AFTER A SERVICEMEMBER DEFENDANT FAILS TO APPEAR IN AN ACTION INVOLVING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY IS VOIDABLE IF THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 521 OF THE SERVICEMEMBERS CIVIL RELIEF ACT, FOR ACTIONS FILED AFTER DECEMBER 19, 2003.**

**Problem 1:** John Doe entered military service in 2004 and remained in military service through 2006. In 2002, Doe mortgaged Blackacre to Richard Roe, who started foreclosure proceedings in 2005. Doe still held title to Blackacre, but did not appear in the action and Roe took a default judgment against him. After a final judgment of foreclosure based on the default judgment, Roe purchased Blackacre at the foreclosure sale. Roe did not file an affidavit concerning Doe's military service. Is Roe's title marketable?

**Answer:** No. The default judgment may be considered validly entered, but the Act gives the servicemember the right to reopen the judgment to defend the action at a later date under certain conditions. Failure to file an affidavit and meet the other requirements of the Act subjects the judgment to being vacated or set aside.

**Problem 2:** Same facts as in Problem 1 except that Roe filed an affidavit stating that the defendant either was not in military service or that the plaintiff was unable to determine whether the defendant was in military service, after which the court appointed an attorney to represent Doe. Is Roe's title marketable?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 521 (2011).

**Comment:** Section 521 of the Act provides protection to members of the armed services from civil default judgments being taken against them during their service in the military or within 60 days after termination of or release from such military service. This section applies only when the defendant service member has not made an appearance. However, an appearance does not include a request for a stay of proceedings. 50 U.S.C. App. § 522 (c).

Judgments rendered in disregard of the Act, while voidable, are not void. If in fact the defendant was not in the military service and no affidavit to that effect was filed, an affidavit filed subsequent to final judgment indicating that at no time during the proceedings was the defendant entitled to the protection of the Act will cure, for title purposes, this defect in the judgment. *See Courtney v. Warner*, 290 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); *Eureka Homestead Soc'y v. Clark*, 145 La. 917, 83 So. 191 (1919).

In order to set aside a default judgment, a servicemember must file an application to set aside the

judgment with the court no later than 90 days after being released from military service and show that he or she was materially affected by reason of such military service in making a defense to the action and has a meritorious or legal defense to the action or some part of it. 50 U.S.C. App. § 521 (2011).

Moreover, the Act contains the following important provision protecting bona fide purchasers:

If a court vacates, sets aside, or reverses a default judgment against a servicemember and the vacating, setting aside, or reversing is because of a provision of this Act, that action shall not impair a right of title acquired by a bona fide purchaser for value under a default judgment.



STANDARD 14.2

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.]

## CHAPTER 15

### TAX TITLES

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#### STANDARD 15.1

#### TAX DEED OF RECORD FOR FOUR YEARS

**STANDARD: A TITLE BASED UPON A TAX DEED ISSUED BY THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT IS MARKETABLE IF IT AFFIRMATIVELY APPEARS THAT: (1) THE TAX DEED HAS BEEN OF RECORD FOR MORE THAN FOUR YEARS; (2) THE TAXES HAVE BEEN PAID BY THE TAX DEED GRANTEE, OR SUCCESSORS, FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME; AND (3) SUBSEQUENT TO THE TAX DEED THERE HAS BEEN NO ADVERSE CLAIM ASSERTED OF RECORD AND NO POSSESSION ADVERSE TO THE TAX DEED GRANTEE OR SUCCESSORS.**

Problem 1: John Doe received a tax deed for a vacant lot in a residential subdivision which was recorded in 2003. The records of the tax collector indicate that John Doe has paid the taxes on the property since that date. There are no deeds or other instruments of record indicating a claim or transfer of interest by the former title holder. May the title be considered marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same facts as in Problem 1 except that after acquiring title by tax deed in 2003 John Doe conveyed the property to Richard Roe in 2005. The records of the tax collector indicate that John and Richard paid the taxes on the property during their respective periods of ownership. There are no deeds or other instruments of record indicating a claim or transfer of interest by the former title holder. Richard will execute an affidavit evidencing that during his period of ownership there has been no possession adverse to his. However, a similar affidavit was not recorded by John. May the title be considered marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: John Doe received a tax deed of a single family residence in 2003. The official records of the county do not provide any information concerning possible service in the United States military by the prior owner. May the title be considered marketable?

Answer: No, unless an affidavit from a knowledgeable person is recorded negating the possibility that the prior owner has a right to redeem the property under the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act. Service members have 180 days after the termination of their military service in which to redeem property lost through tax deed. The right is limited to real property occupied for dwelling, professional, business or agricultural purposes by a service member or the service member's dependents or employees (a) before the service member's entry into military service; and (b) during the time the tax or assessment remains unpaid.

Authorities & References: §§ 95.191, .192(1), .192(3), Fla. Stat.; § 197.572, Fla. Stat. (2007). See FUND TN 30.01.02.

Comment:

The Standard is designed to point out that marketability can be achieved by reliance on the four-year statute of limitations set forth in §§ 95.191 or 95.192, Fla. Stat. (2007). Section 95.191, Fla. Stat. precludes the former owner or other adverse claimant from filing an action to recover possession after the grantee of the tax deed has been in actual possession for four years. Conversely, the statute provides that when the real property is adversely possessed by any person no action shall be brought by the tax deed grantee unless the action is begun within four years from the date of the deed.

Section 95.192 provides that when a tax deed has been issued for four years, regardless of whether the tax deed grantee or successors have been in possession, no action may be brought by the former owner or parties claiming under the former owner. However, the statute does not apply if the prior owner or any claimant claiming under the former owner continues in actual possession one year after issuance of the tax deed and before an action for ejectment is begun.

Read together, it is clear that it is not necessary for the tax deed grantee or successors to be in actual possession of the property. All that is necessary is that the former owner or parties claiming under the former owner did not remain in unchallenged possession after the issuance of the tax deed. Adverse possession would affect the marketability of any title. Therefore, the Standard uses a broad approach and requires no adverse possession since the issuance of the tax deed. Recordation of a reliable affidavit negating adverse possession is advised.

Caution should be exercised if the former owner owns adjacent property at the time marketability is being evaluated. Such possession would create a factual issue as to whether possession of the adjoining parcel extends to and includes the tax deed parcel.

If it cannot be determined that the grantee or the grantee's successors paid the taxes since issuance of the tax deed, title will still be marketable in the absence of evidence that the former owner, or anyone claiming under the former owner, paid the taxes and/or had the property assessed in his/her name.

Caution should be exercised to determine that the former owner does not have the right to redeem the lost property under the Servicemembers' Civil Relief Act of 2004 ("SCRA"). SCRA is a restatement, clarification and revision of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. It provides that when certain real property owned by the service member is sold or forfeited to enforce the collection of a tax or assessment, a service member shall have the right to redeem or commence an action to redeem the property during the period of military service or within 180 days after termination of or release from military service. This provision may not be construed to shorten any period provided by state or local law for redemption. Application of this provision is limited to real property occupied for dwelling, professional, business or agricultural purposes by a service member or the service member's dependents or employees (a) before the service member's entry into military service; and (b) during the time the tax or assessment remains unpaid. 50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq. These revisions apply to any case which is not final before December 19, 2003. 50 U.S.C. App. 501 note. However, somewhat similar provisions existed prior to that date.

A tax deed will not eliminate:

1. Any easement for telephone, telegraph, pipeline, power transmission or other public services purpose of record or evidenced by wires, poles, or other visible occupation.
2. Any drainage easement of record or evidenced by a waterway, waterbed, or other visible occupation.

3. Any easement for ingress and egress to and from other land of record or evidenced by a road or other visible occupation to be preserved.
4. Restrictive covenants running with the land.
5. A lien of record held by a municipal or county governmental unit, special district, or community development district, when such lien is not satisfied by the disbursement of proceeds from the tax deed sale.
6. Oil, gas and mineral rights that are assessed separately from the fee.
7. Matters shown on a plat.
8. Previous loss of land to an adjoining property owner, whether adjudicated or not, resulting from establishment of the mutual boundary line by acquiescence. *Euse v. Gibbs*, 49 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1951).
9. Federal tax liens, unless the federal government received proper notice and the redemption period has expired.

CHAPTER 16

RECORDING, NOTICE, AND PRIORITIES

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STANDARD 16.1

REFERENCE TO UNRECORDED OR IMPROPERLY  
RECORDED INSTRUMENT

**STANDARD: AN UNRECORDED OR IMPROPERLY RECORDED INSTRUMENT REFERRED TO IN AN INSTRUMENT RECORDED IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE WILL ORDINARILY CONSTITUTE A CLOUD UPON THE TITLE.**

Problem: A conveyance of Blackacre refers to a mortgage, or other instrument, such as an option or a lease, thereon held by Richard Roe. There is no such mortgage or other instrument of record affecting the property. May the reference to the unrecorded instrument be disregarded?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: *Hull v. Maryland Cas. Co.*, 79 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1954); *Pierson v. Bill*, 133 Fla. 81, 182 So. 631 (1938); *Gross v. Hammond*, 123 Fla. 471, 167 So. 373 (1936); *Sapp v. Warner*, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 27.03 (2008); FUND TN 22.03.12.

STANDARD 16.2

DELAY IN RECORDING CONVEYANCE

**STANDARD: DELAY IN RECORDING A CONVEYANCE WILL NOT AFFECT THE TITLE THEREBY ACQUIRED EXCEPT WHERE THERE ARE INTERVENING RIGHTS OF A THIRD PERSON.**

Problem: Richard Roe conveyed Blackacre to John Doe. The deed was not recorded until twelve years after its execution and acknowledgment. No question of third party rights is involved. Is the deed valid?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: § 695.01, Fla. Stat. (2008); *Moyer v. Clark*, 72 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1954); *Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co.*, 53 Fla. 1090, 43 So. 919 (1907); *Becker v. Effenberger*, 458 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Comment: If the record reflects, or examining counsel should learn, that Roe died or became incapacitated prior to the time of recording, then it should be determined that the deed was delivered prior to such death or incapacity. FUND TN 10.02.02.

STANDARD 16.3

DELAYED RECORDING OF DEED TO MORTGAGOR

**STANDARD: THE VALIDITY OF A MORTGAGE EXECUTED BY ONE WHO IS, IN FACT, THE OWNER, IS NOT AFFECTED BECAUSE IT IS RECORDED PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF THE INSTRUMENT BY WHICH OWNERSHIP WAS ACQUIRED, WHERE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES ARE NOT INVOLVED.**

Problem: John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe, who thereafter mortgaged it to Edward Lane. Recording of the mortgage preceded recording of the deed. No other instrument covering Blackacre was recording during this interval. Is the mortgage valid notwithstanding the delay in recording the deed to the mortgagor?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: *McEwen v. Larson*, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939); *Southern Bank & Trust Co. v. Mathers*, 90 Fla. 542, 106 So. 402 (1925).

Comment: The Standard involves only the validity of the mortgage. Caution should be exercised with respect to the rights of third parties. See FUND TN 22.03.10.

## STANDARD 16.3-1

### DELAYED RECORDING OF DEED TO MORTGAGOR — RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES

**STANDARD: A MORTGAGE RECORDED PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF THE DEED CONVEYING TITLE TO THE MORTGAGOR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE TO THIRD PARTIES CLAIMING UNDER OR THROUGH THE MORTGAGOR UNLESS THE DEED BEARS A DATE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING DATE OF THE MORTGAGE.**

**Problem 1:** John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe who, thereafter, mortgaged it to Edward Lane. The mortgage was dated and recorded May 5. The deed from Doe to Roe, dated May 1, was recorded May 10. On June 1, Richard Roe gave a “first mortgage” to Bank. Is Edward Lane's mortgage given priority over Bank's by the recording act?

**Answer:** Yes. The Bank was under a duty to examine the records for instruments executed by Richard Roe which were recorded at any time after the date of the deed. Therefore, even though Lane's mortgage was outside the chain of title when it was recorded, the subsequently recorded deed brought the mortgage back within the record chain of title.

**Problem 2:** Blackacre was owned by John Doe. On May 1 Richard Roe mortgaged Blackacre to Edward Lane by an instrument dated the same day. Lane recorded the mortgage that afternoon. By a deed dated and recorded on May 10, Doe conveyed Blackacre to Roe. On May 25, Roe executed a “first mortgage” to Bank. Is Edward Lane's mortgage given priority over Bank's by the recording statute?

**Answer:** No. Although after-acquired title operates to make Lane's mortgage valid when Roe becomes the owner, Lane's mortgage is recorded outside the chain of title and does not provide constructive notice to third parties. Therefore Bank, a subsequent bona fide purchaser, has priority.

**Authorities & References:** § 695.01, Fla. Stat. (2008); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 27.03, 32.60 (2008); 59 C.J.S. *Mortgages* § 241 (2007); FUND TN 22.03.10.

**Comment:** A mortgage prior to record evidence of the mortgagor's ownership is a “wild instrument” as the mortgagor is a stranger to the record title. Such an instrument does not furnish constructive notice to third parties. *See* Title Standard 16.5 (Wild Instruments — Stranger to Stranger); *Poladian v. Johnson*, 85 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1955).

The standard is based in part on the principle that a subsequent party has a duty to check the record from the earliest time that the record reflects the possibility of ownership. Application of this principle would appear to apply equally to deeds dated and recorded on the same day. Therefore it is suggested that the prudent title examiner search the record for the entire day on which the deed is dated and recorded for instruments affecting the title which were recorded earlier on the same day.

This standard illustrates the doctrine of constructive notice. It should be noted that most instruments that are outside the chain of title, and thus do not give constructive notice, actually will be included in an abstract or other form of title information that is compiled by means of a



tract index or a more complete search than is required by the chain of title concept. Such instruments will give actual notice to subsequent parties utilizing such title information. However, in situations where title information is usually not obtained, for example when the subsequent party is a judgment lien creditor or a construction lien claimant, questions of priorities will be decided by the concept of constructive notice as illustrated by this standard.

A specific reference in a deed to a mortgage which is recorded outside the chain of title may be adequate to provide constructive notice of the mortgage. *Sapp v. Warner*, 105 Fla. 245, 141 So. 124 (1932). For a discussion of a reference in a deed which is sufficient to provide constructive notice of such a mortgage, see Title Standard 16.1 (Reference To Unrecorded Or Improperly Recorded Instrument). *See also* FUND TN 22.03.10.

Title Standard 9.4 (Title Acquired By Mortgagor After Execution Of Mortgage) should be reviewed in the context of problem 2.

Prior recording of the mortgage does not affect its validity as between the mortgagor and the mortgagee. *See* Title Standard 16.3 (Delayed Recordings of Deed to Mortgagor).

**STANDARD 16.4**

**POWER OF ATTORNEY — TIME OF RECORDING**

**STANDARD: AN INSTRUMENT DULY EXECUTED BY AN ATTORNEY IN FACT UNDER A PROPER POWER OF ATTORNEY IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE FAILURE TO RECORD THE POWER OF ATTORNEY UNTIL AFTER THE INSTRUMENT EXECUTED THEREUNDER WAS RECORDED, PROVIDED THERE WERE NO INTERVENING EQUITIES.**

Problem 1: John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, by Sam Smith, as their attorney in fact, conveyed Blackacre, non-homestead property, to Richard Roe by deed executed in regular form and promptly recorded in 1972. In 1974 the power of attorney was recorded and there were no intervening claimants to the property. Does Roe have marketable record title?

Answer: Yes, provided the power of attorney was executed prior to the time it was exercised or included words of ratification.

Problem 2: Same facts as above except that in 1973 a judgment was recorded against John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife. Does Richard Roe take free of the judgment?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: § 695.01, Fla. Stat. (2008); *Huselton v. Liggett*, 110 Kan. 145, 202 P. 972 (1921).

## STANDARD 16.5

### WILD INSTRUMENTS — STRANGER TO STRANGER

**STANDARD: A WILD INSTRUMENT, AS THE TERM IS USED HEREIN, IS A RECORDED INSTRUMENT WHICH PURPORTS TO AFFECT TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY IN WHICH NONE OF THE PARTIES TO THE INSTRUMENT HAVE EVER HAD A RECORD INTEREST. A WILD INSTRUMENT DOES NOT RENDER TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY UNMARKETABLE, PROVIDED THAT: (1) IT CAN BE REASONABLY DETERMINED FROM THE RECORD THAT THE WILD INSTRUMENT WAS INTENDED TO DESCRIBE OTHER REAL PROPERTY OR (2) IN INSTANCES WHERE IT CANNOT BE SO DETERMINED, THE WILD INSTRUMENT HAS BEEN OF RECORD FOR AT LEAST SEVEN YEARS AND NO FURTHER INSTRUMENTS HAVE BEEN RECORDED WHICH ARE BASED ON, OR ARISE OUT OF, THE WILD INSTRUMENT.**

Authorities & References: *Poladian v. Johnson*, 85 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1955); *Board of Pub. Instruction v. McDonald*, 143 Fla. 377, 196 So. 859 (1940); *Benner v. Kendall*, 21 Fla. 584 (1885); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.99 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); FUND TN 7.03.01.

Comment: Any wild instrument places the examining attorney on notice of possible outstanding interests and requires a reasonable investigation with respect thereto. Such investigation should always include, but not be limited to, a determination as to possession of the real property and to whom taxes are assessed.

The Standard should not be interpreted to mean that title to real property not meeting the requirements set forth will necessarily be unmarketable.

The seven-year period is based on long-standing custom rather than statutory or case law.

In relying upon this Standard, it must be determined that the competing chain of title commencing with an apparent wild instrument has not ripened into a marketable title as defined in Ch. 712, Fla. Stat. .

If there is a wild chain of title, then the length of such chain may be considered in determining whether the record shows that the wild instrument contains an obviously mistaken description.

STANDARD 16.6

EFFECT OF POSSESSION ON PRIORITY  
UNDER RECORDING ACT

**STANDARD: POSSESSION BY ONE NOT HOLDING AN INTEREST OF RECORD PUTS SUBSEQUENT CREDITORS AND PURCHASERS ON NOTICE AND REQUIRES THEM TO ASCERTAIN THE FULL EXTENT OF A POSSESSOR'S CLAIM OR LOSE THE PROTECTION OF § 695.01, Fla. Stat.**

**Problem 1:** Oil Co. approached John Doe with an offer to lease oil, gas, and mineral rights to Blackacre. Doe was willing to enter into the lease but told Oil Co. that Richard Roe was presently “renting” Blackacre. After Oil Co. entered into the lease with Doe, it learned that Roe held an unrecorded lease which included an option to purchase. Roe was in possession of Blackacre during the negotiations between Oil Co. and Doe. Is Oil Co. protected by the recording act?

**Answer:** No. Lessee Oil Co., a subsequent purchaser under the recording act, had a duty to determine the full extent of Richard Roe's rights. Although Roe's lease was unrecorded, his possession of the property was sufficient notice of his rights to defeat Oil Co.'s status as a subsequent purchaser without notice as required by § 695.01, Fla. Stat.

**Problem:** John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe on June 5. Roe took possession, openly and visibly, on June 6. The deed from Doe to Roe was not recorded. Later that year Cement Co., knowing nothing about Roe, obtained a judgment against Doe and a lien on Blackacre. Is Cement Co.'s interest in the property protected by the recording act?

**Answer:** No. Although Roe failed to record his deed, his possession of Blackacre prior to the judgment lien is notice to Cement Co. of Roe's rights. Cement Co. would lose the protected status of creditor without notice under § 695.01, Fla. Stat.

**Authorities & References:** *Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Laws*, 272 So. 2d 841 (1st DCA Fla. 1973); *Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Roper*, 68 Fla. 299, 67 So. 115 (1914); *Denco, Inc. v. Belk*, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957); *Kroitzch v. Steele*, 768 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 27.05 (2008); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.21 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006).

**Comment:** The above Standard and Problems are designed solely to illustrate the effect of possession on priority under the Recording Act. It should be recognized that in accepting title under the above circumstances, adequate steps should be taken to establish and preserve the fact of possession and its effect on the priorities. This usually will involve a judicial determination with respect to the fact of possession.

Notice arising from possession has been variously characterized as “constructive,” “inquiry,” “actual,” and “implied actual.” See generally 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 27.05 (2008).

Actual knowledge of possession inconsistent with the record is not a prerequisite to imposition of the duty to inquire as to the full extent of the possessor's rights. Constructive notice is created by the fact of possession itself.

A reasonable explanation of possession inconsistent with the record, as found in problem 1, does

not relieve the purchaser from a duty to inquire of the possessor himself. *See Mercer v. Miller*, 157 Fla. 78, 24 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1946); *Denco v. Belk*, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957); *Kroitzsch v. Steele*, 768 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

As to the effective dates of liens, see Title Standard 8.1 (Effective Dates Of Mechanics' Liens) and 9.1 (Lien Of Judgment).

## Chapter 17

### MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT

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#### Standard 17.1

#### PURPOSE OF THE MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT

#### **STANDARD: THE ACT SHOULD BE RELIED UPON TO ELIMINATE IMPERFECTIONS OF TITLE THAT FALL WITHIN ITS SCOPE.**

Authorities & References: § 712.01, Fla. Stat. et seq. (2009); *City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So. 2d 439, 449 (Fla. 1978) (holding that the Act is constitutional); *ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth*, 346 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (Fla. 1977) (mother's life estate holder's deed served as root of title to eliminate the remainder interests of her children); *Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.*, 236 So. 2d 114, 120 (Fla. 1970), *cert. denied*, 400 U.S. 964 (1970) (the Act operates to make title based on wild deed marketable); *Sawyer v. Modrall*, 286 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); *cert. denied*, 297 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1974) (the Act operates to eliminate interest created by deed from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund); *Wilson v. Kelley*, 226 So. 2d 123, 128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969) (quit claim deed may serve as root of title only if it evidences an intent to convey an identifiable interest); *Whaley v. Wotring*, 225 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 14.20 to 14.22 (2007).

Comment: For a discussion of the constitutionality of the Act, see FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 2.5 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006). *See also City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So. 2d 439, 449 (Fla. 1978) (holding that the Act is constitutional); *Wichelman v. Messner*, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957); *Annot.*, 71 A.L.R.2d 816 (1960); Boyer & Shapo, *Florida's Marketable Title Act: Prospects and Problems*, 18 MIAMI L. REV. 103 (1963).

STANDARD 17.2

MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE

**STANDARD: MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE EXISTS, SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS OF THE ACT, WHEN RECORD TITLE HAS BEEN VESTED IN A PERSON, ALONE, OR TOGETHER WITH PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST FOR THIRTY YEARS OR MORE AND NOTHING OF RECORD PURPORTS TO DIVEST THE PERSON OF THE ESTATE.**

Problem 1: The following chain of title appears of record. In 1955 John Doe conveyed Blackacre to "Richard Roe and his heirs for so long as the premises are used for residential purposes." In 1965 Richard Roe conveyed Blackacre to "Simon Grant and his heirs." In 1985 Simon Grant conveyed Blackacre to "Thomas Frank and his heirs." In 2005 did Thomas Frank have marketable record title to Blackacre in fee simple absolute?

Answer: Yes. The 1965 conveyance to Simon Grant purports to transfer the fee simple absolute interest which Thomas Frank claims and was recorded at least thirty years prior to the time marketability is being determined in 2005. Hence the 1965 conveyance is the root of title and all interests not evidenced by it or subsequently created or transferred and not excepted under the Act are extinguished.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1 except that in 1965 Richard Roe delivered the deed of Blackacre to Simon Grant, but the deed was not recorded until 1980. In 2005 did Thomas Frank have marketable record title to Blackacre in fee simple absolute?

Answer: No. The root of title is the last title transaction to have been recorded at least thirty years prior to the time marketability is being determined. The 1955 conveyance is the root of title and it contains the restriction with the possibility of reverter, hence that interest is not extinguished.

Problem 3: John Doe is the grantee in a deed to Blackacre in fee simple absolute recorded in 1975. Nothing affecting Blackacre has been recorded since then. In 2006 did John Doe have marketable record title to Blackacre?

Answer: Yes. The deed qualifies as a root of title and all interests arising prior to the recording of the deed in 1975 are extinguished, unless specifically excepted under the Act.

Problem 4: In 1970, John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe. In 1975, Simon Grant, although he never owned Blackacre, purports to convey a portion of Blackacre to Thomas Frank. Does Richard Roe have marketable title?

Answer: No. Although the 1970 deed is the root of title and the 1975 deed was a wild deed, the latter nevertheless created an estate, interest, claim or charge arising out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title, so is an exception to marketability under § 712.03(4), Fla. Stat.

Problem 5: John Doe is the last grantee in the regular chain of title to Blackacre by a deed recorded in 1960. John Doe died in 1969. Court proceedings recorded in 1970 involving his estate establish that his sole heir, Ralph Doe, acquired ownership of Blackacre. In 2001 did Ralph Doe have marketable record title to Blackacre?

Answer: Yes. The court proceedings affect title to land and were recorded thirty years prior to the time marketability is being determined, hence they qualify as the root of title.

Authorities & References: § 712.01, Fla. Stat. et seq. (2009); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE §§ 2.5-.12 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§ 14.22 (2007); FUND TN 10.01.02.

Comment: A wild or interloping deed may constitute a root of title. *City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So. 2d 439, 446 (Fla. 1978). Exceptions to the operation of the Act are contained in §§ 712.03–.04, Fla. Stat. (2009) and are dealt with specifically in other Standards in this Chapter.

The Act does not eliminate an interest or claim arising out of a title transaction recorded after the root of title, even if the subsequent interest or claim is outside the chain of title, such as a wild deed. *See Holland v. Hattaway*, 438 So. 2d 456, 468-470 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (the Act did not extinguish an easement purportedly created by a wild deed recorded several years after the root of title, although the court held that the easement was extinguished on other grounds).



STANDARD 17.3

EXTINGUISHMENT OF INTERESTS

**STANDARD: SUBJECT TO THE EXCEPTIONS IN MRTA, ALL ESTATES, INTERESTS, CLAIMS OR CHARGES THAT EXIST BY VIRTUE OF ANY ACT, TITLE TRANSACTION, EVENT OR OMISSION THAT OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ROOT OF TITLE ARE EXTINGUISHED BY THE ACT.**

Problem 1: A deed to Blackacre executed by John Doe and recorded in 1965 contained: (1) a condition subsequent that the grantor or his heirs could re-enter in the event of a breach of certain specified conditions and (2) a special limitation that the land was conveyed “so long as” it was used for a specified purpose. A deed to Blackacre recorded in 1975 does not mention any conditions or limitations. No notice of a claim based on them has been filed. Marketability of title to Blackacre was sought to be determined in 2007. Were the right of entry for condition broken and the possibility of reverter barred as clouds upon title?

Answer: Yes. The claims would be based on a title transaction occurring prior to 1975, the effective date of the root of title and no exception is applicable.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1 except that the 1975 deed, or a subsequent deed, contained a provision that the conveyance was “subject to conditions and limitations of record.” Were the rights thereby preserved?

Answer: No. Interests disclosed by the muniments of title, beginning with the root of title, are preserved but § 712.03(1), Fla. Stat. requires that a general reference to such interests include specific identification by reference to book and page of record or by name of recorded plat.

Problem 3: The plat for Blackacre Subdivision, filed in 1925, contained a setback restriction. A deed to Lot 1 in Blackacre Subdivision recorded in 1953 contained a reference to the name of the recorded plat, as did subsequent deeds, but none specifically referenced the setback restriction. Is the setback restriction still valid as to Lot 1?

Answer: Yes. A restriction is preserved if the root or subsequent muniment of title by name refers to the recorded plat that imposed the restriction. § 712.03(1), Fla. Stat.

Problem 4: A deed to Blackacre executed by John Doe and recorded in 1965 reserved an easement. A deed to Blackacre in 1975 does not mention the easement. John Doe and his successors in interest have used the easement, or a part thereof, since 1965. No notice of a claim based on the easement has been filed. Marketability of title to Blackacre was sought to be determined in 2007. Did the easement constitute a cloud upon the title?

Answer: Yes. Easements or rights, interests, or servitudes in the nature of easements, rights of way and terminal facilities and encumbrances thereon are preserved by § 712.03(5), Fla. Stat. so long as they, or any part thereof, are used.

Problem 5: In 1975, ABC Corp. purports to convey Blackacre to John Doe. The deed is signed by “Richard Roe as Secretary of ABC Corp.” No corporate resolution was recorded authorizing Richard Roe to execute deeds on behalf of ABC Corp. Nothing affecting Blackacre has been recorded since then. Does John Doe have marketable title?

Answer: No. Although the deed is the root of title, it contains an inherent defect. Hence, the potential ownership claim of ABC Corp. is not extinguished.

Problem 6: A deed to Blackacre executed by John Doe and recorded in 1965 reserved the right of entry to explore and extract mineral rights. A deed to Blackacre in 1975 does not mention the mineral rights reservation. No notice of a claim based on the reservation has been filed. Marketability of title to Blackacre was sought to be determined in 2007. Did the right of entry to explore and extract mineral rights constitute a cloud upon the title?

Answer: No. See Comment, below.

Authorities & References: § 712.03, Fla. Stat. (2009); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.22 (2007).

Comment: The “root of title” is any title transaction that describes the land sufficiently, and has been of record for more than 30 years. § 712.01, Fla. Stat.; *Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.*, 224 So. 2d 743, 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), *aff’d* 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970) (a void deed may be a root of title); *Miami V. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So. 2d 439, 446 (Fla. 1978) (wild deed); *Kittrell v. Clark*, 363 So. 2d 373, 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (probate); *Mayo v. Owens*, 367 So. 2d 1054, 1057 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (judgment determining heirs).

The title examiner should be vigilant for inherent defects in the root of title. See, e.g., *Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.*, *supra*, at 751 (“‘defects in the muniments of title’ do not refer to defects or failures in the transmission of title . . . but refer to defects in the make up or constitution of the deed or other muniments of title on which such transmission depends”).

A restriction older than 30 years is preserved if the root of title or a subsequent muniment of title contains a reference to the name of the recorded plat that imposed the restriction. *Sunshine Vistas Homeowners Association v. Caruana*, 623 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1993).

The Act may operate to extinguish a county’s claim of ownership. *Florida DOT v. Dardashti Properties*, 605 So. 2d 120, 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (County’s interest in a strip of land held for right of way was extinguished by MRTA).

The Act operates to extinguish an otherwise valid claim of common law way of necessity when such claim was not asserted within 30 years. *H & F Land, Inc. v. Panama City-Bay County Airport and Industrial District*, 736 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1999). The Act does not, however, operate to extinguish statutory ways of necessity. *Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park*, 887 So. 2d 1224, 1233 (Fla. 2004) (receding from *H & F Land, Inc.* to the extent its dicta indicated that the Act applies to statutory ways of necessity).

Whether the Act extinguishes mineral rights is undecided and questionable since the courts have held that mineral rights constitute a separate estate from the surface rights. See, e.g., *P & N Investment Corp. v. Florida Ranchettes, Inc.*, 220 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). However, the Act, subject to its exceptions, does serve to eliminate rights of entry to explore and extract mineral rights, whether expressly reserved or implied. *Noblin v. Harbor Hills Development, L.P.*, 896 So. 2d 781, 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (the Act serves to extinguish rights of entry for exploring or mining oil, gas, minerals, or fissionable materials, unless those rights of entry or easements are excepted); *but see* § 704.05, Fla. Stat. (excluding the rights of entry held by the state or any of its agencies, boards or departments from operation of the

Act).

See § 712.03, Fla. Stat. for a list of exceptions for rights not extinguished by the Act. Section 712.03(9), Fla. Stat., effective July 1, 2010 added another exception for any right, title or interest held by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, any water management district created under chapter 373, or the United States.

STANDARD 17.4

RECORDING A NOTICE TO PROTECT INTERESTS

**STANDARD: RECORDING A PROPER NOTICE PROTECTS ESTATES, INTERESTS, CLAIMS, OR CHARGES FROM THE OPERATION OF THE ACT.**

Problem 1: John Doe, the record owner of Blackacre, gave a mortgage to Richard Roe encumbering Blackacre, which was recorded in January, 1975. The last payment was not due until 2010. On June 15, 1975 a deed to Blackacre, which qualified as a root of title, was recorded but it contained no mention of the mortgage. Must Richard Roe file proper notice to preserve the lien of his mortgage by June 15, 2005?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe gave a 99-year lease to Richard Roe on July 1, 1975, at which time the lease was recorded and Roe went into possession of the land. Did John Doe need to file proper notice of his ownership prior to July 1, 2005 to preserve his interest?

Answer: No. The 1975 transaction created a leasehold interest only. John Doe's fee simple interest would not be extinguished. Filing of notice is necessary only when there is a subsequent title transaction that purports to divest the interest claimed.

Problem 3: The owner of Blackacre Subdivision as developer, joined by Blackacre Homeowners' Association, Inc., filed a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions for Blackacre Subdivision in 1975. John Doe conveyed Lot 1 in Blackacre Subdivision to Richard Roe in 1978. That deed did not mention the covenants or restrictions, and there is no subsequent specific reference to the recording information of the covenants or restrictions in the public record. In 2009, marketability was sought to be determined as to Lot 1. Are the covenants and restrictions still valid as to Lot 1?

Answer: No, unless the Blackacre Homeowners' Association timely complied with the notice requirements under § 712.06, Fla. Stat. or used the procedures in §§ 720.403 – .407, Fla. Stat. to revive the expired covenants.

Authorities & References: § 712.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2009); § 712.05-.06, Fla. Stat. (2009), 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.23[3] (2007).

Comment: The requirements of the notice filed pursuant to the Act are set forth at § 712.06, Fla. Stat. (2009).

The notice merely protects claims as they otherwise exist and does not validate a claim or create a new claim.

Chapter 712, Fla. Stat. was amended effective October 1, 1997, to allow homeowner associations to file a notice under MRTA to preserve covenants and restrictions. § 712.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2009).

If a false or fictitious claim is asserted by the filing of notice pursuant to the Act, the

prevailing party may be entitled to costs and attorneys' fees arising out of any action related thereto and damages sustained as a result of the filing of such notice. § 712.08, Fla. Stat. (2009).

STANDARD 17.5

RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN POSSESSION

**STANDARD: THE ACT DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN POSSESSION OF LAND.**

**Problem:** John Doe was grantee in a deed to Blackacre recorded in 1970, which constitutes the root of title. Nothing further appears of record, but investigation in 2002 disclosed that Richard Roe was in actual open possession of Blackacre. In 2002 did John Doe have a marketable record title to Blackacre free of the claims of Roe?

**Answer:** No. The possession of Roe was inconsistent with the record title in John Doe and was therefore prima facie hostile. Upon satisfactory proof that Roe's possession was in fact held in subordination to the title of John Doe (as, for example, that he was a tenant, licensee, or an employee of Doe), Doe would have had marketable record title under the Act.

**Authorities & References:** § 712.03(03), Fla. Stat. (2009); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.23[4] (2007).

**Comment:** No person can have a marketable record title within the meaning of the Act if the land is in the hostile possession of another person. However, the exception to the Act prevents destruction of existing rights and does not create any new rights.

STANDARD 17.6

SUBSEQUENT RECORDED INSTRUMENTS

**STANDARD: THE ACT DOES NOT ELIMINATE ESTATES, INTERESTS, CLAIMS, OR CHARGES ARISING OUT OF A TITLE TRANSACTION RECORDED SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECORDING OF THE ROOT OF TITLE.**

Problem 1: John Doe is the last grantee of record in a regular chain of title to Blackacre by a deed recorded in 1970. A deed to Blackacre recorded in 1980 recites that John Doe died intestate and the grantor therein named, Richard Roe, was the sole heir at law. In 2007, was the 1980 deed a title transaction not affected or extinguished by the Act?

Answer: Yes. Even if the facts recited are not correct, the 1980 deed is a recorded instrument that affects title to an estate or interest in land, and, hence, a title transaction. Any recorded instrument or court proceeding that affects any estate or interest in land qualifies as a title transaction.

Problem 2: John Doe is the last grantee of record in a regular chain of title to Blackacre by a deed recorded in 1970. In 1980 a stranger to the title executed a deed to Blackacre, at which time the deed was recorded. In determining marketability in 2001, did the 1980 deed constitute a title transaction subsequent to the root of title and therefore not eliminated by the Act?

Answer: Yes. With respect to wild deeds, see Title Standard 16.5 (Wild Instruments — Stranger to Stranger).

Authorities & References: § 712.01, .03(4), Fla. Stat (2009);1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.23[5] (2007).

Comment: The fact that the Act does not eliminate an estate, interest, claim, or charge arising out of a title transaction does not bear, either favorably or unfavorably, on the validity of such estate, interest, claim, or charge. That is, the Act protects existing rights but does not create new rights.

A wild deed may constitute a root of title. *City of Miami v. St. Joe Paper Co.*, 364 So. 2d 439, 446 (Fla. 1978).

STANDARD 17.7

RIGHTS OF PERSONS TO WHOM  
TAXES ARE ASSESSED

**STANDARD: THE ACT DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE RIGHTS OF A PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE LAND IS ASSESSED FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME THE LAND IS SO ASSESSED AND THREE YEARS THEREAFTER.**

Problem 1: John Doe was grantee in a deed to Blackacre in 1970 which constitutes the root of title. Nothing further appears of record, but investigation in 2002 disclosed that Blackacre had been assessed on the county tax rolls in the name of Richard Roe since 2000. In 2002, did John Doe have a marketable record title to Blackacre free of the claims of Roe?

Answer: No. The rights of Roe would need to be ascertained. However, this exception to the Act only prevents destruction of existing rights and does not create any new rights so Roe would have to prove up his purported interest based on something more than the mere payment of property taxes.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1 except that 2002 is the last year that Blackacre is assessed in the name of Richard Roe. In 2003 through 2005 Blackacre was assessed in the name of John Doe. In 2006 did John Doe have a marketable record title to Blackacre free of the claims of Roe?

Answer: Yes. Any rights of Roe would be preserved for only three years after Blackacre was last assessed in his name. This assumes that no other exception is applicable to preserve any rights of Roe.

Authorities & References: § 712.03(6), Fla. Stat. (2009); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.23[6] (2007).

Comment: This exception necessitates examination of the county tax rolls for the three years prior to the year in which marketability is being determined.



STANDARD 17.8

RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA

**STANDARD: THE ACT DOES NOT ELIMINATE ANY RIGHT, TITLE, OR INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OR FLORIDA RESERVED IN THE PATENT OR DEED BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES OR FLORIDA PARTED WITH TITLE.**

**Problem:** John Doe executed a deed to Blackacre and it was recorded in 1960. No mention of any other interest was contained in the deed. Nothing affecting Blackacre has been recorded since. The title to Blackacre was being examined in 2005. The seller agreed to furnish an abstract of title. The buyer demanded that the seller provide an abstract which included the conveyance by which the United States or Florida parted with title. Was the demand justified?

**Answer:** Yes. The statutory exception includes the interests of any officers, boards, commissions or other agencies of the United States or Florida.

**Authorities & References:** § 712.04, Fla. Stat. (2009).

**Comment:** With respect to submerged sovereignty land, see § 712.03(7), Fla. Stat. (2009) (effective June 15, 1978); *Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.*, 492 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1986), *cert. den.* 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (holding that the Marketable Record Title Act as originally enacted and as subsequently amended did not operate to divest the state of title to sovereignty lands, even though conveyances of state lands to private interests encompassed sovereignty lands within the lands being conveyed); 1 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 14.23[7] (2007); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 2.7 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006).

Effective July 1, 2010, § 712.03(9), Fla. Stat., created another exception for any right, title or interest held by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, any water management district created under chapter 373, or the United States.

STANDARD 17.9

Reserved for future title standard

STANDARD 17.10

ELIMINATION OF HOMESTEAD

**STANDARD: THE ACT CAN BE RELIED UPON TO DEFEAT A CLAIM OF HOMESTEAD AGAINST A CONVEYANCE RECORDED PRIOR TO THE ROOT OF TITLE, UNLESS CLAIMANT FILES A NOTICE WITHIN THE 30 YEAR PERIOD AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE ROOT OF TITLE.**

Problem 1: John Doe owned and resided on Blackacre as his homestead, with his wife and two children. In 1960 John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe for valuable consideration, but without the joinder of his wife. John Doe died in 1967, survived by his wife and children. Blackacre was conveyed by Roe in 1972. In 2005, Buyer's attorney examined the abstract and objected to the title. No notice of the homestead claim had ever been filed. Was the attorney's objection valid?

Answer: No. The 1972 deed was the root of title, and all claims prior to it are extinguished unless specifically exempted by the Act.

Problem 2: Same facts as Problem 1 except that there were no conveyances of Blackacre after the 1960 conveyance by John Doe. Was the attorney's objection valid?

Answer: Yes. The homestead claim renders the 1960 deed void and this is a defect inherent in the root of title.

Authorities & References: §§ 712.01-.04, Fla. Stat. (2009); *ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth*, 386 F.Supp. 940, 942-43 (M.D. Fla. 1975), accord, *ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Wadsworth*, 346 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (Fla. 1977); see also, *Reid v. Bradshaw*, 302 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (homestead rights are not eliminated by the mere passage of time).

Comment: The answer to Problem 1 would probably be the same without regard to whether the homestead owner died before or after the effective date of the root of title. See § 712.04, Fla. Stat. However, the *Reid v. Bradshaw* opinion casts some doubt in the latter instance, and caution should be exercised in such a situation. See also, *Conservatory-City of Refuge, Inc. v. Kinney*, 514 So. 2d 377, 378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the Act did not apply to eliminate homestead claims where the children's remainder interests did not vest until the homestead owner died, which was after the asserted root of title).

## CHAPTER 18

### HOMESTEAD

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#### STANDARD 18.0

##### HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS – HEAD OF FAMILY

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER JANUARY 8, 1985, HOMESTEAD PROPERTY MAY BE OWNED BY A NATURAL PERSON, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE OWNER’S STATUS AS HEAD OF A FAMILY.**

**Problem:** Mary Doe, a single woman living alone, owned and resided on Blackacre. A money judgment was obtained against her after January 8, 1985. May Mary Doe have her home designated exempt from levy by forced sale to satisfy this judgment?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** Art. X, § 4(a), FLA. CONST. (1968) (as amended); §§ 222.01, .02, Fla. Stat.

**Comment:** Effective January 8, 1985, the Florida electors amended the 1968 Florida Constitution, Article X, section 4(a) replacing property owned by the “head of a family” with property owned by a “natural person.” Sections 222.01 and 222.02, Fla. Stat., relating to designation by an owner of homestead for an exemption from forced sale, were amended to allow a natural person rather than the head of a family to obtain protection from levy. This change also applies to restrictions on alienation and devise of homestead property. The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the definition of “head of a family” in Florida Constitution Article X, section 4(a) relating to the forced sale exemption, to the restrictions on alienation and devise in section 4(c). *See, Holden v. Gardner*, 420 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982). Based on this reasoning, it appears the definition of a “natural person” in section 4(a) for the forced sale exemption also applies to the restrictions on alienation and devise in section 4(c).

STANDARD 18.1

ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY  
JOINDER OF SPOUSE

**STANDARD: WHEN THE OWNER OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY IS MARRIED, THE SPOUSE MUST JOIN IN ANY CONVEYANCE OR ENCUMBRANCE OF THE PROPERTY UNLESS THE PROPERTY IS HELD AS A TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES AND IS CONVEYED TO THE SPOUSE OR IS HELD BY ONE SPOUSE AND IS CONVEYED TO BOTH SPOUSES AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES.**

Problem 1: John Doe, a married man, owned homestead property. He alone executed a deed in 1965 conveying it to his wife, Mary Doe. Is Mary's title marketable?

Answer: No. Joinder of the spouse was required. The answer might be different if the conveyance occurred on or after the effective date of the 1968 Florida Constitution. See Comment.

Problem 2: John Doe, a married man, owned homestead property. He alone executed a deed in 1975 conveying it to himself and his wife, Mary Doe, as tenants by the entireties. Is the deed valid?

Answer: Yes. See *Jameson v. Jameson*, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980).

Problem 3: John Doe, a married man, owned homestead property. He alone executed a deed conveying it to Richard Roe. John's wife, Mary Doe, executed a separate deed purporting to convey the property to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: No. Both spouses must join in a conveyance of homestead property.

Problem 4: Mary Doe, a married woman, owned Blackacre, and resided on it with her husband, John Doe. John was an invalid and Mary was the head of the family. Mary Doe alone executed a deed conveying Blackacre to Richard Roe. Is the deed valid?

Answer: No. John Doe must join in the deed. It is immaterial whether the deed was executed prior to or subsequent to the effective date of the 1968 Florida Constitution, or whether Mary Doe, under prior law, was a free dealer. See *Bigelow v. Dunphe*, 197 So. 328 (Fla. 1940); FUND TN 16.04.05.

Problem 5: Mary Doe owned Blackacre and resided on it with her husband, John Doe, who was the head of the family. In May 1985, Mary executed a deed conveying Blackacre to Richard Roe. Is the deed valid?

Answer: No. John Doe must join in the deed. On or after January 8, 1985, the restriction on alienation of homestead property applies whether or not the owner of the homestead is the head of a family.

Problem 6: John and Mary Doe, husband and wife, owned homestead property as a tenancy by the entireties. John alone executed a deed conveying the homestead to Mary. Is Mary's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: Art. X, § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (1968); Art. X, §§ 1, 4, FLA. CONST. (1885); § 689.11, Fla. Stat.; *Jameson v. Jameson*, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980); *Williams v. Foerster*, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976); *Estep v. Herring*, 18 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1944); *John v. Purvis*, 199 So. 340 (Fla. 1940); *Moorefield v. Byrne*, 140 So. 2d 876 (3d DCA 1962), *cert. denied*, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.03[2] (2008); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.122 (Fla. Bar CLE 5th ed. 2006); FUND TN 16.02.03.

Comment: Joinder is required under both the 1885 and 1968 Florida Constitutions. Section 689.11(1), Fla. Stat., however, was amended in 1971 to permit interspousal conveyances of homestead property without joinder. The statute's constitutionality has been upheld with respect to property held as a tenancy by the entireties and applied to a 1965 conveyance. *Williams v. Foerster*, 335 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1976).

The 1968 Florida Constitution has been construed to permit the interspousal creation of a tenancy by the entireties in homestead property without the joinder of the grantee spouse. *See, Jameson v. Jameson*, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980). This case also indicates that a conveyance of homestead property from one spouse to the other is valid without the joinder of the grantee spouse. Caution should be exercised in this latter situation, however, as it was not involved in the facts of the *Jameson* case. Neither of these two conveyances of homestead property was valid without spousal joinder if made prior to January 7, 1969, the effective date of the 1968 Florida Constitution.

On or after January 8, 1985, property owned and resided on by a natural person may have homestead status without regard to the owner's status as head of a family. *See*, Title Standard 18.0 (Homestead Exemptions — Head of Family).

For a history of Florida homestead law, *see*, Crosby and Miller, *Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption* (pts. I-V), 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 219, 346 (1949); Note, *Our Legal Chameleon is a Sacred Cow: Alienation of Homestead Under the 1968 Constitution*, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 701 (1972); Maines and Maines, *Our Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida's Homestead Exemption*, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 227 (1978).

*See also* Title Standards 6.4 (Conveyance of Entireties Property By One Spouse To The Other), 18.2 (Gratuitous Alienation Of Homestead Property Before January 7, 1969 – TITLE STANDARD DELETED) and 18.3 (Gratuitous Alienation Of Homestead Property On Or After January 7, 1969).

STANDARD 18.2

GRATUITOUS ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY  
BEFORE JANUARY 7, 1969

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.]

STANDARD 18.3

GRATUITOUS ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY  
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 7, 1969

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER JANUARY 7, 1969, HOMESTEAD PROPERTY MAY BE ALIENATED BY GIFT.**

Problem 1: John Doe owned Blackacre and resided on it as head of his family with his wife, Mary Doe, and his minor child, Alice Doe. In 1980 John Doe, joined by Mary Doe, gratuitously conveyed Blackacre to John Doe and Mary Doe as tenants by the entireties. Subsequently, John Doe died. Was Mary Doe the fee owner of Blackacre?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: Same facts as above, except that Mary Doe did not join in the conveyance. After John Doe's death, was Mary Doe the fee owner of Blackacre?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: Art. X, § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (1968); *Jameson v. Jameson*, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980); 1A BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.27[1] (2008).

Comment: In *Jameson v. Jameson*, 369 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the Third District Court of Appeal construed article X, § 4(c) of the Florida Constitution to require the spouse of a homestead titleholder to join in an interspousal conveyance of the homestead to the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties and declared § 689.11(1), Fla. Stat. unconstitutional to the extent that it would allow interspousal conveyance of the homestead without joinder. This decision was reversed in *Jameson v. Jameson*, 387 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1980), in which the Florida supreme court held that the Florida Constitution does not require joinder in an interspousal conveyance of solely owned homestead property to the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties, and that § 689.11(1), Fla. Stat. is consistent with the constitutional provision as construed by it.

*See* Title Standard 18.1 (Alienation of Homestead Property — Joinder of Spouse).



STANDARD 18.4

ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY — POWER OF ATTORNEY

**STANDARD: A CONVEYANCE OR ENCUMBRANCE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY ACCOMPLISHED BY THE EXERCISE OF A POWER OF ATTORNEY OR DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZING A CONVEYANCE OR ENCUMBRANCE OF REAL PROPERTY IS ACCEPTABLE.**

Problem 1: John Doe, the homestead owner of Blackacre, resided on it with his wife, Mary Doe. Mary Doe executed a power of attorney with all the formalities of a deed to John Doe. The power of attorney, which was recorded, specifically authorized John Doe to convey real property. John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe, executing the deed: “John Doe” and “Mary Doe, by John Doe as her attorney-in-fact.” Does the conveyance to Richard Roe constitute a cloud upon the title to Blackacre?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: John Doe, the homestead owner of Blackacre, resided on it with his wife, Mary Doe. John Doe executed a power of attorney with all the formalities of a deed to Mary Doe. The power of attorney, which was recorded, specifically authorized Mary Doe to convey real property. Mary Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe, executing the deed: “John Doe, by Mary Doe as his attorney-in-fact” and “Mary Doe.” Does the conveyance to Richard Roe constitute a cloud upon the title of Blackacre?

Answer: No.

Problem 3: John Doe, the homestead owner of Blackacre, resided on it with his wife, Mary Doe. John Doe executed a power of attorney with all the formalities of a deed to Richard Roe. Mary Doe executed a power of attorney with all the formalities of a deed to Richard Roe. The powers of attorney, which were recorded, specifically authorized Richard Roe to convey real property. Richard Roe conveyed Blackacre to Stephen Grant, executing the deed: “John Doe, by Richard Roe as his attorney-in-fact” and “Mary Doe, by Richard Roe as her attorney-in-fact.” Does the conveyance to Stephen Grant constitute a cloud upon the title to Blackacre?

Answer: No. The same result also follows if Richard Roe was acting under a single power of attorney jointly executed by both John and Mary Doe. Also, the result would be the same if Richard Roe acted as attorney-in-fact for only one spouse and the other spouse executed the deed.

Authorities & References: Art. X, § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (1968) (as amended); § 689.111, Fla. Stat.; § 709.08(6), Fla. Stat.; *In re Estate of Schriver*, 441 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); *see also*, *City National Bank of Florida v. Tescher*, 578 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1991) *James v. James*, 843 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

Comment:

Section 689.111, Fla. Stat. which became effective on May 12, 1971, provides that the owner of homestead property may execute a deed or mortgage by virtue of a power of attorney, and joinder may be accomplished by the exercise of a power of attorney. In 1995, § 709.08(6), Fla. Stat. was amended to specifically include the homestead property. In addition, § 709.015(4), Fla. Stat., dealing with the exercise of powers of attorney when the principal has been reported by the armed forces as missing, implies that homestead property held as a tenancy by the entireties may be conveyed under a power of attorney after the lapse of one year from the report that the principal is missing. Even though the Constitution requires a joinder of the spouse in an alienation by the owner, such joinder may be by power of attorney.

STANDARD 18.5

ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY  
BY GUARDIAN PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1970 OR  
FROM JULY 1, 1975 THROUGH OCTOBER 1, 1977

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.]

STANDARD 18.6

ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY  
BY GUARDIAN BETWEEN OCTOBER 1, 1970 AND JULY 1, 1975, OR  
ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1977

**STANDARD: ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1970, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1975, AND ON OR AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1977, HOMESTEAD PROPERTY MAY BE ALIENATED OR ENCUMBERED BY THE GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF AN INCAPACITATED OWNER OR SPOUSE ON PETITION AND ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT.**

Problem 1: John Doe owned Blackacre and resided on it as the head of his family with Mary Doe, his wife, and their minor child. Mary Doe was adjudged incompetent on January 10, 1973, and John Doe was appointed guardian of the property of Mary Doe. John Doe conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe on June 10, 1973. John Doe joined in the conveyance as guardian of the property of Mary Doe, pursuant to an order of the circuit court authorizing the sale. Was the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe owned Blackacre and resided on it as the head of his family with Mary Doe, his wife, and their minor child. John Doe was adjudged incompetent on December 10, 1977, and Mary Doe was appointed guardian of the property of John Doe. Mary Doe, as guardian, conveyed Blackacre to Richard Roe on June 10, 1978 pursuant to a court order authorizing the sale. Mary Doe joined in the conveyance as the spouse of the homestead owner. Was the conveyance valid?

Answer: Yes.

Authorities & References: Art. X, § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (1968) (as amended); § 745.15, Fla. Stat. (1973); § 26.012, Fla. Stat. (1973 & Supp. 1974); § 744.441, Fla. Stat. (1977); § 744.451(1), Fla. Stat.; *In re Guardianship of Tanner*, 564 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.142 (Fla. Bar CLE 4th ed. 1999); FUND TN 16.02.01.

Comment: On or after October 1, 1970 through December 31, 1973, statutory authority existed for a guardian of the property of an incompetent to convey homestead property held as a tenancy by the entireties if only *one* spouse was incompetent. §§ 745.15(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1971); §§ 745.15(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1973). On or after January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975, and on or after October 1, 1977, statutory authority exists for a guardian to convey such property with court approval even when *both* spouses are incapacitated. §§ 745.15(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1973); § 744.441(12), Fla. Stat. *See* FUND TN 16.02.01.

Except for property owned by the ward in a tenancy by the entireties, statutory authority exists for the encumbrance of homestead by a guardian of the property, with court approval, on or after October 1, 1970 through June 30, 1975 and on or after October 1, 1977. § 744.441(12), Fla. Stat. (1977); § 745.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1971). On or after January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1975 and on or after October 1, 1977, a guardian could encumber property owned by the ward in a tenancy by the entireties; however, for all other periods statutory authority did not exist that allowed such property to be encumbered. *Compare* § 744.441(12), Fla. Stat. (1979) and § 745.15(4), Fla. Stat. (1973) *with* § 745.15(4), Fla. Stat. (1971). *See* FUND TN 16.02.01.

STANDARD 18.7

DEVISE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY BEFORE JANUARY 7, 1969

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.]

STANDARD 18.8

DEVISE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY ON OR AFTER JANUARY 7, 1969

**STANDARD: A DEVISE OF HOMESTEAD BY ONE DYING ON OR AFTER JANUARY 7, 1969, IS VALID IF THE DECEDENT IS NOT SURVIVED BY EITHER SPOUSE OR MINOR CHILD, AND A DEVISE MAY BE MADE TO THE SPOUSE IF THERE IS NO MINOR CHILD.**

Problem 1: John Doe, a widower, died after January 7, 1969, survived by his three adult children. By his will he devised his homestead to one of his children. Was the devise valid?

Answer: Yes. Since John was not survived by a spouse or minor child, there were no restrictions on the devise of his homestead. Presumably he could have excluded all of his children and devised the homestead to anyone else. *In re Estate of McGinty*, 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971) supports this, although the devise in that case was to one of the children. On or after January 1, 1976, see also § 732.4015, Fla. Stat. (1985).

The devise would not be valid if John were survived by a minor child. Effective July 1, 1973, the age of majority was changed from 21 years to 18 years of age. § 1.01(14), Fla. Stat. (1985).

Problem 2: John Doe died after January 7, 1969, survived by his widow, Mary Doe, and two adult children. By his will he devised his homestead to his widow, Mary. Was the devise valid?

Answer: Yes. The 1968 Florida Constitution was amended in 1972 to permit this, effective as of January 2, 1973. In fact, a devise such as this would be valid if made on or after January 7, 1969. *See In re Estate of McCartney*, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974) (upholding such a devise made in 1970). *See also* § 732.4015, Fla. Stat. (1985).

Problem 3: John Doe died after January 7, 1969, survived by his widow, Mary Doe, and two minor children. By his will he devised his homestead to his widow, Mary. Was the devise valid?

Answer: No. As John was survived by minor children, the devise was invalid.

Problem 4: Mary Doe died after January 7, 1969, survived by her dependent husband, John Doe, and two adult children, Thomas and Alice. By her will she devised her homestead to her son, Thomas. Was the devise valid?

**Answer:** No. Mary was survived by a spouse. Since she had no minor children, she could have devised the homestead to her spouse, but not to anyone else. The result would be the same if John was not dependent, and therefore Mary was not the head of a family, provided that Mary died on or after January 8, 1985.

**Problem 5:** John Doe, a single man living alone on Blackacre, died in May, 1985. He was survived by an adult son and minor daughter, neither of whom lived with nor was dependent on him. By his will, John Doe devised Blackacre to his brother. Was the devise valid?

**Answer:** No. The devise was not valid because John was survived by a minor child. Effective January 8, 1985, a single person's residence is subject to the restrictions on devise of homestead property. *See* FUND TN 16.04.02.

**Authorities & References:** Art. X, § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (1968); §§ 732.401, .4015, Fla. Stat. (1985); §§ 731.05, .27, Fla. Stat. (1973); *see also* §§ 732.102, .103, Fla. Stat. (1985); § 731.23, Fla. Stat. (1973); *In re Estate of McCartney*, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974); *In re Estate of McGinty*, 258 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1971); 2 BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.24 (2008); FUND TN 2.06.01, 2.06.03.

**Comment:** On or after January 8, 1985, property owned and resided on by a natural person may have homestead status without regard to the owner's status as head of a family. *See* Title Standard 18.0 (Homestead Exemptions — Head of Family).

When not devised as permitted by law, as in Problems 3 and 5, the homestead descends under the law of intestate succession. Prior to January 1, 1976, when the decedent was survived by a *widow* and lineal descendants, § 731.27 provided a life estate for the *widow* with a vested remainder to the lineal descendants. *See* §§ 731.05, .23, .27, Fla. Stat. (1973); *Stephens v. Campbell*, 70 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1954). On or after January 1, 1976, if the decedent is survived by a *spouse* and lineal descendants, § 732.401, Fla. Stat. provides a life estate for the surviving *spouse* with a vested remainder to the lineal descendants. *See* §§ 732.401, .4015, Fla. Stat. (1985).

*See* Title Standard 18.8-1 (Descent Of Homestead Property).

Article X, section 5 of the 1968 Florida Constitution states in part: "There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal. . . ." On or after January 1, 1976, this provision is incorporated in § 732.401 and § 732.4015, Fla. Stat. (2008), which read "spouse" instead of "widow." The constitutional provision should be considered whenever dealing with a pre-1976 devise of homestead. *See* FUND TN 2.06.03.



STANDARD 18.8-1

DESCENT OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY

**STANDARD: HOMESTEADS DESCEND AS OTHER INTESTATE PROPERTY, BUT IF THE DECEDENT IS SURVIVED BY: (1) A SPOUSE AND LINEAL DESCENDANTS, THE SPOUSE TAKES A LIFE ESTATE WITH A VESTED REMAINDER TO THE LINEAL DESCENDANTS IN BEING AT THE DECEDENT'S DEATH.; OR (2) A SPOUSE BUT NO LINEAL DESCENDANTS, THE SPOUSE TAKES THE FULL FEE SIMPLE TITLE.**

Problem 1: John Doe, the owner of homestead property, died intestate, survived only by his wife Mary and son Thomas. May Mary alone convey the homestead in fee simple absolute?

Answer: No. Mary takes a life estate with a vested remainder to Thomas.

Problem 2: Mary Doe, the owner of homestead property, died intestate, survived only by her dependent husband John and son Thomas. May John alone convey a 1/2 interest in the homestead in fee simple absolute?

Answer: (Before January 1, 1976) Yes. John takes a fee simple absolute by intestate succession equally with his son, the other heir, as § 731.27, Fla. Stat. applied only to widows. *But see* Art. X, § 5, FLA. CONST. (on or after January 7, 1969).

(On or after January 1, 1976) No. John takes a life estate with a vested remainder to Thomas as § 732.401, Fla. Stat. applies to either spouse.

Problem 3: John Doe, the owner of homestead property, died intestate, survived only by his wife Mary and grandson Stephen. May Mary alone convey the homestead in fee simple absolute?

Answer: No. Mary takes a life estate with a vested remainder to the lineal descendant, Stephen.

Problem 4: John and Mary Doe owned the homestead property as tenants by the entirety. John died. May Mary alone convey the homestead in fee simple absolute?

Answer: Yes. Section 732.401(2), Fla. Stat. provides that § 732.401(1), Fla. Stat. shall not apply to property that the decedent and spouse owned as tenants by the entirety.

Problem 5: John Doe, the owner of homestead property, died intestate, survived only by a nephew who lives out of state and who had very little, if any, contact with Mr. Doe. Can the personal representative of John Doe's estate sell the homestead property?

Answer: No.

Authorities & References: Art. X, § 4(b), FLA. CONST. (1968); §§ 732.401, .4015; §§ 731.27, .23, Fla. Stat. (1973); 1A BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 21.24 (2007); FUND TN 2.06.01, 2.06.02.

Comment: Article X, section 5 of the 1968 Florida Constitution states in part: "There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal . . . ." On or after January 1, 1976, this provision is incorporated in § 732.401, Fla. Stat. and § 732.4015, Fla. Stat. which reads "spouse" instead of "widow." The constitutional provision should be considered whenever dealing with pre-1976 descent of homestead.

A personal representative of an intestate decedent's estate cannot sell the decedent's homestead property if the decedent was survived by one or more heirs at law. *See* §§ 733.607(1), .608(1), Fla. Stat. Title to the homestead property vests at the decedent's death in the heirs at law. *See* §§ 732.101(2), .103 (class of heirs at law). *See also* *Traeger v. Credit First N.A.* and *Moss v. Estate of Moss* cited in the Comments section of Standard 18.10, Title Standard 18.8 (Devise Of Homestead Property On Or After January 7, 1969), and Title Standard 18.10 (Sale of Devised Homestead by Personal Representative).

STANDARD 18.9

HOMESTEAD — JURISDICTION OF COUNTY JUDGE

[Title Standard deleted. See archived version for text.]

STANDARD 18.10

SALE OF DEVISED HOMESTEAD BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

**STANDARD: PROVIDED A TESTATE DECEDENT IS NOT SURVIVED BY A SPOUSE OR A MINOR CHILD, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE MAY CONVEY HOMESTEAD PROPERTY PURSUANT TO: (a) A SPECIFIC DIRECTION IN THE WILL TO SELL THE HOMESTEAD; OR (b) A GENERAL POWER OF SALE IN THE WILL OR A RECORDED COURT ORDER IF THE DEVISEES ARE NOT WITHIN THE CLASS OF HEIRS LISTED IN. § 732.103, Fla. Stat.**

Problem 1: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His residence was specifically devised to a non-profit charitable corporation. The will contains full powers of sale. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His residence was not specifically devised in the will, and the residuary beneficiaries were three non-profit charitable corporations. The will contains full powers of sale. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His residence was specifically devised to one of the children. The will contains full powers of sale. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: No.

Problem 4: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His residence was not specifically devised in the will, and his children are the residuary beneficiaries. The will contains full powers of sale. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: No.

Problem 5: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His will directs his residence to be sold with the proceeds to be distributed to his children. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 6: John Doe died testate survived only by three adult children. His residence was not specifically devised in the will, and his children and two non-profit corporations are the residuary beneficiaries. The will contains full powers of sale. May the personal representative convey the property?

Answer: No, as to the interest of the children.

Authorities &  
References:

Art. X § 4(b), FLA. CONST. (constitutional homestead exemptions inure to surviving spouse and heirs); Art. X § 4(c), FLA. CONST. (homestead not subject to devise if there is a surviving spouse or minor child, except the homestead may be devised to the owner's spouse if there be no minor child); § 732.103, Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining the class of heirs); § 733.607, Fla. Stat. (2008) (“Except as otherwise provided by a decedent’s will, every personal representative has a right to, and shall take possession or control of, the decedent’s property, except the protected homestead”); *McKean v. Warburton*, 919 So. 2d 341, 347 (Fla. 2005) (“where a decedent is not survived by a spouse or minor children, the decedent’s homestead property passes to the residuary devisees, not the general devisees, unless there is a specific testamentary disposition ordering the property to be sold and the proceeds made a part of the general estate.”); *Snyder v. Davis*, 699 So. 2d 999, 1005 (Fla. 1997) (homestead protection from forced sale applies to any family member within the class of persons categorized in § 732.103, Fla. Stat.); *City National Bank of Florida v. Tescher*, 578 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1991) (no restriction on devising homestead property where no surviving minor child and surviving spouse waives homestead rights); *Cutler v. Cutler*, 994 So. 2d 341, 345 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that a direction in the will that claims of the estate be paid out of homestead is the equivalent of specific order to sell the homestead); *Harrell v. Snyder*, 913 So. 2d 749, 753 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“homestead does not become a part of the probate estate unless a testamentary disposition is permitted and is made to someone other than an heir, i.e., a person to whom the benefit of homestead protection could not inure”); *Traeger v. Credit First N.A.*, 864 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that it does not matter that a devisee is not the closest heir under the intestacy statute as the homestead protection applies to all members within the class of heirs); *In re Estate of Hamel*, 821 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that “the best, and perhaps the only, recognized exception to the general rule [that homestead property, whether devised or not, passes outside of the probate estate] occurs when the will specifically orders that the property be sold and the proceeds be divided among the heirs.”); *Moss v. Estate of Moss*, 777 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (homestead protection inures to heirs of decedent’s predeceased spouse); *Knadle v. Estate of Knadel*, 686 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (where will directs sale of homestead for distribution to residuary devisees, proceeds become asset of estate subject to creditor claims); *Clifton v. Clifton*, 553 So. 2d 192, 194 n. 3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (“[h]omestead property, whether devised or not, passes outside of the probate estate. Personal representatives have no jurisdiction over nor title to homestead, and it is not an asset of the testatory estate. . . . It is only when the testator specifies in the will that the homestead is to be sold and the proceeds to be divided that the homestead loses its “protected” status”); *Estate of Price v. West Fla. Hospital, Inc.*, 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (where will directs sale of homestead with no intent to reinvest the proceeds, the proceeds become asset of estate subject to creditor claims).

Comments:

This Standard and the problems hereunder assume a duly appointed personal representative and a will admitted to probate in a Florida proceeding. See generally, Title Standard 5.2.

Homestead property passes outside of the estate and the personal representative lacks authority to convey such property unless (i) the testator is not survived by a spouse or minor child and (ii) the will expresses the testator’s intention that the property lose its homestead character by (a) devising it to someone not within the class of heirs or (b) by specifically directing the personal representative to sell the homestead.

The Constitutional homestead provision “is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining the homestead property.” *Snyder v. Davis*, 699 So. 2d 999, 1002 (Fla. 1997).

It is a common misconception that the absence of an order determining homestead indicates that the property is not “protected homestead.” In fact, property which qualifies as protected homestead constitutes protected homestead, even if no order to that effect has been entered.

The practitioner should record proof that the property was not devised to a person within the class of heirs in § 732.103, Fla. Stat. Proof that the decedent was not survived by a spouse or minor child may be by an affidavit of a knowledgeable person. Proof that the devisee of the homestead property is not an heir of the decedent within the class of heirs set forth in § 732.103, Fla. Stat. may likewise be by affidavit of a knowledgeable person.

CHAPTER 20

MARITAL PROPERTY

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STANDARD 20.1

RECITAL OF UNMARRIED STATUS

**STANDARD: THE RECITAL IN AN INSTRUMENT OF RECORD THAT A PERSON IS UNMARRIED MAY BE RELIED UPON IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE IN THE CHAIN OF TITLE OR OTHER KNOWN FACTS INDICATING THAT THE PERSON WAS MARRIED.**

Problem 1: John Doe conveyed Blackacre by a deed that recited that he was a single man. Nothing of record indicates that Doe was married prior to the recording of the deed. Is an examiner justified in relying on the recital of marital status?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 2: John Doe, the sole owner of Blackacre, conveyed it, describing himself as a single man. Several years previously, John Doe and Mary Doe, his wife, had joined in a mortgage of Blackacre. Nothing of record shows the termination of the marital status. Is an examiner justified in assuming that the grantee takes free of any possible homestead rights?

Answer: No. An examiner should require satisfactory record evidence of elimination of any possible homestead rights.

Authorities & References: FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY TITLE EXAMINATION AND INSURANCE § 3.57 (Fla. Bar CLE 6th ed. 2010); FUND TN 20.02.03, 20.02.05.

Comment: Although the recital of marital status may be binding as to the grantor or mortgagor, it does not eliminate the rights of one who is not a party. However, the improbability of outstanding interests that are not indicated by the chain of title justifies reliance. Any contrary facts coming to the examiner's attention, although not in the chain of title, cannot be ignored.

A recital that a person is unmarried may include a reference to the person being single, a widow or widower. However, a designation as widow or widower of a particular spouse does not necessarily indicate current marital status. *See* FUND TN 20.02.03.

TITLE STANDARDS 20.2 – 20.10

[Title Standards deleted. See archived version for text.]



CHAPTER 21

DESCRIPTIONS

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STANDARD 21.1

TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

**STANDARD: IF THE DESCRIPTION OF LAND CONVEYED IN A DEED IS SUCH THAT A SURVEYOR, BY APPLYING THE RULES OF SURVEYING, CAN LOCATE THE SAME, SUCH DESCRIPTION IS SUFFICIENT, AND THE DEED WILL BE SUSTAINED IF IT IS POSSIBLE FROM THE WHOLE DESCRIPTION TO ASCERTAIN AND IDENTIFY THE LAND INTENDED TO BE CONVEYED.**

Problem 1: The lots in Block 5 of Country Club Estates are numbered consecutively, except for one unnumbered tract lying between Lots 5 and 8 and the plat of the subdivision shows no lots numbered 6 and 7. The original subdivider purported to convey Lot 6, Block 5, Country Club Estates to Richard Roe. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: No.

Problem 2: Same facts as above except that the original subdivider attempted to convey Lot 6, Block 5, Country Club Estates to Richard Roe by a metes and bounds description. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes.

Problem 3: Title to Blackacre was conveyed to Roe by a deed in which the last call in the metes and bounds legal description read "continue 160 feet to the "point of beginning." The actual distance for the call pursuant to a survey of the property is 200 feet to the point of beginning. Is Roe's title marketable?

Answer: Yes. A surveying rule of construction as well as Florida case law establishes that in locating parcels of land, natural or artificial monuments control over courses and distances. Accordingly, errors in courses or distances in calls that run to a fixed point may be ignored. See *Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Westone*, 222 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1969) and *Bridges v. Thomas*, 118 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960).

Authorities & References: *Maynard v. Miller*, 132 Fla. 269, 182 So. 220 (1938); *Burns v. Campbell*, 131 Fla. 630, 180 So. 46 (1938); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 128 (2011); FUND TN 13.03.09.

Comment: The standard uses the example of a deed, but the principle applies to any instrument containing a legal description.

STANDARD 21.2

DESIGNATION OF COUNTY IN METES  
AND BOUNDS DESCRIPTIONS

**STANDARD: A DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS BEING IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA AND BY METES AND BOUNDS IN A STATED SECTION, TOWNSHIP, AND RANGE WITHOUT ANY COUNTY DESIGNATION IS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE.**

**Problem:** John Doe conveyed Blackacre which he owned, describing it as being in the State of Florida and by metes and bounds in Section 12, Township 5 N, Range 29 W. No county was designated in the deed. Is a corrective deed showing the county in which the land lies necessary?

**Answer:** No. Since the section, township and range are definitely given as a part of the description, the location can be ascertained without question as to the county in which the land lies.

**Authorities & References:** *Miller v. Griffin*, 99 Fla. 976, 128 So. 416 (1930); *Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co.*, 53 Fla. 1090, 43 So. 919 (1907); *Peacock v. Feaster*, 52 Fla. 565, 42 So. 889 (1906); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 129 (2011); FUND TN 13.03.03.

STANDARD 21.3

CONVEYANCE DESCRIBED ONLY BY REFERENCE  
TO PREVIOUS RECORDED DOCUMENT

**STANDARD: A CONVEYANCE WHICH DESCRIBES THE LAND ONLY BY A REFERENCE TO A PREVIOUSLY RECORDED INSTRUMENT, WITHOUT RECITING THE DESCRIPTION SET FORTH IN THE PREVIOUS INSTRUMENT, IS VALID, EVEN THOUGH THE TITLE EXAMINER MUST GO TO ANOTHER INSTRUMENT TO IDENTIFY THE PROPERTY CONVEYED.**

**Problem:** A recorded conveyance from John Doe to Richard Roe contains the description, "All of the property conveyed to me in that certain deed from Simon Grant recorded in Official Records Book 47392, Page 798, of the Official Records of Broward County, Florida." The deed from Simon Grant conveyed the South 1/2 of the West 1/2 of Sec. 33, Township 48 South, Range 42 East. Is the description in the conveyance to Richard Roe sufficient?

**Answer:** Yes.

**Authorities & References:** *Gradolph v. Ricou*, 104 Fla. 237, 139 So. 579 (1932); *Hutchinson Island Realty, Inc. v. Babcock Ventures, Inc.*, 867 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 137 (2011); FUND TN 13.03.04.

**Comment:** It is preferable and the better practice generally to have the complete description, including any exception, set out in the one instrument, but such a description as noted above is sufficient to allow positive identification of the property intended to be conveyed.

The standard uses the example of a deed, but the principle applies to any instrument containing a legal description.

STANDARD 21.4

CONFLICT BETWEEN SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION AND  
STATEMENT OF ACREAGE

**STANDARD: IF A DEED CONTAINS A SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY SUCH AS BY GOVERNMENT SURVEY, METES AND BOUNDS, OR REFERENCE TO A PLAT, TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT OF THE ACREAGE, THE SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION PREVAILS OVER THE STATEMENT OF ACREAGE, UNLESS AN INTENT TO CONVEY A CERTAIN QUANTITY IS CLEARLY STATED.**

**Problem:** A recorded conveyance from John Doe to Richard Roe contains a description by metes and bounds, in a certain Section, Township, Range and County, followed by the words “the same being 33 acres, more or less.” A surveyor employed by Roe in anticipation of a subsequent conveyance determines that, in fact, the property described within the stated bounds contains 37 acres. Is a corrective deed necessary to enable Roe to pass marketable title to the described tract including the excess acreage?

**Answer:** No.

**Authorizes & References:** *Jackson v. Magbee*, 21 Fla. 622 (1885); *Benecke v. U.S.*, 356 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1966); *U.S. v. 329.22 Acres of Land*, 307 F.Supp. 34 (M.D. Fla. 1968), *aff'd* 418 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1969); 19 Fla. Jur. 2d *Deeds* § 143 (2011).

**Comment:** The standard applies only to a deed with a specific description accompanied by a statement of acreage. Where the deed indicates an intention to convey a specific number of acres, but the specific description does not coincide with this intention, or where the intention of the parties is in doubt, the standard is not applicable.

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